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Abstract  
The thesis analyses the phenomenon of party-based Euroscepticism with specific 
reference to radical right parties. It provides a bridge between the literatures on party 
behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. Challenging the notion 
that parties belonging to the same party family display similar positions on European 
integration, it argues that radical right parties do not adopt a uniform EU stance. By 
putting forward a typology of radical right Euroscepticism, the thesis establishes that 
radical right European positions differ in terms of content, strength and motivation.  
In explaining this divergence, the thesis adopts a framework of party strategic behaviour 
and argues that party positions on Europe are related to the endogeneity of the party 
system and the dynamics of inter party competition. In particular, the thesis shows that a 
radical right party’s position on European integration as well as the way in which it 
accommodates the European issue in its discourse is a function of the party’s wider 
agenda in the national party system. The latter is developed with reference to (1) party 
type and (2) its predominant aims and objectives at the domestic level. The thesis 
demonstrates that the European issue is integral to the radical right’s discursive toolkit 
but the ways in which the party chooses to debate the issue and/or politicise it largely 
depend on the national context.  
This thesis employs a nested research design as a mixed methods strategy joining the 
study of the wider universe of European radical right parties with intensive case study 
qualitative analysis. It commences with an overview of the general patterns and 
dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism both across Europe and within the political 
arenas where the three party case studies operate. It proceeds by providing an in depth 
study of three radical right parties during the period 1999-2009, including the French 
National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance.  
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Chapter 1 Euroscepticism and the radical Right: domestic strategies and party 
system dynamics 
 
 
Political developments in Europe during the past twenty years have led to an increased 
academic interest in radical right parties as well as the study of Euroscepticism. This 
thesis aims to provide a bridge between the literature on party behaviour, radical right 
parties and the study of Euroscepticism. It argues that radical right parties do not adopt a 
uniform stance on European integration and establishes that their Euroscepticism differs 
in terms of content, strength and motivation. In order to demonstrate this varying 
response to European integration, the thesis employs a mixed-methods approach. It 
begins with an analysis of the general patterns and dynamics of radical right 
Euroscepticism across Europe and proceeds by providing a detailed analysis of three 
radical right parties during the period 1999-2009.  
In explaining this divergence in terms of European Union (EU) attitudes, the thesis 
adopts a framework of party strategic behaviour and argues that the manner in which 
parties respond to the EU is conditional upon the dynamics of party competition and the 
parties’ wider agenda in their national party system. The main findings of the thesis are 
(1) radical right parties do not oppose European integration to the same extent and (2) 
the issue of Europe is integral to the party type to which they belong and their political 
strategies at the domestic level. 
1.1 The research agenda and puzzle  
Since the 1950s the process of political and economic integration at the European level 
has required ceding a high degree of national sovereignty to supranational institutions. 
Despite the ‘permissive consensus’ thesis whereby political elites would freely set 
European policies (Inglehart 1970; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970), this political drive 
towards supranationalism has never been straightforward. Political reaction to the 
European project has in fact been initially elite-based and has been observed as early as 
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1965 with the so-called empty chair crisis triggered by General De Gaulle in France. 
Later, Margaret Thatcher’s tough negotiation policy during the run up to the signing of 
the Single European Act in the mid-late 1980s revealed a high degree of scepticism 
towards the European project. In these two cases maintaining a hard stance on Europe 
served the purpose of preserving and accommodating French and British national 
interests at the time. Elite and party-based opposition has significantly increased since 
the early 1990s in the wake of the process of ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. With 
the Treaty establishing the EU (TEU), the European political elites openly demonstrated 
for the first time their desire to transfer competences from the national to the European 
level in not only market-related policies, but also policies traditionally considered to 
belong to the realm of national politics, including among others foreign policy and the 
currency. This process of integrating Europe, accelerated at Maastricht and continuing 
ever since, has produced growing opposition, which has taken various forms and at 
times halted or delayed the project of a united Europe.  
Given that this opposition has been an ever increasing phenomenon during the last 
twenty years culminating in the recent political controversies over the European 
Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty, trying to understand contemporary European 
politics without understanding the dynamics of the process of opposition to integration 
is a futile exercise. The French and Dutch voter rejection of the project for a European 
Constitution in 2005, the negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2008 and the increasing presence of parties with a Eurosceptic agenda in both 
national Parliaments and the European Parliament (EP) reveal that Euroscepticism, far 
from being an ephemeral and marginal phenomenon, it has become an integral and 
structural part of the European integration process.  
Consequently, the study of negative party positions on European integration has gained 
great prevalence in academic research informing an expanding literature since the late 
1990s. Euroscepticism is understood as being a form of opposition to European 
integration, currently epitomised by the political system of the EU 1 , which is not 
confined to particular value and belief systems, but on the contrary has been expressed 
                                                
1 Note that the terms EU and European integration are used interchangeably throughout the 
thesis. 
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by parties belonging to various party families. Opposition has been diverse in its origin 
since a variety of political parties have strongly expressed their dissent coming from a 
range of ideological backgrounds and national contexts. Parties from both Western and 
Eastern Europe have expressed their disagreement with aspects of European integration. 
In the 1980s, reservation about the European project was mostly articulated by Socialist 
parties (Featherstone 1988) whereas from the end of the 1990s onwards opposition is 
expressed by communist, radical left and radical right parties as well as some 
conservative, and at times green parties. Single issue anti-EU parties and movements 
have also been observed. Although empirically most parties expressing strong anti-
European feelings tend to be of small size and situated in the periphery of their party 
system, including among others the Greek Communist party or the French National 
Front; some of them are larger and mainstream parties having participated in their 
national coalitions/governments, such as the British Conservatives. Given this diverse 
expression of Euroscepticism, the question of how political parties position themselves 
on the issue of European integration and why this differs among parties, is central to the 
discipline of political science and the field of European Studies.  
In explaining party divergent positions on European integration the debate in the 
literature has been predominately structured in terms of party level and national level 
explanations. In particular, parties oppose Europe because of party-specific 
characteristics, which constitute their ideological profile and are antithetical to what 
Europe stands for. At the same time, parties operate in their national political system, 
which also influences their standpoints on particular policies, including their policy on 
Europe. These nation-specific elements include among others the electoral system, the 
configuration of the party system, probabilities to access office, and positions of major 
potential allies or competitors. These explanations are not posited to be necessarily 
antithetical as many cases have demonstrated that the two arguments can be at best 
complementary or at worst difficult to disentangle.  
The argument runs as follows: on the one hand, party families whose aggregate 
ideological values are closer to the centre of the left-right axis of political contestation, 
for instance the mainstream Socialist and Conservative/Christian Democrat party 
families, are less likely to be Eurosceptic because of their centrist ideological character 
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also reflected in the current political balance within the EU. Moreover, parties belonging 
to the above party families are usually mainstream with increased interest in gaining 
office. Thus increasing their likelihood to be part of a government motivates them to 
avoid contestation over European integration and consequently renders them less likely 
to adopt a strong Eurosceptic stance and rhetoric. On the other hand, when it comes to 
extremist (left or right) party families the literature has identified similar explanations of 
their Euroscepticism. These parties are Eurosceptic because they are situated at the 
ideological extremes of the left-right axis of political competition. Their value systems 
are antithetical to what the political system of the EU represents, the latter  being a 
careful compromise between the centrist Socialist and Christian Democratic parties. 
Additionally, these parties are located in the periphery of their domestic party systems 
and are much more likely to increase their vote intake from emphasising strong 
oppositional positions. This provides them with increased incentives to politicise the 
issue of European integration and are thus more likely to be Eurosceptic. This is what 
Sitter has called the ‘politics of opposition’ (2001).  
Although the literature has not been conclusive on the question of why parties oppose 
integration to differing extents, empirical studies have pointed to the fact that the 
strongest Eurosceptic feelings are located mainly within the radical right and radical left 
(Taggart 1998; Hix 1999; Marks and Wilson 2000; Marks and Steenbergen 2004). 
However, the main focus of the literature has been thus far to analyse different positions 
among party families largely disregarding the analysis of different European positions 
within party families. This is true with the considerable exception of a volume on 
variation among socialist parties (Featherstone 1988), two journal articles on agrarian 
and communist parties (Batory and Sitter 2004; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007) and a 
Conference paper on the conservatives (Flood, Soborski et al. 2007) which display the 
beginning of an academic interest.  
In particular, the positions of parties belonging to the radical right party family have 
been considerably under-researched. This is partly because radical right parties are 
viewed as strong advocates of negative positions on European integration. The 
underlying assumption in the literature would suggest that, by virtue of belonging to the 
same party family, these parties display similar levels of Euroscepticism and in most 
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cases project a ‘principled’ Euroscepticism utterly rejecting the process of European 
integration. Indeed, Hainsworth argues that ‘[these parties] are well placed to act as the 
voice of popular opposition and protest against developments declared to be anti-
national’(Hainsworth 2008: 85). Radical right parties either because of their extremist 
ideology (Marks and Wilson 2000; Hooghe, Marks et al. 2004) or because of their 
marginal position in their domestic party system (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001) have 
increased incentives to oppose Europe.  
Frieschi suggested as early as 2000 that ‘the strident anti-Europeanism of the French 
National Front […] contrasts sharply with the pro-European stance of the Italian 
National Alliance’ in the EP (2000: 518). However, it is only very recently that scholars 
have identified that behind this seemingly uniform stance hides a vast array of party 
response to Europe which has also varied over time (Mudde 2007; Hainsworth 2008). 
This can also be verified by the latest 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey on party positions 
(Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) where radical right parties exhibit varying scores on the 
question of their overall EU position. In a scale structured from one to seven, where one 
indicates a strongly opposing position and seven a strongly favourable position, radical 
right parties range from a strongly opposing ‘one’ for the French National Front to a 
comparatively favourable approach of the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom, which 
scores 4.75. Indeed, an in-depth research of radical right parties’ EU positions indicates 
that they do not display a homogenous stance on European integration. Indicatively, the 
French National Front utterly rejects the EU project whereas the Greek Popular 
Orthodox Rally accepts the need for European cooperation at a higher multilateral level. 
The Italian National Alliance is contrasted with the above two cases as it largely accepts 
the process of European integration and seeks to maintain and promote Italian national 
interest within the EU institutional framework.  
Although the above indicate that parties belonging to the radical right  party family 
display dissimilar positions on European integration, the issue of radical right EU 
attitudes remains under researched in terms of content as well as underlying 
argumentation. Seeking to build on the above-mentioned literature and to contribute 
towards an improved understanding of radical right stance towards European 
integration, this research is informed by three interrelated questions.  
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1 How can we conceptualise the nature of radical right positions on the EU?  
2 How do radical right parties respond to the issue of European integration? 
3 Why do radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents?  
 
In answering the above research questions, the thesis aims to explore the wider 
preoccupation of why political parties belonging to the same party family display 
dissimilar positions on European integration and under which conditions is a party more 
or less likely to adopt a Eurosceptic position. In this type of research framework, 
different European positions constitute the dependent variable of the thesis.  
1.2 The Argument and theoretical approach    
In answering the first and second research questions, the thesis argues that the nature of 
radical right Euroscepticism can be conceptualised based on four indicators, including 
the definition of Europe, the principle, the practice and the future of European 
integration. Based on these indicators, derived from the current literature on 
Euroscepticism, Mair’s (2007) distinction between the policy and polity aspect of the 
EU and an attentive reading of the Treaties establishing the EU, the thesis suggests that 
radical right parties may be broadly categorised into three patterns of opposition to 
European integration. These include the ‘rejectionist’, the ‘conditional’ and the 
‘compromising’ patterns (for a detailed analysis, see Chapter 3).  
The thesis answers the third research question, namely ‘why do radical right parties 
oppose Europe to differing extents?’ taking a party strategic behaviour approach. It 
argues that the way in which radical right parties respond to the issue of European 
integration is conditional upon the dynamics of party competition and the parties’ wider 
agenda in their national party system. Different levels of Euroscepticism as well as the 
dissimilar ways in which parties accommodate the issue of European integration into 
domestic party politics across Europe is a function of their primary aims and objectives 
in the national arena. Party type constitutes the main independent variable of the thesis 
as it explains different radical right party positions on European integration.  
 22
Hooghe, Marks & Wilson (2004: 125) suggest that ‘the Euroscepticism of extreme 
parties arise […] not only from their opposition to the EU’s policies, but also because 
they reject the ideology of the EU’s construction’. Radical right Euroscepticism is 
strongly linked to opposition to immigration, the defence of the national community and 
culture against foreigners (Hooghe, Marks et al. 2004: 134). These parties ‘tend to see 
European integration as an encroaching, bureaucratic and elitist phenomenon. 
Accordingly, it serves to undermine constructs and values, such as the nation-state, 
national identity, state sovereignty, deeply embedded roots and national belonging.’ 
(Hainsworth 2008: 82). Radical right parties express a sovereignty-focused discourse 
and as such relinquishing sovereignty to a supra-national institution denies the very 
premise of their ideology. According to this school of thought, ideology becomes the 
prime determinant shaping a party’s position on Europe.  
While agreeing with this proposition, the thesis argues that party programmatic factors 
have significant explanatory value only when analysing broader trends of party positions 
on European integration. When examining qualitative differences within party families, 
the explanatory value of this approach diminishes not least because in theory this 
approach does not expect to find dissimilar European positions within party families. 
Also, Euroscepticism being a quite versatile and multi-faceted phenomenon, may be 
expressed in a different manner across European countries. This is especially pertinent 
to radical right parties as their nationalist ideology draws its resources from the national 
context more than any other party family. The importance of the national political 
setting and how a party chooses to behave within its confines becomes important in 
analysing this party family’s European position. In this sense, the thesis builds on 
previous work by scholars including Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008a; 2008b) who point 
to the importance of the national context as well as Sitter (2001; 2003) who suggests 
that party strategies should be given credit when analysing how the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism is expressed across Europe. The novelty of the thesis’ approach lies in 
systematising the relation between party behaviour and a party’s EU stance. 
Additionally, it introduces ‘party type’, thus far absent from the literature, as an 
independent variable in the analysis.  The classification of a party into a ‘type’ depends 
on the latter’s relationship with civil society and the state (Katz and Mair 1995) and 
includes the mass party, the anti-system party, the catch-all party and the cartel party. It 
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differs from the notion of party family which refers to a party’s origins and sociology, 
transnational links, policy and ideology (Mair and Mudde 1998).  
In particular, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2008d: 255) have argued that ‘the question of 
how a party determines its underlying position on the European issue is often different 
from how that issue has been accommodated into […] party politics’. The authors 
suggest that in fact there has been a conflation of ‘Euroscepticism as (a) a broad, 
underlying position and (b) whether or not (and how) parties use the European issue […] 
as an element of inter-party competition’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008d: 255).  
Building on this, and considering the importance of the ‘party type’ variable in the 
analysis, the thesis argues that  
1. Party type and aims/objectives resulting from this determine specific party 
positions on Europe. 
2. The national context becomes influential with regards to how the party chooses 
to debate and/or politicise the European issue at the domestic level. 
Based on the above propositions, the thesis contends that the dynamics of party 
competition in national party systems have significant explanatory value in 
understanding the phenomenon of Euroscepticism within the radical right party family. 
A radical right party’s position on European integration as well as the way the party will 
accommodate the European issue in its discourse is a function of the party’s wider 
agenda in the national party system. The latter is developed with reference to (1) party 
type and, resulting from this, (2) its predominant aim and objectives in the party system. 
As such radical right Euroscepticism is not only conditional upon a party’s deeply-
entrenched ideological premises but on a number of other factors (see figure 1.1 below).  
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Figure 1.1 The argument in a nutshell  
 
Radical right party type 
 
  
 
Predominant party goal 
at the domestic level 
 
 
 
 
Discursive strategy     Position on the EU 
towards the European 
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The thesis argues that parties belonging to the radical right party family display 
characteristics of different party types, including protest/anti-system, catch-all and 
cartel. This in turn leads them to put forward different aims and objectives within their 
respective party system as well as develop dissimilar strategies. Parties have in their 
toolkit a series of different strategies and tactics. According to models of competitive 
party behaviour, parties have at their disposal three main strategies. They pursue policy, 
votes and office (Strom 1990). However, at given points in time they may prioritise one 
strategy over the other. Which strategy they will prioritise largely depends on which 
predominant party type characteristics they may feature. This impacts upon any decision 
they make at the domestic level, including their discursive strategy towards the 
European issue as well as their overall EU stance. A party’s position on European 
integration may be strategically employed at the domestic level for party political 
purposes. 
In particular, the thesis argues that protest anti-system radical right parties are associated 
with the ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptic pattern. Rejecting European integration and adopting 
an adversarial strategy towards the European issue become a tool for differentiation 
from the other parties in the national political context towards the ultimate goal of 
polarising the debate and attracting a significant segment of the society sympathising 
with this type of non-conformist views.  
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The adoption of a ‘conditional’ European position is associated with catch-all radical 
right parties. Although they oppose Europe, these parties avoid radicalising their 
discourse and seek to accommodate the European issue within debates that they perceive 
to be close to the median voter. The European issue becomes a vote-maximisation tool.  
Cartel radical right parties adopt a ‘compromising’ position on Europe. Although they 
are sceptical towards a number of EU initiatives and practices, they downplay their 
criticisms with a view to decreasing the salience of, and avoiding contestation on, the 
European issue. They dismiss the importance of contesting the European issue at the 
domestic level using Europe as a tool for the party’s governmental entrenchment and a 
potential leading role within it (see table 1.1. and figure 1.2 below). Note that the word 
‘dismissive’ is employed here in the sense used by Meguid (2008), namely avoiding 
taking an open and clear position on the European issue with a view to reducing its 
salience (for a detailed analysis see Chapter 2). 
Table 1.1 The Argument in detail 
Radical right 
party type  
Predominant  
party goal 
Discursive 
strategy 
towards the 
European issue 
Position on the 
EU 
Anti-system   Policy / Issue Adversarial Rejectionist 
Catch-all Votes  Accommodative Conditional  
Cartel Office  Dismissive Compromising  
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Figure 1.2 The Argument ‘unpacked’   
Anti-system party       Catch-all party Cartel party 
 
 
Issue-based politics         Vote-seeking    office-seeking   
 
 
       adversarial         accommodative                          dismissive 
discursive strategy       discursive strategy                  discursive strategy 
 
 
rejectionist EU position  conditional EU position           compromising EU position 
  
In accordance with proposition two above, the importance of the national context 
becomes significant with regards to how a party chooses to debate and/or politicise the 
European issue at the domestic level. Radical right parties tend to associate the issue of 
Europe with other issues that they find are of domestic relevance. The three case studies 
of the thesis (discussed below) show that this argument becomes thus nation-specific 
and differs from one case to another.  
In particular, the French National Front associates the European issue with that of 
globalisation as it views European integration as a project of regional globalisation and 
largely as an accomplice to the negative effects of globalisation on the nation-state. The 
Greek Popular Orthodox Rally connects the issue of Europe to broader themes of Greek 
security policy criticising the EU and the other Greek national parties for not 
‘uploading’ the Greek national interest with regards to foreign and security policies onto 
the European level. The Italian National Alliance associates the European project to a 
potential greater role for Italy on the international arena arguing that Italy should play a 
dynamic role in international relations through the EU.  
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1.3 Research design    
1.3.1 Methodology and case selection  
This thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach drawing on literature from the radical 
right, political behaviour and Euroscepticism. It employs a nested research design as a 
mixed methods strategy joining intensive case study analysis with large-N analysis 
(Lieberman 2005). The thesis combines the study of the wider universe of European 
radical right parties with a rigorous case study qualitative analysis in order to attain 
maximum analytical leverage. It employs the comparative method, and more 
specifically the method of difference as the cases under investigation exhibit variation in 
the dependent variable, namely dissimilar positions on European integration.  
In order to explain different levels of Euroscepticism within the European radical right 
party family, the thesis is divided into two sections. This is an integrated study with a 
view to having a holistic approach to answering the puzzle and improving the prospect 
of making valid inferences in both cross-national and case-study research. The first 
section of the thesis observes the general patterns of Euroscepticism within the radical 
right party family both across Europe and within the political arenas where the three 
case studies operate. It provides a broader analysis of radical right Euroscepticism 
studying twelve parties from ten EU member states. The study approximates the wider 
universe of cases and comprises nearly the totality of radical right parties included in 
both the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and comparative party manifesto studies. The 
second section proceeds with an investigation of three case studies of radical right 
Euroscepticism. Qualitative case study analysis is used in order to gain theoretical 
insights from particular cases, explore the dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism and 
capture the relationship between theory and facts in a largely narrative form (Lieberman 
2005: 436).  
In particular, the first section displays the ‘big picture’ of Euroscepticism in the 
European radical right. Based on a novel conceptualisation of Euroscepticism, it maps 
radical right party positions on European integration using national and European party 
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manifestos as the main primary source. This analysis provides the general framework of 
the thesis and guides the case selection for in-depth comparative research. Given that the 
number of cases is low, the thesis is unable to draw conclusions with any statistical 
relevance. It proceeds instead by providing a spatial representation of radical right 
Euroscepticism across Europe using data from both expert surveys on party positions 
and coded party manifesto data from the Euromanifesto’s project. The thesis also 
employs computerised content analysis (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003) in order to acquire 
systematic information on the forms of political competition and the policies of key 
parties in France, Greece and Italy locating the thesis’ case studies in their national 
political space. These findings are subsequently used in order to further analyse how the 
European issue is played out in each political system. 
The second section of the thesis provides an in-depth analysis of three radical right 
parties where there is a difference of degree in the dependent variable, namely levels of 
Euroscepticism. As a result, the thesis adopts the method of difference (Hancké 2009: 
73). That is, ‘by “controlling” for certain common features, […] the analyst can thereby 
exclude these factors from the analysis and focus upon those conditions that do vary 
systematically within the selected universe […]’ (Norris 2005: 36). The thesis contends 
that radical right parties draw upon broadly similar themes and ideas. The parties 
analysed here share a common origin, rooted in the defence of national interests and 
identity drawing mostly upon the nationalist political doctrine ‘that strives for the 
congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde 
2007:16). Although they cannot be considered identical in every respect, their ideology 
can be neatly summarized by three epithets: nationalism, authoritarianism and populism 
(Mudde 2007). Ideological differences among the parties are thought to be too small to 
account for different levels of Euroscepticism within this party family. As a result, 
levels of nationalism, authoritarianism and a degree of populist rhetoric are held largely 
constant throughout the thesis (for a detailed analysis see Chapter 2).  
The French National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National 
Alliance constitute the case studies of the thesis. These are three cases of radical right 
parties broadly sharing the above ideological characteristics but displaying strong 
variation in the dependent variable, i.e. levels of Euroscepticism (see Chapter 3). The 
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French National Front belongs to the ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptic pattern, the Popular 
Orthodox Rally displays a ‘conditional’ type of Euroscepticism and the Italian National 
Alliance has adopted a ‘compromising’ stance on Europe.  
It is worth mentioning that the National Alliance was disbanded in 2008 during the 
writing of the PhD thesis following a Berlusconi-Fini agreement to join under the 
banner People of Freedom. In 2010, Fini left the joint party with Berlusconi but a 
significant part of the National Alliance has remained inside the People of Freedom. 
During the past few years, the Italian party moved towards a more conservative outlook. 
While agreeing with the conclusions in the literature, the thesis adopts Mair and 
Mudde’s (1998) argument that party identity and goals are contingent upon their origin 
and ideology. In this respect, it is indubitable that the National Alliance had its origins in 
right-wing radicalism since it was the offspring of the fascist Italian Social Movement. 
The value of this case lies in understanding whether and how a party’s move away from 
the party family may impact upon its European position providing an interesting contrast 
to the French and Greek cases.    
These three parties operate in political systems that are largely similar in terms of type 
of democracy they have adopted (Lijphart 1999). Although only France employs a 
clearly majoritarian electoral system in the form of a two-round system in both 
presidential and parliamentary elections, there is a majoritarian as opposed to consensual 
logic underlying the workings of all three political systems. In all three political 
systems, the dynamics of party competition are mostly bi-polar (either two-party or two-
block) rather than multi-polar. In particular, France is divided into two competing party 
blocs, although each bloc in turn is sub-divided into further fragments. The left and right 
are the main competitors within the political system although the National Front has 
become an important force during the 2000s (Grunberga and Schweisguth 2003; 
Bornschier and Lachat 2009). In Greece, the system has been characterised as polarised 
pluralism, either ‘limited’ (Mavrogordatos 1984) or ‘extreme’ (Seferiades 1986). It has 
evolved into a two-and-a-half party system where two major parties have been 
associated with the left and right respectively and an additional third small party has 
been associated with the radical left (Legg and Roberts 1997: 132). From mid-1990s 
onwards, Italy experienced a shift from consensual politics ‘towards strong political 
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leadership that has marked the evolution of the new bipolar party system’ (Fella 2006: 
13-14). Party polarisation into two main blocks is prominent in all three EU member 
states, namely polarised multi-partyism in France and Italy whereas polarised two-
partyism in Greece. Table 1.2 below summarises the similarities amongst the three case 
studies.  
 
Table 1.2 Comparability of the case selection   
 
 National Front Popular Orthodox 
Rally 
National Alliance 
Ideology  
(nationalism) 
National preference Ethnic homogeneity  Imperial 
Ideology  
(authoritarianism) 
High High High 
Ideology  
(populism) 
Strong Strong Contained 
National  
political system  
polarised  
multi-partyism 
polarised  
multi-partyism 
polarised  
two-partyism 
 
The thesis employs the most similar systems research design according to which similar 
cases display variation in the dependent variable. As shown above, the cases under 
investigation share common elements in terms of their ideology (detailed explanation 
provided in Chapter sections 5.1.1, 6.1.1 and 7.1.1 ‘What the party stands for’) as well 
as the political system within which they operate. As a result, party ideology and 
national political system are ‘controlled for’. The thesis adopts a party type-specific 
argument and independent variable, which varies across the cases (see table 1.1 above).  
1.3.2 Sources  
The thesis makes use of a variety of primary sources throughout. The first section is 
based upon the usage of party manifestos for both national and European elections. 
Manifestos are uniquely authoritative statements of narratives that express the collective 
beliefs of the party as a whole and exemplify the way in which the party chooses to 
portray itself externally. These documents are presented in official party platforms and 
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represent the official party line and the party united as a whole.  They ‘are a product of 
the party in central office; therefore the positions that are stated here should primarily be 
attributed to this face of party organisation’ (Conti 2010: 97). The study of party 
manifestos has great potential for estimating party policy positions. Although manifestos 
do not detect internal party dissent, they provide objective data (Marks, Hooghe et al. 
2007: 27) as they ‘chart the party’s position at each election on the basis of its own 
authoritative policy pronouncement’ (Budge 2002). They are the result of ‘complex 
debates and negotiations over the normative essence of a party, its strategies at any point 
in time and its definitions of friends and foes’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 183). Moreover, 
the first section employs data from both expert surveys and codified analysis of political 
text. In particular, the thesis employs data from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey on 
the Positioning of Political Parties (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) as well as data from the 
European Parliament Election Study (EES 2009). It has been a purposeful choice to 
combine data sources from both expert surveys and manifesto analysis given that 
‘Expert and manifesto data approach party positioning differently, and they have 
contrasting strengths and weaknesses’ (Marks, Hooghe et al. 2007: 26).  
The second section of the thesis uses election programmes, papers, declarations, internal 
press, leader writings and speeches as its primary sources. In addition to these sources 
and for triangulation purposes (Davies 2001; Hancké 2009), the author has conducted 
semi-structured elite interviews with politicians from the three party case studies 
between February 2009 and March 2010 (see Appendix X). Interviews have been 
selected as a tool in qualitative research in order to ‘assist the political scientist in 
understanding the theoretical position of the interviewee; his/her perceptions, beliefs and 
ideologies’ (Richards 1996: 199). They have increased the depth of information and 
provided valuable insights from ‘key’ politicians involved in each party. Very 
importantly, they have contributed towards a greater understanding of the underlying 
logic of each party’s choice on how to position itself on European integration. Following 
the semi-structured method, there was a clear list of issues to be discussed while at the 
same time the interviewer was flexible in terms of the sequence of questions asked as 
well as the topics considered in order to allow the interviewees to develop their own 
ideas and elaborate their points of interest.  
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In order to provide an additional cross-reference between interviews and party literature, 
the author has conducted qualitative content analysis of 1642 Member of European 
Parliament (MEP) speeches in Plenary during the 5th and 6th EP legislative terms. This 
analysis quantified the recurrent issues within each party’s MEP speeches. In particular, 
the author coded 1080 speeches of the French National Front MEPs (302 speeches 
during the 5th term and 778 speeches during the 6th term), 123 speeches of the Greek 
Popular Orthodox Rally’s MEPs (they only acquired EP representation during the 6th EP 
term), and a total of 439 speeches of the Italian National Alliance’s MEPs (196 during 
the 5th term and 297 during the 6th). The main method of content analysis used here is 
‘conventional’ whose ultimate aim lies in describing a phenomenon lacking a pre-
defined theory or expectation about the results (see Appendix III). This method does not 
impose pre-conceived categories and is rather directed towards ‘gaining direct 
information’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279). The aim was to use this method in order 
to observe the salient issues for each party as they are developed in their EP speeches 
and ultimately to assess the level of congruence between the attitudes of two faces of 
party organisation. That is whether the party in central office producing the party 
literature and the party in public office providing the speeches are united on the 
European issue both in terms of their overall position and their precise argumentation.  
1.3.3 Time frame 
The thesis has a largely contemporary focus. The 1999-2009 period has been chosen 
since during these years there has been extensive discussion over the ratification of the 
European Constitution which has aroused strong nationalist sentiments across Europe. 
The failed 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands are seen as ‘epitomizing a 
growing mood of scepticism about Europe that could be sensed more or less throughout 
the enlarged Union’ (Mair 2007: 1). The protracted ratification process of the Lisbon 
Treaty not only entails further restrictions on national autonomy over policy-making but 
is also considered to pose an increasing threat to national sovereignty.  
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1.4 Originality and contribution of the thesis   
This thesis aims to provide a bridge between the literatures on party behaviour, radical 
right parties and the study of Euroscepticism and contribute to the academic 
understanding of small party behaviour. It provides an input on the definition, 
measurement and causality of Euroscepticism (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a; 2008b). 
This is achieved through creating a novel typology of the phenomenon of 
Euroscepticism, through the in-depth analysis of the dynamics influencing party 
Eurosceptic attitudes in different party systems and through the novel empirical research 
of parties whose Euroscepticism has been largely under-researched.  
In particular, the contribution of the thesis is conceptual, theoretical, empirical and 
methodological. In answering the first research question, namely ‘how can we 
conceptualise the nature of radical right positions on the EU?’, the thesis critically 
evaluates the current definitions of Euroscepticism and adds to the academic 
understanding of the phenomenon by developing a new framework of Euroscepticism. 
This new typology intends to (1) improve the academic conceptualisation of the term, 
(2) contribute towards ‘measuring the dependent variable’ debate, and (3) identify 
divergent patterns of  European positions within the context of radical right parties.  
In tackling the second research question, namely ‘how do radical right parties respond to 
the issue of European integration?’, the thesis makes a significant empirical 
contribution. This thesis is, to the knowledge of the author, the first study qualitatively 
analysing radical right party positions on European integration in a sample that 
approximates to the wider universe of cases in Europe. It constitutes the first case study 
research systematising the analysis of the European positions of the French National 
Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance. In fact, this 
thesis represents the only account [written in English] of the Greek party’s profile, 
values, ideas and behaviour.  
In explaining ‘Why do radical right parties oppose Europe to differing extents?’ the 
thesis makes a significant theoretical contribution. It feeds into the wider literature on 
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contemporary comparative European politics and adopts an approach explicitly linking 
the literature on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. 
This represents a novel synthesis of the literature associating party type to radical right 
party positions on European integration. The thesis challenges assumptions made in the 
literature regarding the positions of ideologically similar political parties and argues that 
being ‘anti-system’, ‘catch-all’ or ‘cartel’ impacts upon a party’s discursive strategy 
toward the European issue as well as its overall EU stance.  
Lastly, the thesis makes a methodological contribution being a study of party positions 
on the EU adopting a mixed-methods approach. The thesis has combined qualitative 
with quantitative research; spatial analysis of party competition based on computerised 
content analysis with spatial analysis relying on expert surveys and party manifesto data; 
elite interviews and content analysis of MEP speeches.  
1.5 Outline of the thesis  
The thesis is divided into two sections. The first section discusses issues of theory, 
conceptualisation and measurement of Euroscepticism. It also provides a spatial 
representation of radical right EU positions across Europe, but also within the political 
systems where the thesis’ case studies operate. The second section examines in detail the 
three patterns of radical right Euroscepticism employing the case studies of the French 
National Front, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National Alliance for 
each pattern respectively.  
In particular, Chapter 2 discusses the core similarities of the parties under investigation 
demonstrating the comparability of the cases with regards to radical right deeply-held 
values and beliefs. It argues that the cases are comparable because they share broad 
ideological characteristics pertaining to this party family. It sets out the wider theoretical 
framework within which this thesis operates. Based on the literature on party types and 
party behaviour, the chapter identifies the relevant hypotheses which guide the thesis. 
The theoretical proposition of this chapter maintains that radical right parties may 
employ a number of strategies in their domestic party system. Their position on 
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European integration is a function of which party type they belong to and on their wider 
agenda in the national party system. 
Chapter 3 puts forward a novel conceptualisation of Euroscepticism suggesting that 
radical right parties may be categorised into three patterns of opposition towards 
European integration. These comprise the ‘rejectionist’, ‘conditional’ and 
‘compromising’ patterns of Euroscepticism and are identified through the careful 
examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European integration 
and the EU. These include a cultural definition of Europe, the principle of cooperation at 
a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire for building a future 
European polity. It proceeds by conducting qualitative analysis of party literature of 
twelve radical right parties from ten European countries adding empirical substance to 
the theoretical reasoning of the chapter. 
Chapter 4 analyses the general patterns and dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism in 
Europe. It employs data from two sources, namely the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey 
(Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) and the 2009 European Election Study (EES 2009). This is 
done in an exploratory manner in order to demonstrate how the phenomenon of radical 
right Euroscepticism manifests itself across Europe. The objective is to confirm that 
policy and ideology can be broadly kept similar among radical right parties but that their 
positions on European integration significantly diverge. It proceeds by using the tools of 
spatial analysis in order to provide a visual and spatial overview of the structure of 
electoral competition in France, Greece and Italy where the thesis’ case studies operate. 
Using computerised content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, 
the chapter presents the case studies’ positions in comparison to the rest of the party 
system. This helps generate expectations regarding the cases’ behaviour in the political 
system as well as the potential electorate they may appeal to.  
Chapter 5 analyses in detail the ‘rejectionist’ pattern of radical right Euroscepticism. 
Using the French National Front as its case study, it argues that the party’s extremist 
policy on European integration is integral to its overall political strategy in its national 
party system. The National Front is intrinsically an anti-system party whose main 
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political strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based drawing its 
electoral base from clearly-defined voters and its predominant goal is to claim 
ownership of specific policies or issues. The National Front uses its policy on European 
integration as a differentiation tool from the rest of the party system in order to polarise 
the political debate and appeal to a specific segment of the French electorate.  
Chapter 6 explores the ‘compromising’ pattern of radical right Euroscepticism. The case 
study of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally reveals that this Eurosceptic pattern is 
associated with vote-maximising party strategy. The party’s anti-European discourse is 
portrayed in a way that de-emphasises its radicalism. It focuses on issues which the 
party perceives as important to the general public so that it can portray itself as being 
close to the median voter. The Greek Popular Orthodox Rally has linked its European 
position to the issue of Greek security concerns portraying itself as occupying a unique 
niche in the Greek party system. 
Chapter 7 constitutes the final substantive chapter of the thesis. It examines the final 
pattern of radical right Euroscepticism, namely the ‘compromising’ type. The chapter 
employs the Italian National Alliance as its case study arguing that this is a case of a 
Eurosceptic party changing its European position over time for instrumental and tactical 
purposes as part of its wider modernisation process. In its quest for power, the party 
downplays the issue with a view to decreasing its salience and avoiding contestation on 
the matter. Since the party’s primary goal lies in becoming part of the governing cartel 
and a major player within it, it has increased incentives to adopt a conciliatory position 
on European integration. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism becomes a political tool for 
its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-
right leaders abroad.  
The concluding chapter 8 reviews the thesis’ main findings and places them in the larger 
context of the literature on party-based Euroscepticism. It explores the wider relevance 
of the thesis as well as the generalisability of the argument in examining different levels 
of Euroscepticism within other party families. It discusses the broader contribution of 
this research and points to directions for future research.  
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Part 1 Theory, Conceptualisation and Measurement 
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Chapter 2 Theorising Radical Right Euroscepticism 
 
Introduction  
The main research question posed in this thesis, namely ‘why do parties that belong to 
the same party family adopt dissimilar positions on European integration?’ feeds into the 
wider literature on the relationship between the dimensions of political contestation and 
party positions on European integration as well as the most specific literature on party-
based Euroscepticism. Although the literature has mainly focused on ‘party family’ 
rather than ‘within party family’ different levels of Euroscepticism, it is informative and 
provides the researcher with important guidelines as to how to approach this research 
question. However, before embarking in answering the question and laying out the 
guiding hypotheses of the thesis, one needs to substantiate the extent to which the 
parties under investigation are comparable. This is important given that the radical right 
party family classification is contested in the literature and does not provide clear and 
comprehensive indicators on the exact characteristics that constitute a radical right party. 
Having this in mind, this chapter is divided in three sections. It starts with explaining the 
core similarities of the parties under investigation demonstrating the comparability of 
the case studies. It continues by setting out the wider theoretical framework within 
which this thesis operates. Based on the literature, the chapter identifies the relevant 
hypotheses that guide the remainder of the thesis. It is argued that the cases under 
investigation are comparable because they share ideological characteristics pertaining to 
this party family. Since deeply entrenched ideological values and beliefs are set to be 
broadly similar among the case studies, the chapter turns to examine the explanatory 
value of other variables, including party type, party behaviour and short and long term 
political opportunities within the domestic party system.  
In a nutshell, this chapter argues that radical right parties may employ a number of 
strategies in their domestic party system. Their position on European integration is a 
function of which party ‘type’ they belong to, that is their relationship between civil 
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society and the state, and on their wider agenda in the national party system. This 
agenda depends on whether the party attaches more importance to policy, office or 
votes. Protest anti-system parties seek to differentiate themselves from the rest of the 
party system by showing distrust for the latter. As part of this wider agenda, they reject 
European integration aiming to appeal to a particular niche of the society. Radical right 
parties with catch-all elements adopt a conditional position on Europe. The selection of 
their anti-EU criticisms depends on what they perceive to be close to the median voter’s 
position. Their overall party strategy is geared towards vote-maximisation. Cartel radical 
right parties adopt a compromising position on Europe. They try to decrease the salience 
of the issue and avoid open contestation on the matter in order to increase their chances 
to participate in government.  
 
2.1 The Radical right party family   
In answering the research question, the thesis adopts the method of difference. Due to 
this research design choice, it is vital for the analysis to indicate the characteristics these 
parties share. This discussion is particularly relevant given that radical right parties 
largely draw characteristics from their national contexts, which naturally vary from one 
European country to another. This section of the chapter discusses the extent to which 
the parties under investigation are members of the same party family. Based on this 
analysis, radical right parties are classified as sharing broadly similar ideological 
features, including nationalism, authoritarianism and populism. This analysis has a two-
fold purpose. The identified characteristics define the group of parties under 
investigation and form the key similarities, which are held constant among the parties 
throughout the thesis. It is hence argued that these similarities cannot explain the degree 
of variation observed in the dependent variable, namely the different levels of 
Euroscepticism (to be discussed in detail in Chapter 3). Therefore other variables, which 
are dissimilar among the parties under investigation, must be treated as possible 
explanations, which will be discussed in sections two and three of the chapter.  
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2.1.1 The Issue of Terminology   
From the outset, it is important to note that there is a plethora of terms used for these 
parties. Authors have preferred using many epithets to differentiate groups within the 
political ‘right’. The most frequently employed are ‘extreme’ (Hainsworth 1992; 
Hainsworth 2000a; Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2000; Carter 2005) and ‘radical’  
(Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Norris 2005). Other scholars add the element of populism 
and talk about ‘neo populist’ parties (Taggart 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998) or about 
‘radical right-wing populism’ (Betz 1994; Mudde 2007). Other labels observed in the 
literature include ‘far right’, ‘national populist’, ‘neo-fascist’, ‘authoritarian’, not to 
mention but a few. Although these labels are generally defined in rather similar terms 
(Mudde 2000: 180), the thesis favours the term ‘radical right’. Radical right is seen to be 
anti-democratic and to share the nationalism of the extreme right, ‘without being totally 
hostile to liberal democracy’ (Hainsworth 2008: 8-9). Radical right parties –similarly to 
extreme right parties– espouse a narrow and largely ethnically based exclusionary 
representation of the nation, which is combined with an authoritarian political 
perspective. Unlike extreme right parties, however, they have ‘accepted’ to operate 
within a democratic political system. They are radical not in terms of being outside the 
existing political order but in terms of being radical within that order (Minkenberg 
1997). They do not openly oppose the values and practices of liberal democratic 
regimes, do not favour a totalitarian form of government nor embrace violence in their 
discourse.  
 
2.1.2 Classifying the radical right  
The literature has been highly inconclusive on which features constitute a radical right 
party, mainly providing shopping lists of attributes that can be as many as ten depending 
on the scholar (Ignazi 1997a; Hainsworth 2000a; Mudde 2000). Carter (2005: 15) 
suggests that whereas there are defining necessary features that constitute this party 
family, there are also some secondary characteristics, which may vary from one party to 
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another. This is partly due to the fact that the ideological legacies of radicalism and 
fascism differ from a country to another. Mair and Mudde (1998) have identified a 
number of approaches for the classification of political parties into party families. These 
include transnational federations, party name, origins and sociology and policy and 
ideology. For classifying radical right parties, Ignazi (2003) has also included the 
element of their spatial location on the left-right axis of political competition.  
Parties establish trans-national federations and international links in order to promote 
their interests at the European, global or even regional level. This approach, however, 
can hardly apply to radical right parties. Due to nationalism being a constituent 
component of their ideological make-up, the establishment of permanent links with 
parties from other countries becomes practically unfeasible. Indicative is the 2007 
dissolution of the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty EP political group after barely six 
months of existence. The break-up of the political group occurred following a dispute 
between the Romanian and the Italian party on the issue of Romanian immigration to 
Italy.  
Using a party’s name (Beyme 1985) as an indicator of its identity can also become  
slightly misleading in the case of radical right parties. This is because these parties avoid 
the use of words such as extreme, radical or right in their name. They may choose words 
such as freedom or popular to be components of their name to avoid the ‘extremist’ 
label. Some parties may opt to include the word ‘national’ in their appellation, including 
the French National Front or the British National Party. This, however, is not consistent 
and does not imply that parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party or the Polish 
Peasants’ Party do not belong in the radical right party family.  
The origins and sociology approach based on the notion of societal cleavages mobilising 
parties in similar historical circumstances (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) is relatively 
straightforward and widely acknowledged in the literature. However, with regards to 
extreme right parties it must be treated with caution. This approach implies that these 
parties have the intention to mobilise similar interests, which has not been empirically 
substantiated. Based on this idea, Ignazi (1997a) made a distinction between ‘old’ 
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traditional extreme right-wing parties and ‘new’ post-industrial extreme right parties. 
The first group constitutes remnants of the two World Wars in the first part of the 20th 
century and is openly tied to the fascist tradition. The second group does not have any 
links with the fascist ideology. ‘These parties are the by-product of the conflicts of post-
industrial society where material interests are no longer so central’ (Ignazi 1997a: 53). 
Ignazi views the later group as being the offspring of the silent revolution representing 
the response to the new values of post-industrial European societies. Despite the merits 
of his work, the categories of Iganzi’s typology are prone to overlap as the demarcation 
line is not clear cut. This typology does not take into account the temporal factor 
disregarding that these parties tend to evolve and change over time, which clearly 
indicates the difficulty in classifying the parties under investigation. Not all ‘new’ 
radical right parties have emerged during the same historical period. Taking the example 
of the French National Front and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally, which according to 
Ignazi may be classified as ‘new’, we observe that they were founded approximately 
thirty years apart. The French party was founded in 1972 whereas the Greek in 2000.  
The party’s spatial location in its domestic party system has also been seen as an 
indicator of  belonging to the radical right party family. Ignazi (1997b: 301) suggests 
that in order to be a member of this family, a party should ‘be located at the right-wing 
pole of the political spectrum such that no other party is further to the right’. However, it 
is possible that more than one radical right parties operate in one country. Italy is a 
prominent example of this. According to Ignazi’s proposition, however, only one party 
may be characterised as radical right. It is also unclear how far to the right should the 
parties be in order to be included in the party family in question and whether there is a 
precise ‘position marking the border between extreme right and moderate right’ (Ignazi 
2003: 31). This points to the fact that location in itself may become an imprecise 
criterion for classification.  
Lastly, policy and ideology have been rightly identified as important indicators of party 
similarity. Analysis of party policy has been based upon methods such as expert surveys 
(Benoit and Laver 2006) and party manifesto analyses (Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006). 
This approach has significant analytical leverage as parties belonging to a family are 
likely to broadly share a similar and coherent system of beliefs as a basis for political 
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action. The later is defined as ‘a party’s body of normative(-related) ideas about the 
nature of man and society as well as the organisation and purposes of society’ (Mudde 
2000: 19). Mudde (2007) identifies a minimum and a maximum definition of radical 
right parties. The minimum definition includes one core concept central to and 
constitutive of radical right ideology, namely the centrality of the nation. Nationalist 
ideology is understood as ‘an ideology which builds on the idea of the nation and makes 
it the basis for action’ usually translated in demands for self-determination (Kellas 1991: 
21). Nationalism is rooted in the defence of national interests and identity drawing 
mostly upon the nationalist political doctrine ‘that strives for the congruence of the 
cultural and the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde 2007: 16). In this 
sense, radical right parties ‘seek to provide a sense of solidarity and belonging that binds 
supporters to their vision of the nation and society’ (Hainsworth 2008: 67). Mudde’s 
maximum definition also includes the features of authoritarianism and populism. 
Authoritarianism is defined as the ‘belief in a strictly ordered society, in which 
infringements of authority are to be punished severely’ (Mudde 2007: 23). Whereas the 
idea of strict law and order is included in this definition, it does not necessarily imply an 
anti-democratic sentiment, which is linked with the fact that the party family is entitled 
‘radical’ instead of ‘extreme’. Radical right parties may not necessarily advocate anti-
democratic policies and institutions but may express distrust for the existing political 
system. This is directly connected to the key concept of populism as a rhetorical style. 
Radical right parties tend to see the society as separated into two groups, i.e. the corrupt 
elite versus the people (Mudde 2007).  
This section has pointed to the difficulties in identifying the constitutive elements of the 
radical right party family. It has shown the inadequacy of approaches, including 
transnational federations, party name, origins and sociology and spatial location. The 
main conclusion is that, for the purposes of this study, the policy and ideology approach 
can be thought as instructive in terms of classifying radical right parties. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that the researcher should not ‘become too hooked on adopting 
an essentialist, fit-all interpretation of right-wing extremism but rather to be alert to 
recognising the style, the discourse, the themes and the issues’ (Hainsworth 2008: 68) 
integral to this party family. These parties draw upon broadly similar themes and ideas 
and their ideology can be neatly summarized by three epithets: nationalism, 
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authoritarianism and populism. Levels of nationalism, authoritarianism and a degree of 
populist rhetoric are held constant throughout the thesis. Ideological differences among 
the parties are thought to be too small to account for different levels of Euroscepticism 
within this party family (see hypotheses later in this chapter and Chapter 4).  
2. 2 The academic debate  
2.2.1 Dimensions of political conflict  
The research question of the thesis feeds into the wider debate in the literature on 
political conflict and European integration. Scholars have sought to explain party 
positions on European integration with reference to the notion of dimensions of political 
conflict. They have analysed whether contestation over European integration resolves 
itself into a single dimension or whether it involves two or more separate dimensions 
(Steenbergen and Marks 2004: 1). These dimensions are the left/right divide that refers 
to socioeconomic issues and the more/less integration dimension indicating willingness 
to give up one’s sovereignty by promoting supranational governance. The fundamental 
basis for this research is Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) work presenting political 
mobilisation and cleavages as deeply entrenched structures with the power to polarise 
the political system and political parties as agents of these societal conflicts. Although 
there is academic debate on whether these cleavages are frozen as Lipset and Rokkan 
argued, the literature recognises that they still carry theoretical and explanatory value 
and that ‘the ideological continuum from left to right is a central organising dimension 
in Western Europe’ (Steenbergen and Marks 2004: 4).  
Based on the above, scholars have put forward four models regarding political 
contestation over Europe. First, the international relations model suggests that 
contestation over European integration takes place on a single anti-integration versus 
pro-integration dimension and that contestation is utterly independent of the left/right 
divide (Hoffmann 1966; Haas 1968; Moravcsik 1998). Second, the regulation model 
proposes that European integration is absorbed into the left/right dimension and that the 
two dimensions are fused in the left/right divide (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000). Third, the 
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Hix-Lord model (1997: 26) puts forward that the left/right dimension remains 
orthogonal to the more/less integration dimension. The authors argue that major political 
parties are incentivised to maintain the existing left/right pattern of contestation and 
when new issues or parties arise on the political agenda, they try to force them on the 
existing left/right dimension. They thus prefer to ‘compete on the left/right dimension 
while bottling up competition on issues of European integration’ (Steenbergen and 
Marks 2004: 6). Finally, the Hooge-Marks model (2001) hypothesises that the politics 
of European contestation can be explained using a two dimensional approach where the 
dimensions are not necessarily fused or orthogonal to each other. More precisely, the 
centre-left prefers ‘regulated capitalism’ and as a result it is likely to become more pro-
European as the debate over integration focuses on market regulation rather than 
market-making. The centre-right, on the other hand, prefers a neoliberal model. It 
favours combining European-wide markets with minimal European regulation. Once 
economic and monetary integration is achieved it resists further integration (Steenbergen 
and Marks 2004: 10).  
The above approaches are somewhat dissimilar and generate different expectations 
about the connection between the issue of Europe and the left/right divide. For the 
purposes of the thesis’ research question, two issues need to be pinpointed at this point. 
First, it is clear that all scholars that have sought to address the question of what drives 
party positions on European integration assume that this puzzle may be explored by 
using the tools of spatial analysis and representation. This method will thus be employed 
in order to analyse how the dynamics of party competition in a given domestic context 
may impact on party positions on European integration (see Chapter 4). Second, the 
left/right dimension may be thought as a useful predictor of party positions on European 
integration among party families since the positions or alignments of actors within the 
left/right space may serve as cognitive and ideological constraints on their general 
political interaction, including their views on the issue of Europe (Hix 1999). However, 
the left/right dimension has low explanatory value in analysing within party family 
differences since ideological variation is not great enough to predict their different 
positions on Europe. Going back to the first section of this chapter, the thesis has argued 
that radical right parties are broadly similar in terms of their ideological orientation. This 
leads to a number of other factors that should be taken into account in explaining 
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different levels of radical right Euroscepticism, including party type and short and long 
term political opportunities within the domestic party system.  
2.2.2 Party-based Euroscepticism  
Since the late 1990s, the literature focusing solely on negative positions on integration 
has largely expanded. The main debate has been structured in terms of explanations that 
refer to party specific characteristics and national level characteristics. On the one hand, 
parties oppose Europe because the latter is antithetical to their deeply entrenched 
ideological values and beliefs. On the other hand, the dynamics of the wider domestic 
party system may also impact on a party’s attitude on Europe. In this respect, 
institutional issues including the electoral system, the configuration of the party system,  
coalition dynamics and the positions of major potential allies or competitors operating in 
the same political system may act as catalysts in the formulation of a party’s anti-
European position.  
Marks and Wilson (2000) have been strong proponents of the party specific explanation 
of Euroscepticm. The authors focus on the importance of political conflicts that have 
historically shaped political life in Western Europe. They argue that traditional cleavage 
theory accounts for a party’s position on European integration and that it is a better 
guide than using national variations. ‘The new issue of European integration is 
assimilated into pre-existing ideologies of party leaders, activists and constituencies that 
reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental domestic issues’ (Marks and Wilson 
2000: 433). Their argument follows that by paying close attention to a party’s 
historically embedded predisposition, one can predict or simply ‘read’ how it will 
respond to a new issue such as European integration. The authors observe that the 
radical right is ‘distinguished by intense Euro-phobia’, which is linked to their strong 
nationalism (2000: 457). Radical right parties are ideologically and sociologically 
predisposed to strongly oppose European integration. Traditional cleavage theory works 
well to account for a party’s position on European integration and, according to Marks 
and Wilson, it is a better guide than using national variations.  
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Along similar lines, Aspinwall (2002) argues that party ideology appears to be a useful 
indicator of position on European integration. The radical right ‘oppose 
supranationalism because of the erosion of national power and the threat to national 
identity this entails, as well as the danger to economic well-being’ (Aspinwall 2002: 87). 
In examining Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. Kopecky and Mudde also 
support this argument. They argue that ‘ideology is the crucial factor in explaining the 
positions that political parties adopt on issues surrounding the current process of 
European integration’ (Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 321). They suggest that parties do 
not change their views and positions on the key ideas of the European project. Rather, 
change of opinion may occur with regards to party positions on the precise functioning 
of the EU framework. In other words, parties are committed to their general opinions 
about the European project due to their basic ideological predispositions. They may 
change their views over time regarding the practice of European integration. The authors 
argue further that ‘if party ideology plays an important role in determining party 
positions on the dimension “support for European integration”, we would expect all 
parties belonging to one party family to have the same position on that dimension.’ 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 320).  
Although the work of the above scholars is highly informative regarding different 
positions on European integration among party families, it is less instructive when 
seeking to account within party family differences. This approach suggests that 
European-wide ideological similarities lead parties belonging to the same party family 
to adopt similar positions on Europe. It disregards, however, the important qualitative 
differences in levels of Euroscepticism among radical right parties in both Western and 
Eastern Europe. As the literature has also suggested, this also holds for agrarian and 
communist parties, some of which have adopted utterly dissimilar policies on Europe 
compared to their fellow communist or agrarian parties in other European countries 
(Batory and Sitter 2004; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). Having said that, it must be 
recognised that a party’s general values and beliefs is a very useful way of looking at the 
‘big picture’ of party positions on European integration. As Aspinwall (2000: 105) 
suggests ideology serves ‘as a means to reduce transaction costs in determining political 
support’.  
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However, this literature tends to treat parties as isolated organisations. On the contrary, 
parties operate within a political system the dynamics of which can lead them to amend 
and adjust their values, beliefs and policies. A party’s position in its national party 
system may also affect its policy orientation towards Europe. Having this in mind, 
Taggart (1998: 368) has classified political parties as to ‘how they relate to the 
Euroscepticism they manifest’. He views party positions on Europe through a different 
prism and argues that the European issue provides a touchstone of domestic dissent. He 
suggests that ‘Euroscepticism is manifest in political parties in different forms and can 
be used in different ways’ (Taggart 1998: 368). He identifies that Euroscepticism is 
mainly demonstrated in single-issue and protest-based parties. For the first group of 
parties, opposition to European integration constitutes their sole political reason for 
existence. The second group stands outside the established group of parties and its anti-
EU position is an appendage of their general opposition to the functioning of political 
systems. In a subsequent paper, Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000: 7-8) have suggested that 
protest parties adopt a Eurosceptic stance ‘as a deliberate means of differentiating 
themselves from the political mainstream’. This analysis suggests that ideology although 
a significant component in explaining opposition to European integration is not enough 
to predict it alone. The ‘degree to which ideology serves as a constraint depends partly 
on the party’s position in the party system and so it is necessary to also consider the 
relative positions of parties within their respective party system’  (Taggart 1998: 379). 
Parties peripheral to their domestic party systems are more inclined to using the issue of 
Europe as a mobilising issue compared to parties that occupy a central position.  
Following a similar logic, Sitter (2001) argues that Euroscepticism is a government-
opposition dynamic. Patterns of competition at the domestic level shape the translation 
of the European question into party politics. Examining party politics in Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden, highly Eurosceptic countries and where opposition is expressed 
across the party system, Sitter finds that principled Euroscepticism is not expected to 
characterise catch-all or cartel parties. When this occurs, it is mainly the consequence of 
electoral purposes. In interest or value-based parties, such as the Green parties, 
Euroscepticism is driven by the extent to which these parties perceive the state as an ally 
or a threat. The old hard left and new politics parties form an ideological and protest-
oriented Euroscepticism because they oppose integration as a part of Western 
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capitalism. The radical right and new populism parties are ‘driven largely by their 
opposition or protest strategy’ (Sitter 2001: 27). Their stance is a result of their 
peripheral (almost excluded) position in the party system. Sitter also suggests that in the 
case when Eurosceptic parties aspire to participate in a governing coalition, they are 
expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism because of its potential electoral cost. This 
literature has been complemented by Batory and Sitter (2004) who explain variation of 
Euroscepticism within the agrarian party family on the basis of long and short-term 
policy goals. In their analysis of Communist Euroscepticism, Benedetto and Quaglia 
(2007) suggest that although there are three sets of factors influencing their EU position, 
including international, national and party-specific, communist parties have responded 
primarily to vote and coalition-seeking opportunities. Johansson and Raunio’s (2001) 
work demonstrates that in Finland party competition and leadership are strong 
explanatory factors of party responses to European integration while in Sweden public 
opinion and factionalism provide more explanatory leverage.  
It is noteworthy that the explanations in the literature focusing mainly on national level 
factors, including short and long term opportunities, do not utterly discard the 
explanatory value of a party’s ideology. This is because ideology and strategy are 
closely intertwined and it is hard and sometimes counter-intuitive to try to disentangle 
one from the other. Ideology and strategy are both integral to party behaviour thus 
sometimes the reasoning works in a step by step process. Indicatively, Batory and Sitter 
(2004: 525) argue that ‘If a party assesses European integration as a threat to both its 
(voters’) economic interests and its values or ideology, it is expected to adopt a hard 
Eurosceptic stance […]. However, if these two conditions do not hold, electoral strategy 
and coalition tactics shape a party’s incentives regarding Euroscepticism’. The authors 
demonstrate that there are other important considerations, and not only a party’s 
identity, which play a significant role in adopting a policy position. Incentives produced 
by the general political context within which parties operate are important and need to 
be taken into account when explaining different positions on Europe within a party 
family. In his analysis of socialist party positions on European integration, Featherstone 
(1988) argues that the parties have been influenced by the wider domestic political 
system, including the impact of other political parties, the parties’ perceptions of the 
impact of European integration on the national economy and some country-specific 
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historical experiences. He concludes that ‘variation suggests the importance of the 
national dimensions in policy making’ (Featherstone 1988: 302) and proposes that there 
is no indication of correlation between left/right attitudes and EU policy across Europe.  
This section of the chapter concludes that party deeply-entrenched ideological values 
and beliefs have important analytical value demonstrating in a European-wide scale how 
belonging to a party family is associated to a party’s position to European integration. 
However, this approach can mainly explain among rather than within party family 
different positions on Europe. While not discrediting these arguments, scholars have 
also portrayed Euroscepticism as a government-opposition dynamic or a manifestation 
of domestic dissent among protest based parties peripheral to their national party 
system. Although the ideological position of a party may provide the researcher with a 
useful starting point, it does not give enough information to deduce a party’s EU 
position. Simply put, we cannot ‘read’ a party’s position on European integration by 
knowing the party family it belongs to. Thus the researcher is pointed towards 
explanations that refer to a party’s goals and relative position in its national political 
environment, to which the chapter turns.  
2. 3 Answering the research question  
Parties do not operate as isolated units but on the contrary as units within the wider 
political context of their domestic party system. Within each national party system, 
different types of party operate (Katz and Mair 1995) each having different political 
goals and objectives (Strom 1990). Electoral competition and coalition games shape the 
opportunity structures and incentives that parties face (Kitschelt 1999), which may have 
an effect on party policies, including their position on European integration (Batory and 
Sitter 2004; Benedetto and Quaglia 2007). This section discusses the literature on party 
types and party behaviour from which it derives the principal hypotheses and argument 
guiding this research project.  
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2.3.1 Party types and party behaviour  
According to the literature on party politics, parties may be classified and understood 
with reference to their relationship with civil society and the state as well as their 
organisational structures (Katz and Mair 1995). Based on the latter, four ‘ideal’ party 
types have been identified, including the mass, anti-system, catch-all and cartel parties. 
The mass party type has usually been associated with left wing ideologies as they –at 
least historically– have mobilised well-defined social groups which have also been the 
members of these parties. This is the archetypal party model, the relevance of which has 
waned given the declining levels of party membership and popular involvement 
(Scarrow 2000). The success of the anti-system party lies in amplifying popular 
discontent for (Scarrow 1996) and undermining the legitimacy of the system within 
which it operates. It does not share the values of the regime and its ‘opposition is not an 
“opposition on issues” […] but and “opposition of principle” (Sartori and Mair 2005: 
118). It expresses distrust vis-à-vis politics and its opposition indicates a wish for an 
ultimate political goal incompatible with the constitutional structures of a given polity. 
This type of party ‘is marked by its adherence to an imagined community obliging it, 
and the entire system, to a standard of perfection’ (Keren 2000: 109). Anti-system 
parties imagine an impossible reality and their reason for existence lies in trying to 
realise it. The catch-all party variant actively seeks to reduce its ideological differences 
from its main competitors (Kirchheimer 1966). The political charisma of the party 
leader is pivotal for the party’s success since the public is not expected to cast its vote 
on the basis of embedded social divisions and predispositions but rather on trust on the 
party’s ability to contribute to the efficiency of the political system (Krouwel 2003: 26). 
The cartel party has been the most recently identified party type. This type is 
‘characterized by the interpenetration of party and state, and also by a pattern of inter-
party collusion’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 17). The cartel party becomes part of the state and 
it continues to have access to state subventions and the media both in government and in 
opposition. This model implies that the most relevant parties in the system cooperate or 
‘collude’ in order to gain privileged access to state regulated channels of communication 
(Katz and Mair 1995: 18). Competition becomes contained and the links of the party 
with society decrease as the latter becomes agent of the state.  
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Rational choice theory suggests that there are three models of competitive party 
behaviour, including the vote, office and policy-seeking party. The vote-seeking party 
model derives from Downs’ (1957) work on electoral competition, which argues that 
parties are not only vote seekers but also vote maximisers. The office-seeking party 
model assumes that parties seek to maximise control over office rather than votes. For 
office-seekers, votes are valued instrumentally to the extent that they can increase the 
number of government portfolios in their control (Riker 1962). Policy-seekers try to 
maximise their effect on policy. This model ‘was developed in response to the “policy-
blind” axioms of the first generation of game theoretic studies of government formation’ 
(Strom 1990: 567). Thus policy-based theories assume that coalitions will occur by 
policy connected parties (Axelrod 1970). However, the idea of a policy-seeking party 
may also be employed outside the literature of coalition-making.  
It is important to note that ‘Pure vote seekers, office seekers or policy seekers are 
unlikely to exist’ (Strom 1990: 570). Rather each party may attach higher significance in 
one of these strategies depending on a variety of factors and most importantly its long 
and short term objectives within the institutional and partisan constraints, which 
‘structure political opportunities’ in any given political environment (Strom 1990: 579). 
Thus, ‘maximising one goal may entail merely satisfying another, or even fully-blown 
trade-offs’ (Bakke and Sitter 2005: 244). For the purposes of the thesis, it is assumed 
that at a given point in time parties will tend to prioritise one of these goals over the 
others in order to engage with domestic party competition.  
2.3.2 Radical right party behaviour   
Synthesizing the two literatures on (1) party types and (2) party behaviour may generate 
expectations on how radical right parties may behave in a given political system 
conditional upon the type of party they belong to. This synthesis assumes that parties 
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belonging to the same party family may (1) display characteristics of different party 
types and (2) may have different objectives within their respective party system2.  
An anti-system party, given its intrinsic aim to strive to delegitimize the system within 
which it operates, is more likely to adopt a policy or issue-based approach to party 
competition3. ‘The theory of issue-ownership finds a campaign effect when a candidate 
successfully frames the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing 
the country that he is better able to handle than his opponent’ (Petrocik 1996: 826). In 
the context of an anti-system radical right party behaviour, this can be thought as 
portraying that the party has the only solution to the problems of the society. The party 
is likely to take a diametrically different position compared to all other parties in a few 
issues that it considers to be at the heart of its political agenda. The ultimate goal here is 
to differentiate itself from the other parties and delegitimize the system. For issue-
owners, ‘the goal is to achieve a strategic advantage by making problems which reflect 
owned issues the programmatic meaning of the election and the criteria by which voters 
make their choice’ (Petrocik 1996: 828). Thus the party will tend to focus its efforts on 
issues integral to its discursive toolkit, which are intrinsically linked to its political 
profile and attract a specific niche segment of the electorate. These may include among 
others immigration, Euroscepticism and corruption.  
A radical right party with catch-all elements is more likely to present itself as a political 
entrepreneur in an effort to make broader appeals and attract electoral support from all 
segments of the society (Katz and Mair 1995: 12). The catch-all radical right party has 
abandoned appealing solely to core constituencies, such as small shopkeepers, craftsmen 
and low level employees. It has been incentivised to drastically reduce its stress on the 
issues that divide it from the mainstream political forces of the party system. Within the 
context of the party’s active pursuit of votes from across the political system, a relative 
de-emphasization of radicalism in the party’s discourse has occurred. Ultimately, this is 
geared towards attracting the median voter for vote maximisation purposes.  
                                                
2 Note that the mass party type has waned over time and as such it is not discussed further.  
3 Note that the policy-seeking model derives from coalition theories. The idea of ‘policy-
seeking’ has been adapted here as issue-based competition in order to apply to small radical 
right parties.  
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Radical right parties that actively pursue to become part of the governing cartel have 
fundamentally different incentives. A cartel party sees politics as a profession in itself 
and seeks to mitigate the consequences of party competition. Politics become a game ‘in 
which the limited inter-party competition that does ensue takes place on the basis of 
competing claims to efficient and effective management’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 19). To 
the extent that a radical right party actively pursues government participation, its main 
motivation is to adopt policies that may not directly target the median voter but are close 
to its major potential governmental allies. The party seeks to prove that it is capable of 
holding a governmental portfolio and as such the adoption of controversial policies or 
the pursuit for drastic changes is carefully avoided.  
The above can be summarised as follows (also see table 2.1):  
 anti-system radical right parties are likely to emphasize ownership of a number 
of issues in order to differentiate themselves from the rest of the party system  
 catch-all radical right parties are incentivised to de-emphasize their radicalism 
and stress issues that have the potential to tie them to the median voter  
 cartel radical right parties are likely to avoid controversial statements or policies  
This is directly linked with Meguid’s (2008) refined theory of party competition. 
Meguid seeks to explain niche party electoral success or failure by suggesting the latter 
depends on the strategies that mainstream parties adopt on the niche party’s central 
issue. These include the ‘adversarial’, ‘accommodative’ and ‘dismissive’ strategies. The 
‘adversarial’ strategy consists of taking ‘a position on the new issue dimension opposite 
to the niche party’s’ (Meguid 2008: 29). This behaviour indicates open hostility to the 
niche party’s stance, stresses the importance of this issue dimension and calls voters to 
cast their ballot on the basis of this issue. In the ‘accommodative’ strategy, ‘the 
mainstream party adopts a position similar to the niche party’s’ (Meguid 2008: 28). This 
(apparent) policy convergence is geared towards undermining the distinctiveness of the 
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niche party’s issue position in the hope that niche party voters will desert this party in 
favour of the mainstream. The ‘dismissive’ strategy includes avoiding taking a position 
on the niche party’s position indicating the low salience of this issue dimension. The 
‘mainstream party signals to voters that these issues lack merit’ (Meguid 2008: 28) and 
effectively ignores it.  
The thesis suggests that these strategies can also be employed by niche parties 
themselves. Transposing Meguid’s theory of party competition to radical right party 
behaviour and discursive strategy over a particular issue, we can conclude that:  
 anti-system radical right parties  adopt an adversarial strategy  emphasize 
issue ownership  strong policy divergence  
 catch-all radical right adopt an accommodative strategy  de-emphasize their 
radicalism  apparent policy convergence with mainstream parties  
 cartel radical right parties  adopt a dismissive strategy  signal (relatively) 
low issue salience  avoid controversial statements or policies  
Table 2.1 The logic of radical right party competition  
 
Party 
predominant  
goal 
Radical 
right party 
type  
Target 
electorate 
Party discursive 
strategy  
Policy / Issue Anti-system  Niche Adversarial 
Votes  Catch-all Median  Accommodative 
Office  Cartel Conservative Dismissive 
 
2.3.3 The hypotheses  
Based on this framework, it is argued that the manner in which parties respond to the 
European issue is conditional upon their wider agenda in their national party system. As 
discussed above, this wider agenda depends on the party type and whether the party 
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gives primacy to access to office and a leading role within it, increasing its electoral 
appeal by appealing to the median voter, or being persistent on pushing a specific 
policy/issue (Müller and Strøm 1999). These points can also be found in the literature on 
party-based Euroscepticism that focuses on party competition as the explanatory of 
variable of different levels of Euroscepticism among parties. Sitter’s (2003) and Batory 
and Sitter’s (2004) framework of party strategic behaviour may be instructive here. The 
authors suggest that party European attitudes are conditioned upon four party goals, 
including party organisation and identity, policy, quest for votes and quest for office. 
However, party identity is not considered as relevant for the purposes of the thesis since, 
as argued above, the parties under investigation share common broad ideological 
features. Similarly party organisation is excluded from the analysis as radical right 
parties enjoy poor levels of organisation and membership and party leaders are relatively 
unconstrained by the rest of the party (Pedahzur and Brichta 2002).  
Anti-system parties seek to increase their votes through anti-mainstream protest.  
Szczerbiak and Taggart (2000: 7-8) have suggested that protest parties adopt a 
Eurosceptic stance ‘as a deliberate means of differentiating themselves from the political 
mainstream’. They seek to appeal to a particular niche of the society that agrees with 
their vision of a utopian imagined community. In this respect Europe becomes a tool in 
their long term goals. The situation is different with catch-all or cartel radical right 
parties. Sitter (2001) finds that principled Euroscepticism is not expected to characterise 
catch-all or cartel parties, but when it does, it is mainly the consequence of electoral 
purposes. He also suggests that in the case when Eurosceptic parties aspire to participate 
in a governing coalition, they are expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism because 
of its potential electoral cost (Sitter 2001). Parties adopt moderate positions in order to 
become part of the governing cartel.  
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Based on the above, it is hypothesised that:  
1. If a radical right party has anti-system elements, it is likely to emphasise 
ownership of the European issue and adopt a European discourse antagonistic of 
European integration (adversarial strategy).  
 The party’s anti-European argumentation is likely to be articulated in a 
manner that will try to be unique to its own worldview and dissimilar from 
all other parties in the national political system. 
2. If a radical right party strives to have a catch-all appeal, it is likely to support the 
EU ‘under conditions’ (accommodative strategy).  
 These conditions may be set on issues which the party perceives to be 
considered important by the general public so that it can portray itself as 
being close to the voters in general and the median voter in particular.  
3. If the party’s primary goal is to become part of the governing cartel and a major 
player within it, it is likely during its quest for power to downplay the issue of 
Europe and adopt a conciliatory position on European integration (dismissive 
strategy). 
 Given that it would have participated in decision-making at the EU level, its 
criticism towards aspects of European integration is likely to have a 
constructive character. Its European discourse may be connected with 
another issue associated with ‘high politics’ with which governmental parties 
are primarily concerned.  
It must be clarified that with reference to hypothesis 3, the thesis does not make a 
deterministic statement regarding the effects of government participation on party 
policy. There have been many examples of radical right party government participation, 
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which did not result in dramatic party policy change (for instance the Italian Northern 
League or the Austrian Freedom Party). Rather, it is the party’s active willingness to 
acquire office and become central in the governmental cartel in it that is likely to be 
associated with a ‘compromising’ position on Europe.  
 
2.3.4 The argument  
The main argument of the thesis is that the way in which radical right parties respond to 
the EU is conditional upon their wider agenda in their national party system. This wider 
agenda depends on (1) party type and (2) party predominant goal in the party system.  
Protest anti-system parties utterly reject European integration. The adoption of this 
policy becomes an opportunity to undermine the legitimacy of both their national 
political system as well as the EU. In this manner, they differentiate themselves from the 
rest of the party system and signify strong policy divergence. They increase the 
European issue’s salience by adopting an adversarial strategy.  
Catch-all radical right parties adopt a conditional position on Europe. They avoid radical 
statements and select their anti-European discourse on the basis of what they perceive is 
close to the median voter’s potential criticisms. This is an accommodative strategy that 
signifies a degree of policy convergence with the mainstream parties geared towards 
vote-maximisation.  
Cartel radical right parties adopt a compromising position on Europe. They downplay 
the issue of Europe in order to decrease its salience and avoid contestation on the matter. 
This is seen as a dismissive strategy that may increase their chances to participate in 
government and occupy a leading role within it (also see table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2 Radical right party competition and the European issue 
 
 
 
 
 
Additionally, the national context becomes significant with regards to how the party 
chooses to debate and/or politicise the European issue at the domestic level. Parties tend 
to associate Europe with other issues that they find are of domestic relevance and may 
help their cause. This becomes increasingly relevant to radical right parties as their 
discursive toolkit largely draws from the national context.  
In short, radical right EU position is explained by long and short term party objectives in 
the national system. The precise argumentation on the European issue, however, is 
influenced by the national context and may be linked to another issue of domestic 
relevance considered to be core to the party’s political agenda. More widely, radical 
right parties use the issue of Europe for political purposes relevant to their domestic 
agenda.  
2.3.5 Falsifiability  
The thesis employs a standard research design whereby an independent variable is 
identified as explaining a dependent variable. In particular, radical right positions on 
European integration (dependent variable) are contingent upon party type and party 
behaviour at the domestic level (independent variable). In Political Science, one ‘should 
construct theories so that they can be shown to be wrong as easily and quickly as 
possible’ (King, Keohane et al. 1994: 100). Complying with the concept of falsifiability 
(Popper 1968), if future research identifies a case exhibiting that a systematic 
association between party type and position on Europe does not exist, the argument of 
the thesis could be falsified.  
Position on the 
EU 
Party 
predominant  
goal 
Party type  Party strategy  
Rejecting  Policy / Issue Anti-system  Adversarial 
Conditional  Votes  Catch-all Accommodative 
Compromising  Office  Cartel Dismissive 
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Examples that could lead to the argument’s falsifiability could include a protest party 
adopting a pro-European position albeit its generic aim to delegitimize the system within 
which it operates. Another example would be a radical right party striving to generate a 
catch-all appeal but nonetheless espousing a hard ‘rejectionist’ EU stance or a party 
seeking to assume a leading role within the governing cartel but opposing Europe. Until 
such evidence is produced, however, this research project will treat party type and party 
behaviour as the main independent variable.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has laid out the core similarities among radical right parties. It has argued 
that they share broad similar ideological characteristics in terms of nationalism, 
authoritarianism and a degree of populist rhetoric. These features substantiate the 
comparability of the cases. By reviewing the literature on political conflict and party-
based Euroscepticism, the chapter has argued that in answering the research question 
one should look at the short and long term political opportunities of each party within 
the domestic party system. Three hypotheses are derived from the literature on party 
type and party behaviour. It is argued that anti-system parties’ rejectionist European 
position serves as a tool for differentiation from the rest of the party system. Radical 
right parties seeking to have a catch-all appeal use the European issue as a vote-
maximisation tool. Radical right parties with a strong motivation to enter government 
and become central within it avoid contestation on the European issue.  
The hypotheses and argument are tested in a two-step approach. First, Chapter 4 shows 
the relative positions of the parties under investigation within their respective party 
system. This is done through the computerised content analysis of party manifestos 
during the 1999-2009 decade, which results in a spatial analysis of party positions. It is 
necessary to consider the ‘relative positions of parties within their respective party 
system’  (Taggart 1998: 379). This allows the researcher to observe how far or close the 
radical right party’s policies are from the other parties and generate expectations 
regarding the party’s behaviour and potential electorate in its national political system. 
Second, the thesis proceeds with an in-depth analysis of each case study in order to 
 61
empirically substantiate the hypotheses of the thesis. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 conduct a 
qualitative analysis of party stance on Europe and assess how this plays out with party 
long and short term objectives in the system.  
Before embarking on the analysis of what explains different levels of Euroscepticism 
within the radical right party family, the thesis analyses the nature of Euroscepticism. 
The following chapter discusses issues of definition and measurement. It provides a 
novel conceptualisation of the phenomenon and discerns three patterns of radical right 
opposition to European integration.  
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Chapter 3 Defining and measuring radical right Euroscepticism 
 
 
Introduction  
Euroscepticism is a social and political phenomenon whose manifestation has become 
ever increasing since the early 1990s. Used as a term, Euroscepticism has been very 
popular coined in various contexts. Although its use dates back to the mid 1980s first 
used in the British press, it has been subsequently employed in different national 
political, historical and cultural contexts. The ‘transplanted’ usages of the term from one 
European state to another have ascribed to it various meanings. In common usage, 
Euroscepticism has come to be a blanket term for any kind of opposition to, doubt about 
or reservation about the European project.  
Scholars interested in the domestic politics of European integration both from a public 
opinion and political parties’ perspective have sought to describe and define the 
phenomenon of Eurosceptisicm. However, they have not directly touched upon the 
nature and conceptualisation of radical right Euroscepticism. Aiming to fill this gap in 
the literature; improve the academic understanding of the phenomenon; and establish 
and reinforce the thesis’ puzzle, this chapter critically evaluates the current definitions 
of Euroscepticism and suggests an improved conceptualisation of the term directly 
applicable to the study of radical right opposition to European integration.  
Based on the current literature on Euroscepticism, Mair’s (2007) distinction between the 
policy and polity aspect of the EU and an attentive reading of the Treaties establishing 
the EU, this chapter argues that radical right parties may be categorised into three 
patterns of opposition towards European integration. These include the rejectionist, 
conditional and compromising patterns of Euroscepticism and are identified through the 
careful examination of party attitudes on four different aspects related to European 
integration and the EU. These include a cultural definition of Europe, the principle of 
cooperation at a European multilateral level, the EU policy practice and the desire for 
building a future European polity.  
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The chapter is divided into three sections. It first discusses the prominent works in the 
literature on Euroscepticism assessing the extent to which they apply to the European 
positions of radical right parties. Second, it proposes the conceptualisation of radical 
right attitudes to European integration in terms of three patterns of opposition. Third, it 
conducts qualitative analysis of party literature of twelve radical right parties from ten 
European countries adding empirical substance to the theoretical reasoning of the 
chapter. The analysis demonstrates significant qualitative differences within the radical 
right party family, which has otherwise been understood as similar in terms of its 
position on European integration.  
3.1 Defining negative attitudes towards European integration  
3.1.1 A short history of Euroscepticism: the contextual use of the term  
Euroscepticism is a widely accepted term describing negative attitudes towards 
European integration. Conceptualising and defining Euroscepticism has presented 
researchers with various problems. It is an elusive term emerging from journalistic 
discourse having assumed different meanings across time and space. Its early uses can 
be understood as being ‘embedded within the specific British political and historical 
context’ (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 16). Indeed, the term was first traced in 
journalistic articles written for the British press during the mid-1980s when there was a 
tendency to use the term ‘Euro-sceptic’ interchangeably with that of ‘anti-Marketeer’ 
(Spiering 2004: 128). This comes as no surprise due to the political climate of the mid 
and late 1980s where there were great tensions between the then UK Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, and the European Commission. The Thatcherite discourse gave the 
term a connotation of extremism  (Spiering 2004: 128) and in the British context the 
term has come to refer to a position of hostility to and outright rejection of British EU 
participation (George 2000: 15).  
Although Euroscepticism has its historical roots in the United Kingdom, it has 
progressively become established elsewhere, especially since the process of ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty. Mudde also identifies 1992 as the ‘turning point’ for radical 
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right parties both in terms of their position on European integration as well as the 
salience of the issue in their agenda (Mudde 2007: 159). However, ‘where the term 
“Euroscepticism” is adopted in the context of distinctively articulated national political 
debates, it assumes a meaning which must be understood relative to the different 
national political traditions and experiences of European integration which frame those 
debates’ (Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 17). In this sense, the term may be employed as 
a portmanteau of any type of opposition to or reservation about the European project. 
This vagueness of the term is partly reflected in the literature on party-based 
Euroscepticism, which has yet to suggest a precise definition of this phenomenon. 
3.1.2 Definitions in the literature: theoretical contributions and shortcomings 
Taggart, being the first scholar to define Euroscepticism, suggested that it is ‘the idea of 
contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified 
opposition to the process of European integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366) and argued that 
Eurosceptic parties are more likely to stand outside the status quo. Over the years, 
Taggart and Szczerbiak have further developed this definition by suggesting the 
distinction between hard (principled) and soft (contingent) Euroscepticism. On the one 
hand, hard Euroscepticism indicates a party’s ‘outright rejection of the entire project of 
European political and economic integration and opposition to their country joining or 
remaining members of the EU’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001: 10). Thus hard 
Eurosceptics advocate withdrawal of their country from the EU due to disagreement 
with the current conception of the project. This objection ‘comes from the belief that 
the EU is counter to deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative 
values’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2001: 10). On the other hand, soft Euroscepticism is 
‘NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where 
concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified 
opposition to the EU’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008c: 2).  
Szczerbiak and Taggart’s definition of Euroscepticism is the most widely accepted in 
the literature for a number of reasons and not least because it successfully identifies 
Eurosceptic trends and tendencies within countries and party systems. By applying this 
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typology on radical right parties, however, one may present a less clear picture of their 
attitudes and underlying argumentation. As far as the first type is concerned, Taggart 
and Szczerbiak argue that parties may adopt a hard Eurosceptic position as the EU 
epitomizes negative values. This assertion holds true in the case of radical right parties. 
Due to the nationalistic elements of their ideology, these parties consider 
supranationalism as an enemy of the nation-state. This however presents a conceptual 
problem as not all radical right parties are hard Eurosceptics. Whereas some seek their 
country’s EU withdrawal and reject European integration ‘on principle’, others are 
content to criticise the system from within. Thus, this hard – soft distinction becomes 
less sensitive to the fact that some radical right parties may not oppose their country’s 
EU membership and may rather disagree with the way in which the EU project is run. 
Additionally, the authors rightly argue that soft Eurosceptic parties present concerns 
over a number of policy areas. Radical right parties, however, are not solely concerned 
over EU policies but also over the type of EU decision-making and may present 
conditions under which they would support cooperation at a higher level. The definition 
of soft Euroscepticism does not capture the further distinction made between opposition 
to the polity and policy aspects of European integration4. This distinction is particularly 
prominent in radical right discourse and will be explained below. 
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) have suggested an alternative categorisation of party-based 
Euroscepticism differentiating between diffuse and specific support for European 
integration. Drawing from Easton’s (Easton 1965) seminal work on political regimes, 
they define diffuse as ‘support for the general ideas of European integration’ while 
specific is defined as ‘support for the general practice of European integration’ 
(Kopecky and Mudde 2002: 300). This framework leads to a two by two matrix of 
possible party positions structured along the Europhobe/Europhile and EU-
optimist/pessimist axes. These include first, the Euroenthusiasts who support both the 
ideas of European integration and the general practice of integration. Second, the 
Eurorejects who do not accept either. Third, the Eurosceptics who support the idea of a 
united Europe but disagree with the general practice of integration. Fourth, the 
Europragmatists who are against the idea of the EU but support the practice of 
                                                
4 This idea is largely based on P. Mair, ‘Political Opposition and the European Union’, 
Government and Opposition, 2007, 42, 1, pp. 1-17.  
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European integration. These categories being ideal types, they argue, are serviceable for 
the qualitative analysis of party positions. 
Mudde (2007: 161-165) has used this typology to discuss the European attitudes of 
populist radical right parties in Europe currently as well as over time. This typology is 
successful at describing radical right positions on European integration to the extent 
that it has somewhat (albeit indirectly) incorporated the policy and polity aspect of the 
EU in the dimensions of diffuse and specific support. However, the four types that are 
distinguished on the basis of these two dimensions are not entirely relevant to the party 
family under investigation. The ‘Euroreject’ category can be both theoretically and 
empirically applicable to this party family. The ‘Eurosceptic’ category is also highly 
relevant as it is empirically possible for radical right parties to support the idea of 
cooperation at EU level but not in the shape of the EU. However, the  ‘Euroenthusiast’ 
category is not empirically observable, especially after the process of ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty during the early 1990s. Simply put, there are no radical right parties 
that enthusiastically support the process of European integration. The ‘Europragmatist’ 
type is also problematic in this regard as principled opposition to the idea of European 
integration is highly unlikely to lead to favourable positions on the project of the 
current EU. Mudde (2007: 162) himself accepts this arguing that ‘very few European 
political parties fall into this category’. 
Flood (2002) has suggested a six-point continuum along which he categorises party 
positions. It starts from the rejectionist position at the one end of the spectrum and ends 
with the maximalist position at the other end. In between there are four intermediate 
positions: revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, and reformist. This is an ordinal 
categorisation of an opposition/support continuum. However, Flood’s categories are 
rather broad and ‘are not intended to convey any suggestion of a specific content to the 
positions which they describe, beyond basic stances towards the EU’s development’ 
(Flood 2002: 5). This, once again, points to the complexity of categorising party 
positions on European integration given the lack of specific criteria of categorisation.  
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Drawing upon Taggart and Szczerbiak’s hard and soft Euroscepticism, Rovny (2004) 
has offered a conceptualisation of Euroscepticism in terms of two scales including the 
magnitude and motivation. While the combination of degree (magnitude) and the drive 
(motivation) of Euroscepticism are the typology’s assets, the latter has not made a 
substantive addition to the literature. Conti (2003: 19) has suggested a typology of party 
attitudes to integration along a five point continuum: hard Euroscepticism, soft 
Euroscepticism, no commitment, functional Europeanism and identity Europeanism. 
Conti argues that the final goal of a hard Eurosceptic party is the radical change of the 
EU trajectory or country withdrawal shifting power back to member states. Hard 
Eurosceptics mainly use protest-based language. A soft Eurosceptic party seeks to 
reform the EU trajectory, prefers integration through intergovernmental institutions and 
adopts goal-oriented discourse (Conti 2003: 19). The theoretical contribution of this 
typology remains significant as it puts forward the main components of party attitudes to 
European integration. Conti suggests the final goal and the mode of integration preferred 
by each party as well as the language they use. Regarding radical right Euroscepticism, 
however, this typology fails to capture qualitative differences that range beyond the 
simple distinction between the hard and soft types.  
Sørensen (2008) has defined the nature of public Euroscepticism identifying four broad 
ideal types including the economic, sovereignty, democracy and social types. Although 
the aim of her research has been to discuss public EU attitudes, the ‘sovereignty type’ 
can be instructive in discussing radical right positions on European integration. Radical 
right ideology is rooted in the defence of national interests and identity drawing mostly 
upon the nationalist political doctrine ‘that strives for the congruence of the cultural and 
the political unit, i.e. the nation and the state’ (Mudde 2007: 16). As such, the issue of 
sovereignty is particularly salient in radical right discourse and  differentiates the 
attitudes of these parties from those of other party families. We can thus group radical 
right attitudes as mostly belonging to the ‘sovereignty type’. However, Sørensen’s work 
does not help analyse different European positions of the radical right party family that 
fall within the sovereignty type to which the chapter turns. 
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3.2 Conceptualising radical right attitudes on European integration: three patterns 
of opposition    
Aiming to improve the conceptualisation of radical right attitudes towards the EU, this 
section proposes the categorisation of their positions on European integration into the 
rejectionist, conditional and compromising patterns. The three categories of radical 
right party attitudes advanced here are deduced from party positions on four aspects of 
European integration, which derive from the current literature on Euroscepticism, 
Mair’s (2007) distinction between the policy and polity aspect of the EU and an 
attentive reading of the Treaties establishing the EU. These include a cultural definition 
of Europe, the principle for cooperation at a European multilateral level, the current EU 
policy practice and the future of the EU polity. They represent four fundamental aspects 
of the debate on European integration and provide the indicators on the basis of which 
the three patterns of radical right Euroscepticism are identified.  
3.2.1 Four aspects of European integration 
The first aspect of European integration is a cultural definition of Europe. The common 
identity of European peoples is defined as the feeling of cultural, religious and 
historical bonds among the European nation states. Mudde identifies this definition of 
Europe based on the Christian, Hellenistic and Roman traditions as present in radical 
right party discourse. Europe is seen as a civilisation ‘shared by the various different 
and independent European nations’ (Mudde 2007: 169-170). This definition does not 
imply that Europe is considered to be above the nation. Rather, Europe as a continent 
encapsulates the common elements that bind European peoples together and serves to 
distinguish ‘us’ from ‘others’. This cultural definition of Europe is closely related to a 
spatial/border definition and becomes the prime justification for the exclusion of 
Turkey from Europe and, by extension, the EU. Since Christianity is one of the 
constitutive elements of Europe, its borders must stop to the Urals and the 
Mediterranean excluding any non-Christian country to the east and south. If Europe 
accepted a religiously dissimilar country such as Turkey, then the European 
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construction would lose one of its essential characteristics and would ultimately 
collapse. 
The second aspect discussed here is the ‘principle’ of European integration. This is 
anchored on the preamble of the Treaty Establishing the European Union stating that 
the member states are ‘RESOLVED to mark a new stage in the process of European 
integration undertaken with the establishment of the European Communities’ (European 
Union 2002: 9).5 The ‘principle’ of European integration indicates a party’s wish and 
willingness for cooperation at a higher multilateral level. This type of cooperation refers 
only to cooperation within the EU framework even if the structures of the latter are 
criticised and reform is actively pursued. It does not signify bilateral or trilateral 
cooperation between selected European states on particular ad hoc policies, including 
for instance some aspects of trade. In this respect, cooperation under the European Free 
Trade Area does not imply the support of the principle of European integration. The 
latter is an agreement providing only for trade, requiring no political commitment and 
taking place outside the EU framework. On the contrary, the principle of European 
integration refers to a multi-faceted multilateral agreement with a political character 
within the EU structures even if the reform of the latter is actively pursued. Thus 
opposing the principle of European integration entails opposition against ‘not only the 
government and its policies but also the whole system of governance’ (Mair 2007: 5). 
The principle of integration also features in Szczerbiak and Taggart’s abovementioned 
‘hard/principled’ opposition to European integration as well as Kopecky and Mudde’s 
‘Euroreject’ category. 
The third and fourth aspects of European integration derive from Mair’s discussion of 
political opposition in the EU context. They are deduced from the distinction between 
opposition to the policy and opposition to the polity aspects of the EU and are 
respectively labelled as the ‘practice’ and ‘future’ of European integration (Mair 2007: 
5). The ‘practice’ indicator is also inferred from the TEU’s stipulation according to 
which ‘The Union shall be served by a single institutional framework which shall 
ensure the consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain 
                                                
5 Capitals in the original. The TEU has been selected as the major Treaty establishing the 
European Union with which all member states are obliged to comply.  
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its objectives while respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire’ (European 
Union 2002: 11). The ‘practice’ of European integration comprises the overall body of 
EU law and institutional framework, which include the policies administered at the 
European level as well as the nature of decision-making. Opposition to the practice of 
European integration becomes opposition to the policy aspect of the EU.  
The ‘future’ indicator of the EU refers to the member states’ strong desire to promote 
European cooperation within the EU political framework with the general aim of 
creating an ever closer union. This aspect of integration features in the TEU, which 
specifies that ‘This Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe’ (European Union 2002: 10). According to the 
Treaty, member states recall ‘the historic importance of the ending of the division of the 
European continent and the need to create firm bases for the construction of the future 
Europe’ (European Union 2002: 9). Opposition to the future of European integration 
develops into opposition to the polity aspect of the EU. Note that this implies 
Euroscepticism because this is ‘at odds with what is the dominant mode of ongoing 
integration’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a: 8). Table 3.1 below summarises these four 
aspects.  
Table 3.1 Conceptualising European integration 
 
The four aspects of European integration 
Definition  The feeling of cultural, religious and historical 
bonds among the European peoples.   
Principle The wish and willingness for cooperation at a 
European multilateral level. 
Practice  The EU institutional and policy status quo. 
Future  The making of a European polity. 
 
3.2.2 The three patterns of radical right opposition 
In defining the EU in terms of four fundamental features including the definition, 
principle, practice and future of integration, our understanding of the range of positions 
available for parties to adopt increases and the analysis becomes more specified. These 
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four aspects of integration represent the principal point of reference of this study. They 
provide the researcher with the analytical toolkit integral to the process of identification 
of potential radical right EU positions. This section argues that radical right 
Euroscepticism can be categorised into the rejectionist, conditional and compromising 
patterns.  
‘Rejectionist Euroscepticism’ is a position implying acceptance of common cultural, 
historical and religious European characteristics. However, there is strong opposition to 
the remaining three aspects of European integration. This includes rejection of the 
principle of cooperation within the EU framework, disagreement with the European 
institutional and policy status quo and resistance to the future building of a European 
polity. It is necessary to manage all policies solely at the national level and to withdraw 
from the EU at any cost. This position is generally associated with ardent anti-
supranationalism and national self-determination discourse. The general aim is to shift 
power back to the nation state and restore sovereignty of the nation state’s institutions 
denying the legitimacy of the EU system of governance as a whole. This pattern largely 
overlaps with Szczerbiak and Taggart’s hard Euroscepticism as well as Kopecky and 
Mudde’s ‘Eurorejects’. 
‘Conditional Euroscepticism’ entails acceptance of the common heritage of European 
peoples, approval of the principle of European cooperation but hostility to the current 
policy practice as well as the future building of a European polity. Although the 
significance of nation state cooperation at a European level is acknowledged, the 
current institutional balance as well as the policy status quo are unacceptable because 
they compromise nation state sovereignty. Consequently, closer unification of the 
European polity is not an appealing option. ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptics accept by and 
large the system but have objections to the policies and institutions of EU governance. 
This pattern is usually connected to a conditional wish for European cooperation to the 
extent that state sovereignty is not compromised by supranational decisions. A 
‘conditional’ position on Europe implies the rejection of decisions taken by 
supranational institutions and the endorsement of reform so that nation state interests 
are guaranteed. Cooperation has already gone too far and opposition to an ever closer 
union is strong. Whereas both the practice of integration and the institutional balance of 
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powers are dismissed, intergovernmental cooperation within the EU structures and in 
policies deemed beneficial to the nation state is largely supported. To be sure, there is a 
great variation of the policies each ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptic wishes to be governed 
intergovernmentally. ‘Conditional’ Eurosceptics tend to favour the creation of a Europe 
administered by an institutional framework resembling a confederation, namely 
intergovernmental cooperation without the presence or with limited power of 
supranational institutions. Legitimacy of the EU project is denied to the extent that a 
majority of decisions have been taken by supranational institutions and not by the 
member states.  
‘Compromising Euroscepticism’ comprises acceptance of a common European culture, 
support for the principle and the practice of integration but opposition to the future 
building of a European polity. ‘Compromising’ Eurosceptics admit that European 
integration is not necessarily a good thing but that some of its aspects are beneficial to 
the state. Transferring decision-making power to European institutions is particularly 
unattractive. However, a degree of integration is necessary for the general prosperity of 
the state and particularly in the economic domain. Partaking in the EU structures and 
institutions provides the possibility to (re)negotiate change and reform from within the 
EU institutional structures in order to promote one’s national interest. This implies a 
willingness to ‘play by the rules of the game’ aiming to reinforce the EU’s 
intergovernmental aspect as well as the member states’ decision-making power 
typically (but not necessarily) to the detriment of supranational institutions. An ever 
closer union is not acceptable, however, because that would entail reinforcing 
federalism. Although this pattern of opposition to the EU project has a negative 
character, it may not necessarily be considered as Eurosceptic; Szczerbiak and Taggart 
prefer to use the term ‘Euro-criticism’ or ‘Euro-contestation’ when discussing similar 
types of attitude (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008d: 252).  
As seen in table 3.2 below, a cultural definition of Europe is a point of agreement 
among the three patterns of radical right Euroscepticism. Europe is seen as standing on 
a tripod composed by ancient Greek democracy, Roman legal tradition, and 
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Christianity.6 These three necessary constituent elements provide the basis for a cultural 
as well as a spatial definition of Europe. They also generate the justification of the 
almost unanimous position of radical right parties against Turkish EU accession. 
Furthermore, opposing the future building of a European polity under the auspices of 
the EU represents the lowest common denominator of radical right negative attitudes on 
European integration.7   
Table 3.2 Patterns of radical right opposition to European integration  
 
Aspects of European Integration 
Patterns of 
opposition  
Cultural 
Definition 
Principle of 
cooperation  
Policy 
practice  
Future  
EU polity  
Rejectionist  In favour  Against  Against Against 
Conditional  In favour  In favour  Against Against 
Compromising  In favour  In favour  In favour  Against 
 
Given that, as mentioned above, radical right attitudes on European integration is a case 
of ‘sovereignty-based’ Euroscepticism (Sørensen 2008), the issue of sovereignty in 
their discourse needs to be addressed. The transfer of decision-making power to 
European institutions is prominent within all three types but is viewed in a different 
manner. Both the ‘rejectionist’ and ‘conditional’ patterns entail strong opposition to 
supranationalism and ceding one’s sovereignty to the benefit of European institutions. 
Any type of transfer of sovereignty to European institutions on any type of issue is 
unacceptable. However, ‘conditional’ Eurosceptics differ to ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptics 
on three grounds. First, they recognize that particular issues cannot be resolved 
exclusively at the domestic level. Second and as a result of the first, they are willing to 
accept that European countries must actively cooperate at a multilateral level. Third, 
they agree that cooperation can take place within the EU framework only if the latter is 
reformed. This entails taking power away from supranational institutions to the benefit 
                                                
6 Note that this definition of European identity directly applies to the radical right’s world view 
and may not necessarily be shared by other parties or the European public. For a detailed 
discussion of European identity from the citizens’ perspective, see Bruter, M. Citizens of 
Europe?: the emergence of a mass European identity, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.  
7 To clarify, the patterns suggested here are devised in order to provide useful information 
regarding party discourse. They have indeed an ordinal character, namely ranging from more to 
less opposition against the EU. However, measuring the exact distance between them is outside 
the scope of this chapter.  
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of member states. This sometimes is articulated in a ‘Europe of Nations’ discourse or 
supporting the prospect of a European confederation.  
‘Compromising’ Eurosceptics do not support the transfer of sovereignty either. 
Nevertheless, they accept –albeit not without criticisms– the current structures of 
European integration. A degree of European integration is desirable because it brings 
important economic advantages and prosperity to the member states. The main 
difference between the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ patterns in terms of the 
issue of sovereignty lies in how the current EU framework is treated. Whereas the first 
push for intergovernmental cooperation in all policy spheres advocating a framework 
lacking supranational institutions, the latter are willing to act within the existing EU 
structures, in other words to ‘play by the rules of the game’.  
To clarify, the issue of sovereignty to European institutions is prominent within all 
radical right Eurosceptic patterns. As mentioned above, these parties’ EU position can 
be broadly grouped as belonging to Sorensen’s (2008) ‘sovereignty type’. However, the 
act of ceding national sovereignty to European institutions is viewed in a different 
manner across these patterns. Both the ‘rejectionist’ and ‘conditional’ patterns are 
fervent opponents of supranationalism and oppose transferring absolute sovereignty to 
European institutions on any type of policy. However, the ‘conditional’ Eurosceptics are 
willing to accept that European countries must cooperate at a multilateral level on 
particular issues, which they believe cannot be resolved exclusively at the domestic 
level. ‘Conditional’ Euroscpetics usually suggest the creation of a confederation 
whereby important issues would be dealt with at a higher level while at the same time 
member states would retain national sovereignty. ‘Rejectionist’ Eurosceptics only accept 
bilateral nation state cooperation on a case-by-case basis and are against their country’s 
EU membership.  
‘Compromising’ Eurosceptics also adopt a national interest rhetoric criticising the extent 
to which EU member states have ceded sovereignty towards European institutions. 
Nevertheless, they accept –albeit not without criticisms–  the current structures of 
European integration. To a degree European integration is desirable as it brings 
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advantages to the member states. The main difference between the ‘conditional’ and the 
‘compromising’ Eurosceptics lies in how they view the current EU framework for 
European cooperation. Whereas the first do not accept that the EU is the desirable 
platform for cooperation suggesting alternative frameworks (i.e. a confederal structure), 
the later are willing to act within the existing structures of the EU. In other words, 
‘compromising’ Eurosceptics are willing to play by the rules of the game.  
In sum, the demarcation line between the ‘rejectionist’ and the ‘conditional’ 
Eurosceptics lies in their view on the issue of withdrawal from the EU. The 
‘conditional’ Eurosceptics significantly differ from the ‘compromising’ Eurosceptics 
because they do not accept that the EU is the desirable framework for European 
cooperation.  
3.3 Radical right attitudes on European integration: an empirical overview   
This section, which is largely empirical, tests the validity and relevance of the above 
patterns though a qualitative analysis of party literature of twelve radical right parties 
from ten European countries (see table 3.3). 8  Radical right parties are defined here on 
the basis of Mudde’s (2007: 26) suggestion that their ‘core ideology is a combination of 
nativism, authoritarianism, and populism’. The parties included in this study feature in 
Mudde’s appendix of populist radical right parties (2007: 305-308). The thesis also 
studies the Italian National Alliance which only features in Mudde’s 2000 appendix 
(Mudde 2000: 185). Recent academic discussions have pointed towards the party’s 
steady evolution towards a conservative party under Gianfranco Fini’s leadership 
(Ignazi 2005). While agreeing with the conclusions in the literature, it is indisputable 
that the party has its origins in right-wing radicalism given that it is the offspring of the 
fascist Italian Social Movement and as such it is included in the current study. 
Party programmes have been selected as they are carefully crafted compromises 
representing the party as a whole and directed both externally to potential voters as well 
                                                
8 The chapter does not consider the Greater Romanian Party due to the lack of linguistic skills on 
the part of the author.  
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as internally to the party members. The chapter examines party stances as signalled by 
official party programmes and statements but recognises that the European position 
may be nuanced within the parties, especially privately. The analysis is based on party 
manifestos during the period 1999-2009 and some secondary sources on the parties. To 
the extent that this has been possible, both national and European elections manifestos 
have been selected. A qualitative methodological approach is preferred here because it 
has the potential to unfold the different argumentation of the parties. This will enrich 
and add qualitative substance to expert surveys’ numerical assessments, which will be 
discussed both at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
3.3.1 The ‘Rejectionist’ pattern  
The parties belonging to this pattern are the French National Front, the League of Polish 
Families, the British National Party and the Italian Tricolour Flame. These parties 
display among others similar positions on the issues of sovereignty transfer, European 
legislation, immigration, enlargement, and foreign policy. Although they accept that 
European peoples share cultural, historical and religious characteristics, they are against 
the principle of ceding national sovereignty to non-national institutions and oppose any 
European legislation or Treaty. They also blame the EU suggesting that it has been one 
of the sources of their domestic immigration and economic problems. These parties do 
not accept the principle that nations should cooperate at a higher European level. They 
advocate that policies must remain strictly national and wish for their country’s EU 
withdrawal. They clearly reject the EU policy practice and the future building of an EU 
polity openly questioning the latter’s political legitimacy.  
The National Front is a staunch critic of European integration. In the beginning of the 
1990s, the party’s EU stance was clear. France should ‘exit the European Union’ 
(National Front 2002a: 26)9. Over the years, its position on French EU withdrawal has 
become slightly indirect but nevertheless existent. The party expresses its wish for the 
overhauling of the European Treaties. It suggests a tour of European capitals in order to 
renegotiate the Treaties. In case of failure of agreement with the EU member states, the 
                                                
9 Original text: ‘Sortir la France de l'Union européenne’ 
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National Front advocates the organisation of a popular referendum on the question  
‘Should France regain its independence vis-à-vis the Europe of Brussels?’(National 
Front 2007: 61) 10 . This rhetoric indicates that the party advances French EU 
withdrawal. This should take place in a hassle-free manner, just like a velvet divorce. 
Indeed, the literature suggests that the party ‘calls for a restoration of French 
sovereignty and independence and for the exit of France from the EU’ (Hainsworth, 
O'Brien et al. 2004: 47). The party supports the restoration of the French currency as 
well as the reestablishment of French internal border controls. In 2004, Jean Marie Le 
Pen argued ‘Let’s liberate France’ (National Front 2004)11 while in 2009 that ‘Their 
Europe is not our Europe’(National Front 2009)12. 
The League of Polish Families argues along similar lines in favour of Polish 
withdrawal. The 2008 manifesto maintains the party’s opposition to Polish EU 
membership and argues that ‘We oppose the incorporation of Poland into the European 
Union and we will strive so that Polish people reject integration within the European 
Union in the national referendum’. Thus, in the case of a national referendum, the party 
would reject European integration (League of Polish Families 2008)13. The party argues 
that the EU ‘being a supranational quasi State structure whose interests conflict with 
those of the individual nation states’14 ‘seeks to overshadow national cultures’ 15 and 
‘abolishes the independence of individual countries’ (League of Polish Families 2004: 
29)16.  
Along similar lines, the British National Party argues ‘Back to British independence’ 
(British National Party 2001: 1) and ‘Leaving the European Union – The sine qua non’ 
viewing the EU as an aspiring super state against British interests (British National 
Party 2005: 5). In the 2009 EP elections the party argued that ‘By voting for the BNP 
you will be voting to put the interests of Britain and British People FIRST. Our policy 
                                                
10 Original text: ‘La France doit-elle reprendre son indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe de 
Bruxelles?’  
11 Original text: ‘Liberons la France’ 
12 Original text: ‘Leur Europe n’est pas la notre’ 
13 Original in English.  
14 Original text: ‘The EU is a - Unia Europejska jest taką poza- i ponadnarodową strukturą 
quasi-państwową. Posiada interesy często rozbieżne z interesami poszczególnych narodów.’ 
15 Original text: ‘Unia Europejska dąży do wygaszenia narodowych kultur’ 
16 Original text: ‘Unia Europejska znosi niepodległość poszczególnych państw’ 
 78
on the European Union is clear, straightforward and unambiguous: Britain would be 
better off out of the EU’ (British National Party 2009: 2). The Italian Tricolour Flame 
indirectly advocates withdrawal arguing that Italy and the European states should 
restore political sovereignty and that the EU has been artificially created in Maastricht 
from the elites and without the will of the people (Tricolour Flame 2006: 2). 
3.3.2 The ‘Conditional’ pattern 
The radical right parties adopting a ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic position strongly 
differentiate themselves from the ‘rejectionist’ pattern in that they do not maintain that 
their countries should exit the EU. These are the Austrian Freedom Party, the Belgian 
Flemish Interest, the Italian Northern League (Lega Nord), the Danish People’s Party, 
the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and the Bulgarian Attack. For these parties, 
the EU framework as currently conceived is clearly not the right platform for European 
multilateral cooperation. In contrast to the previous category, they crucially accept the 
principle that European peoples need and should cooperate. They refrain from 
supporting the current policy and institutional practice as well as the future building of 
a European polity.  
As far as the Austrian Freedom Party is concerned, we learn from the literature that it 
has ‘used the campaign before the general elections to underline its scepticism 
regarding EU enlargement’ (Pelinka 2004: 216). The party has been sceptical with 
respect to the lifting of any kind of borders within the Union and has promoted a 
general rethinking of Austria’s membership (Pelinka 2004: 222). The party has called 
the European Constitution a ‘madness’.  Adreas Mölzer, the party’s only MEP during 
the legislative period 2004-2009, argues that ‘Europe of the Brussels syndicate has 
nothing in common with the conception of a Europe of free and sovereign states’ 
(Mölzer 2007)17. The party has a cultural conception of Europe stating that Europe ‘is 
grounded in the Western Christian community of values’ (Austrian Freedom Party 
2005: 8)18. The party argues that the future of Europe lies in the close cooperation of its 
peoples. It mentions that the EU is only one part of the European reality and should not 
                                                
17 Original in English. 
18 Original text: Es gründet in der christlich-abendländischen Wertegemeinschaft. 
 79
develop to a European federal state. The Freedom Party ‘is committed to a Europe of 
free and independent homelands as part of a confederation of sovereign Nation states’ 
(Austrian Freedom Party 2008: 5) 19  calling for ‘the maintenance of Austria's 
sovereignty in a Europe of nations’ (Austrian Freedom Party 2006)20. It supports the 
radical reduction of EU bureaucracy (Austrian Freedom Party 2009: 1) and rejects 
enlargement to Turkey (Austrian Freedom Party 2004: 1; 2009: 2). The party puts 
forward an alternative framework for European cooperation thus accepting the principle 
of integration. It nevertheless disagrees both with the EU policy practice and the 
building of a future European polity.  
Similarly, the Flemish Interest criticises the EU for being bureaucratic and intruding the 
sovereignty of the nation state and its people. The party argues that the EU should 
neither evolve into a political union nor a federation (Flemish Interest 2004: 27). It is 
critical towards the EU as it is currently conceived arguing that the nation state should 
take precedence. ‘The Flemish Interest supports a confederal Europe that respects 
national and self-determination. Not a European superstate, but an intergovernmental or 
confederal alliance of sovereign nations’ (Flemish Interest 2009a)21. The party says 
‘Yes to Europe, No to EU Super State’ being ‘against an EU super state that gains more 
and more control over the internal affairs of the different member states; the nation 
states have to remain the most important pillars of European cooperation’ (Flemish 
Interest 2009b) 22 . It does not, however, advocate withdrawal giving preference to 
intergovernmental cooperation within the framework of a European confederation. It 
argues that ‘The creation of a federal Europe is impossible and undesirable because 
Europe is a mosaic of peoples, all having an ancient history, their own language and 
culture, tradition of law with specific collective goals. There does not exist a European 
                                                
19 Original text: ‘Die FPÖ bekennt sich zu einem Europader freien und unabhängigen 
Vaterländer im Rahmen eines Staatenbundes souveräner Nationalstaaten.’ 
20 Original text: ‘Die FPÖ fordert die Aufrechterhaltung der Souveränität Österreichs in einem 
Europa der Vaterländer’  
21  Original text: ‘Het Vlaams Belang is voorstander van een confederaal Europa dat de 
eigenheid en het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van de naties respecteert. Geen Europese superstaat, 
maar een intergouvernementeel of confederaal samenwerkingsverband van soevereine naties.’ 
22 Original text: ‘Verenigd Europa ja, superstaat EU neen Wij zijn tegen een EU-superstaat die 
steeds dieper ingrijpt in de interne aangelegenheden van de verschillende lidstaten;  de 
natiestaten zijn en blijven de peilers van verdere Europese samenwerking.  ’ 
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identity in the same sense as an American identity. No one considers themselves 
primarily Europeans and then Italian or Swedish.’(Flemish Interest 2009c: 6)23. 
Conti (2003: 27) finds that the Northern League’s position has changed from a 
supportive to a much more radical stance. Quaglia (2003: 18) also indicates this shift 
arguing that it is consolidating its Euroscepticism. Indeed the party criticises the 
European institutions for not being close to European citizens and for not respecting the 
traditions and cultures of European peoples. The party promotes a ‘Europe that is a free 
association of European peoples’ (Northern League 2004: 1) 24  but is against the 
creation of a European federal state arguing that their vision of Europe is not one of ‘a 
centralised super-state led by technocrats who are politically irresponsible for their 
actions’ (Northern League 2004: 1)25. It argues that ‘we must construct a Europe that is 
founded on the respect of national and territorial realities, giving the European Union 
only a limited degree of sovereignty, delimiting its competences and the fields of its 
intervention avoiding ambiguities’ (Northern League 2006: 26) 26 . For the party, 
‘integration means pursuing our commonalities but also embracing our specificities’ 
(Northern League 1999: 2)27.  ‘We are in favour of a confederal model in which the 
various member states maintain their sovereignty and where the regional and territorial 
specificities are recognised’ (Northern League 2009: 61)28. The party is also against the 
European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty supporting its ratification through the 
means of a referendum (Northern League 2008). Thus whereas the Northern League 
                                                
23 Original text: ‘Een federaal Europa is onmogelijk en ongewenst omdat Europa een mozaiëk is 
van volkeren, allemaal met een eeuwenoude geschiedenis, met een eigen taal en cultuur, 
rechtstraditie en met eigen specifieke collectieve doelstellingen. Er bestaat geen Europese 
identiteit in dezelfde zin als er een Amerikaanse identiteit is. Niemand beschouwt zich in de 
eerste plaats Europeaan en pas daarna Italiaan of Zweed.’ 
24  Original text: ‘la realizzazione di un’Europa che sia una libera associazione dei popoli 
europei.’ 
25 Original text: ‘L’Europa dei Popoli non è quindi un Super Stato neo-centralista guidato da 
tecnocrati politicamente irresponsabili del loro operato’ 
26 Original text: ‘si deve cercare di costruire un’Europa fondata sul rispetto delle realtà nazionali 
e territoriali, cedendo all’Unione Europea solo una limitata parte di sovranità,delimitando 
chiaramente le proprie competenze; vanno delimitati con precisione gli ambiti di intervento 
dell’Unione Europea, evitando norme ambigue ed indefinite 
27 Original text: ‘Integrare significa ricercare tutto ciò che è comune e valorizzare tutto ciò che è 
specifico.’ 
28 Original text: ‘Ecco perché vogliamo un’Unione europea retta su un modello confederale, in 
cui i vari Stati membri mantengano inalterate le proprie sovranità, e dove le Regioni e i territori 
vedano riconosciuti le proprie specificità e differenze’ 
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accepts the principle of EU cooperation, it discards the current policy arrangements and 
rejects future EU cooperation.   
Whereas the Danish People’s Party is against European unification and suggests that 
the EU must not gain power over the member states, it sustains that particular policies 
may be dealt with at a European multilateral level. In its 2002 programme, the party 
argues ‘The Danish People's Party wishes friendly and dynamic cooperation with all the 
democratic and freedom-loving peoples of the world, but we will not allow Denmark to 
surrender its sovereignty. As a consequence, the Danish People's Party opposes the 
European Union.’ (Danish People's Party 2002)29. Danish sovereignty is very important 
to the party and as a result, ‘nothing can be put above the Danish Constitution’ (Danish 
People's Party 2002) 30 . Whereas the party argues against European unification 
suggesting that the EU must not gain power over the member states, it promotes 
particular policies of its interest that should be dealt at a European multilateral level 
‘We oppose the development of the EU which is going towards the United states of 
Europe. The Danish People’s Party wants a close and friendly cooperation in Europe 
(Danish People's Party 2004) but cooperation should be limited to areas such a trade 
policy, environmental policy and technical cooperation. We oppose the introduction of 
a European political union’ (Danish People's Party 2002)31. The party believes that the 
EU’s functions ‘must be limited to: issues that great member-state majorities wish to be 
addressed through the EU, where cross-border nature of issues calls for common 
solutions and where economies of scale call for common solutions’ (Danish People's 
Party 2007)32. Whereas in 1999 the party was adamantly against the EP accusing it for 
various scandals (Danish People's Party 1999), in the 2000s it agrees to a Parliament 
with controlled functions (Danish People's Party 2004). The party supports cooperation 
                                                
29 Original text: ‘Dansk Folkeparti ønsker et venskabeligt og dynamisk samarbejde med alle 
demokratiske og frihedselskende nationer i verden, men vi vil ikke acceptere, at Danmark 
afgiver suverænitet. Heraf følger, at Dansk Folkeparti er modstander af Den Europæiske Union’  
30 Original text: ‘Det betyder, at intet må sættes højere end den danske Grundlov’  
31 Vi er modstandere af udviklingen i EU, som går i retning af Europas Forenede Stater. Dansk 
Folkeparti ønsker et tæt og venskabeligt samarbejde i Europa, men samarbejdet skal begrænses 
til områder som handelspolitik, miljøpolitik og teknisk samarbejde. Vi er modstandere af 
indførelsen af en europæisk politisk union. 
32 Original text: ‘Dansk Folkeparti mener, at EU´s funktioner skal indskrænkes til at omfatte: * 
opgaver, som store befolkningsflertal i medlemslandene ønsker at løse gennem EU, ** opgaver, 
hvis grænseoverskridende karakter nødvendiggør fælles løsninger, *** opgaver, for hvilke der 
er afgørende stordriftsfordele i fælles løsninger.’ 
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in general but opposes the introduction of a European political union or a federal state 
(Danish People's Party 2004) and argues that Denmark shall remain a sovereign state 
especially as far as its borders are concerned. 
Similarly, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally sustains that the future of Greece is linked 
to a great extent to the EU. However, this can only occur within the context of a 
confederation whereby member states would recognise and protect their historic, 
cultural and ethnic roots as well as the ethnic characteristics of the European peoples 
(LAOS 2007: 23). ‘Greek EU integration can only occur within the context of a 
Confederation and only under the condition that our national specificities would be 
protected’ (LAOS 2003: 12)33. LAOS ‘does not deny Greece’s European identity’ 
(LAOS 2003: 8)34 accepting ‘a Europe of nations’ (LAOS 2004: 2)35 whereby European 
nation states would cooperate in matters of mutual interest. However, the party 
expresses strong criticisms against the EU’s current and future trajectory arguing that 
the European Constitution’s goal is to ‘destroy our national sovereignty and abolish the 
differences between peoples’ (LAOS 2005: 1)36.  
Lastly, the Bulgarian Attack does not dedicate much space in its electoral programme 
on the EU, indicating the low importance of the issue in the party’s agenda. The EU is 
briefly discussed in the foreign policy section arguing that Bulgaria’s foreign relations 
must be expanded to include not only the EU but also other states (Attack 2009). This 
indicates that although the party is a fervent supporter of the maintenance of national 
sovereignty, it accepts the existence of the EU as a foreign policy actor. While it seeks 
to reinforce foreign relations with other states, it does not find Bulgaria’s EU 
withdrawal as a desirable alternative.    
                                                
33 Original text: ‘Η ενσωμάτωση επομένως της χώρας μας στη Ε.Ε. μπορεί να γίνει μόνο στα 
πλαίσια μιας Συνομοσπονδίας και υπό τον όρο ότι θα προστατεύεται η ιδιαιτερότητά μας’ 
34 Original text: ‘Ο ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. δεν αρνείται την ευρωπαϊκή ταυτότητα της Ελλάδος,’ 
35 Original text: ‘Εμείς δεχόμαστε μια Ευρώπη των Εθνών’ 
36 Original text: ‘Στοχεύει μάλιστα στην αλλοτρίωση της εθνικής ταυτότητας και την κατάργηση 
της διαφορετικότητας των λαών.’  
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3.3.3 The ‘Compromising’ pattern 
The parties belonging to this pattern agree with the principle for cooperation and the 
policy practice of European integration. They also acknowledge that their country’s 
economic prosperity is largely a result of cooperation within the EU framework. These 
parties are the Italian National Alliance (Alleanza Nazionale) and the Latvian For 
Fatherland and Freedom (Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK). They suggest that the EU 
should be reformed within its existing structures and refrain from proposing an 
alternative framework for cooperation, such as the confederation argued by some of the 
parties belonging to the ‘conditional’ pattern. Nevertheless, they are not active 
proponents of further integration nor do they promote the uploading of further national 
policies to the European level.  
In his analysis of party positions on integration in Italy, Conti argues that the Italian 
National Alliance attaches particular importance to the nation. It ‘rejects the idea of a 
federal Europe and supports one of a looser union where the power of nation states is 
preserved and the outcomes of European integration are systematically checked’ (Conti 
2003: 26). It argues that national specificities constitute Europe’s wealth and the EU 
should not ‘negate the nation state but rather constitute a Confederation of nation states; 
in this sense the states and their interests would contribute to rather than obstruct the 
formulation of the European interests and priorities’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)37. In 
this respect, Italy should not entrust itself to Europe but contribute to remake Europe 
taking into account Italian specificity (National Alliance 2006a: 13). The party is 
against abandoning national sovereignty arguing that   ‘The Right has always argued in 
favour of a Europe of nations rich by its identities and cultures that should be respected 
and cannot be reversed by a Super State’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)38. Nonetheless, 
the party supports a number of EU policies including technology, energy and the 
Lisbon Agenda as well as the reduction of the transatlantic technology gap with 
                                                
37 Original text: ‘non annullando gli Stati nazionali bensì costituendo una Confederazione di 
Statinazione; in questo senso gli Stati e gli interessi nazionali contribuiscono e non sono di 
ostacolo alla formazione dell’interesse e delle priorità europei.’ 
38 Original text: ‘Ma la Destra ha anche sempre affermano il valore di un’Europa delle nazioni, 
ricchezza plurima di identità e culture, che vanno alimentate e rispettate e non possono essere 
annullate in un super Stato informe’ 
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particular focus on the energy security, the liberalisation of the market, the completion 
of the Trans-European Energy networks, and the support for renewable energy. 
Moreover, albeit without explicitly referring to Turkey, the party welcomes ‘new 
countries from Europe, which grows geographically and politically starting with the 
immediate neighbours where the Italian projection is very important (Southeastern 
Europe and the Balkans)’ (National Alliance 2006a: 9)39. The Italian National Alliance 
feels that it is a European force and intends to contribute to the process of EU reform. 
The party views integration through a cost-benefit analysis approach and seeks to 
reinforce the Italian national interest through participating in the European institutions 
(Conti 2003). This clearly indicates that the party has accepted that it should promote 
Italian interests within the existing EU structures.  
Likewise, the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom argues that the EU must be 
strengthened only as an association of member states and that Latvian politicians should 
work hard to achieve advantageous conditions for their country within the EU (For 
Fatherland and Freedom 2006). Latvia is seen as part of the western European cultural 
and historical heritage. The party supports Latvia’s EU integration. The latter is 
considered as a means to stabilise the independence and democratic statehood of Latvia. 
As an EU member, however, Latvia should not diminish its national identity and 
cultural distinction and should always seek to maintain its national interest. ‘We will 
strengthen member state national sovereignty’ (For Fatherland and Freedom 2004: 1)40 
working to achieve advantageous conditions for Latvia and Latvian citizens. ‘We 
support a Europe where the EU and the member states share accountability and 
responsibilities, rather than the creation of a federal Europe or a "superpower". The EU 
should have competence in issues where it can act more efficiently than individual 
member states’ (For Fatherland and Freedom 2009: 1)41. ‘The European Parliament 
platform should not contribute to the erosion of Latvian and national sovereignty’ (For 
                                                
39 Original text: ‘di nuovi paesi in un'Europa che si amplia geograficamente e politicamente, a 
cominciare dai icini prossimi dove massima è la proiezione italiana (Europa sud‐orientale e 
balcanica).’  
40 Original text: ‘Mēs stiprināsim ES valstu nacionālo suverenitāti.’ 
41 Original text: ‘Mēs atbalstām tādu Eiropu, kur atbildība un pienākumi tiek solidāri dalīti starp 
ES un dalībvalstīm, nevis federālas Eiropas "supervaras" radīšanu. ES kompetencē jābūt tiem 
jautājumiem, kuros tā var rīkoties efektīvāk nekā individuāla dalībvalsts.’ 
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Fatherland and Freedom 2009: 2)42. Latvia’s EU aim is not to delegate too much of its 
sovereignty but to achieve a union of free and equal nation states in favour of the 
principle that member states can be the decision-makers in important policies, including 
foreign policy, defence, security and taxation (For Fatherland and Freedom 2004: 1).  
Both parties have thus accepted that they should promote and strengthen their country’s 
position within the existing structures of the EU. In other words, they have accepted to 
play by the ‘rules of the game’.  
Table 3.3 Radical right party positions on European integration 
 
Patterns of opposition to European integration  
 Rejectionist  Conditional  Compromising    
Austria   Austrian Freedom Party   
Belgium  Flemish Interest    
Bulgaria  Attack   
Denmark   Danish People’s Party   
France National Front    
Greece  Popular Orthodox Rally   
Italy  Tricolour Flame  Northern League National Alliance 
Latvia   For Fatherland 
and Freedom  
Poland League of Polish Families   
United 
Kingdom 
British National Party    
 
 
The above analysis has resulted in the categorisation of four radical right parties in the 
‘rejectionist’ pattern, six parties in the ‘conditional’ pattern and two in the 
‘compromising’ pattern. Since one of the aims of this chapter has been to provide 
qualitative support for quantitative assessments of party positions, it is worth comparing 
the results of this study to those of the latest 2006 Chapel Hill survey (Hooghe, Bakker 
et al. 2010). As seen in table 3.4 below, they largely overlap. On the question ‘Overall 
orientation of the party leadership towards European integration’, the National Front 
                                                
42 Original text: ‘Eiropas Parlamenta tribīne nedrīkst tikt izmantota Latvijas un citu dalībvalstu 
suverenitātes graušanai,’ 
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and the League of Polish Families score respectively the lowest scores. The opposite is 
true for the Italian National Alliance and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom. Six 
parties rank somewhere in the middle. Note that the Chapel Hill Survey has not 
measured the EU positions of the British National Party and the Italian Tricolour 
Flame.  
Table 3.4 2006 Chapel Hill party scores on the question ‘Overall orientation of the 
party leadership towards European integration’  
Pattern Party name Chapel Hill Score 
Rejectionist British National Party  - 
 League of Polish Families 1.38 
 National Front  1 
 Tricolour Flame - 
Conditional  Attack                                            2.46 
 Austrian Freedom Party                1.75 
 Danish People’s Party 2.33 
 Flemish Interest                            2.5 
 Northern League  1.5 
 Popular Orthodox Rally                2.38 
Compromising For Fatherland and Freedom         4.75 
 National Alliance 4.75 
Note: (1=strongly opposed; 7=strongly in favour) 
Conclusion  
In an attempt to provide a bridge between the literature on radical right parties and the 
study of Euroscepticism, this chapter has proposed the conceptualisation of radical right 
opposition to European integration into the rejectionist, conditional and compromising 
patterns. It has presented for facets of European integration, including the definition of 
Europe, the principle, the policy practice and the future building of a European polity. It 
is on the basis of these four indicators that the three patterns have been identified. This 
chapter has lastly provided a qualitative analysis of party literature aiming to improve 
our understanding of the nuanced radical right anti-EU argumentation. By building on 
our existing knowledge of these parties’ EU positions from expert surveys, it has 
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systematically mapped and analysed the nature of radical right Euroscepticism during 
the 1999-2009 decade.  
The identification of four fundamental aspects of European integration may become 
helpful in providing a solution to the wider problem of measuring the dependent 
variable, i.e. different levels of Euroscepticism. They can add precision and clarity when 
assessing a party’s position on Europe and may be used to identify similar patterns 
within different party families. This, however, is true with a caveat. The definition of 
Europe may need to be refined in order to apply to other party families. The usefulness 
of this three-fold conceptualisation of radical right Euroscepticism lies in identifying the 
nuances of the phenomenon in descriptive terms. The three patterns have also an 
analytical purpose since different patterns of Euroscepticism may be associated with 
different party behaviour at the domestic level.  
The qualitative analysis of party literature demonstrates that, although these parties 
belong to the same party family, they display three utterly different patterns of 
opposition to European integration. This is a striking finding for a number of reasons. 
First, it provides evidence to support that radical right parties do not only differentiate 
themselves from other party families given that they adopt a ‘sovereignty type’ 
Euroscepticism. They also seek to differentiate themselves from each other. Second, it 
demonstrates that radical right parties although highly nationalistic in character, do not 
present themselves as being anti-European in the wider sense of the term. They willingly 
accept the common aspects shared by European peoples because these serve to 
distinguish ‘us’ from the ‘others’. Third, and perhaps contrary to common ‘journalistic’ 
wisdom, not all radical right parties oppose European integration to the extent of 
pushing for their country’s EU withdrawal. Instead, some radical right parties are rather 
pragmatic in their approach to integration.   
These findings have important implications in terms of possible explanations of party-
based Euroscepticism. Arguably the issue of European integration may be assimilated 
into pre-existing ideologies that reflect long-standing commitments on fundamental 
domestic issues. Traditional cleavage theory may account for general party response to 
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European integration (Marks and Wilson 2000).  However, the findings of this chapter 
demonstrate that traditional cleavage theory is less able to explain the extent of 
opposition or to predict different types of argumentation within a given party family. 
Other predictors of party-based Euroscepticism, including the national context and party 
strategic objectives within the domestic party system may also have explanatory power. 
This is especially true for radical right parties. Given that nationalism is core to their 
ideology, their European position may be largely influenced by the national context. A 
comparison of radical right party policies and preferences across Europe ‘can tell us a 
great deal about the boundedness of the various party families’ (Treschel and Mair 
2009: 2).  It can offer great insights into how an issue may be emphasized in different 
political settings and provide some hints regarding the association between the issue of 
Europe and the dynamics of party competition in EU member states. To this aim, 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 intend to analyse in detail radical right party motivations behind 
adopting a different type of Euroscepticism by focusing on the French National Front, 
the Greek LAOS and the Italian National Alliance.  
Before doing so, the following chapter uses two datasets in order to make a graphic 
representation of how the phenomenon of radical right Euroscepticism manifests itself 
across Europe. Moreover, it uses the tools of spatial analysis in order to provide a visual 
and spatial overview of the structure of electoral competition in the political systems 
where the thesis’ case studies operate, namely France, Greece and Italy.  
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Chapter 4 
 
A spatial representation of radical right Euroscepticism  
 
Introduction  
Contrary to what has been argued in the literature, the third chapter of the thesis has 
substantiated that in fact the radical right party family displays dissimilar positions on 
European integration. The second chapter outlined the hypotheses deriving from the 
literature on party types, party behaviour and party-based Euroscepticism, which are 
used as the theoretical guidelines of this chapter. The hypotheses originate from the 
perspective of a party’s type and its expected behaviour in the party system. More 
precisely, it is hypothesised that (1) if a radical right party has anti-system elements, it is 
likely to adopt a European discourse antagonistic of European integration; (2) if a 
radical right party strives to have a catch-all appeal, it is likely to support the EU ‘under 
conditions’ and (3) if the party’s primary goal is to become part of the governing cartel 
and a major player within it, it is likely to downplay the issue of Europe and adopt a 
conciliatory position on European integration.  
Following from the above, the aim of this chapter is two fold. First, it analyses the 
general patterns and dynamics of radical right Euroscepticism. It employs data from two 
sources, namely the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010) and 
the 2009 European Election Study (EES 2009). Research is conducted in an exploratory 
manner in order to demonstrate how the phenomenon of radical right Euroscepticism 
manifests itself across Europe. The objective is to confirm that policy and ideology can 
be broadly kept similar among radical right parties, but that their positions on European 
integration specifically diverge.   
Second, it uses the tools of spatial analysis in order to provide a visual and spatial 
overview of the structure of electoral competition in France, Greece and Italy. Using 
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computerised content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, the 
chapter presents the case studies’ positions in comparison to the rest of the party system. 
This helps generate expectations regarding the three parties’ behaviour in the political 
system as well as the potential electorate they may appeal to. It is argued that the French 
National Front’s position in the French political system is very marginal. In contrast, the 
Greek Popular Orthodox Rally’s position is comparatively closer to other parties and 
much less isolated from the rest of the party system. The Italian National Alliance 
occupies the centre-right space in the system although  there is no party of political 
significance situated to its right.  
The chapter commences with a discussion of the dimensionality of domestic politics and 
proceeds with an evaluation of where radical right parties lie on the axes of political 
contestation across Europe. It continues with a short discussion of the computerised 
content analysis method. The last part of the chapter presents the results of the content 
analysis in France, Greece and Italy analysing party location within each political 
system. The findings are discussed with reference to the main hypotheses of the thesis.  
4.1 Dimensions of politics and structure of domestic party competition 
This section discusses the dimensionality of European politics and maps radical right 
parties on the main axes of political contestation. This allows the author to compare 
radical right parties cross-nationally. By examining the radical right party family across 
Europe using two datasets, two main points may be discerned. First, the parties under 
investigation vary very little in terms of their position on the left-right and libertarian-
authoritarian dimensions. Second, great variation can be discerned in terms of their 
position on European integration.  
4.1.1 Axes of political contestation  
It is widely acknowledged in the literature of comparative politics that ‘Most theories of 
political behaviour assume that the dimensionality of the political space is exogenously 
determined by social or value divisions’ (Hix 1999: 72). Political parties respond to 
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these societal value divisions -or cleavages- and are constrained by the political space, 
which is consecutively constructed in their domestic party system. According to 
Kitschelt, the three values captured by the slogan of the French Revolution ‘liberty, 
equality, fraternity’ are the principal social values endorsed by citizens in every political 
context and are responsible for creating dichotomies of interests. Each of these values 
‘envisions societal end-states associated with different, at times complementary, but 
more often conflicting modes of social organisation’ (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Consequently 
‘the programmatic content of political competition in contemporary democracies 
constitutes nothing but the perpetual struggle to cope with the trade-offs among the three 
ultimate values’ (Kitschelt 1994: 9), which are translated into social practice.  
The first societal value refers to the liberty in the market, namely to the trade-off 
between market and planned allocation of resources. Second, the value of equality 
relates to the principle of collective organisation binding all members of the society. 
These two values ‘mutually presuppose each other [and] beyond a threshold the two 
principles are associated with rival forms of organisation’ (Kitschelt 1994: 9). This 
occurs because proponents of the value of equality over that of liberty tend to prefer 
formal collective forms of political and economic organisation, usually provided by a 
strong state, over spontaneous market allocation of resources among groups and 
individuals. The political decision on this trade-off has been a major source of political 
polarisation in modern democracies. It clearly epitomises the political answer to the 
questions on how scarce resources must be allocated and which decision-making 
procedure must regulate this process. Because these two values presuppose one another, 
they are depicted in the literature by a single dimension of political contestation, namely 
the ‘distributive’ axis illustrating the decision on the economic allocation of resources. 
Here, this axis is referred to as the socialist-capitalist axis, the socialist pole indicating 
state-planned economy and egalitarian distribution of resources whereas the capitalist 
end of the axis representing complete market allocation of resources and individual 
economic freedom.  
The third value, fraternity, refers to the communitarian social order. The trade-off here is 
between exclusive and inclusive structures of the community and social values 
exemplified by on the one hand independent self-organised communities and 
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paternalistic societal hierarchy on the other. This trade-off is depicted in the libertarian-
authoritarian axis of political contestation and includes primarily positions on several 
non-economic societal issues. This axis may be thought to be independent from the 
distributive axis because the choice over the social aspects of the community does not 
tend to predict the choice on the allocation of resources. There is the theoretical and 
empirical possibility that a libertarian supports either market allocation of resources or 
state intervention. Similarly, there can be both economically right-wing and left-wing 
authoritarianism. Admittedly, economically left-wing socialist parties are much more 
likely to be libertarian but this does not exclude the possibility of a capitalist libertarian 
party, such as many liberal parties in Europe. The same applies to authoritarianism: 
right-wing authoritarianism is much more likely to occur but this must not preclude left-
wing authoritarianism, including (post-) fascist and hard-line communist parties.  
Based on the above, which are derived from Ktischelt’s work on political parties (1994; 
1995) as well as Marks and Steenbergen’s findings on the interaction between European 
integration and national political conflict (2004), it can be reasonably claimed that the 
European national party systems are two-dimensional in character. These two 
dimensions represent the major issues of political division in Europe and cut across each 
other. The first is contestation over economic redistribution, welfare and regulation of 
the economy. This is more accurately depicted by the socialist-capitalist axis and 
expresses the class conflict over resources. The second summarising the contestation 
over non-economic social issues and the structure of the community is depicted by the 
libertarian-authoritarian axis. This dimension ‘captures conflict about traditional values 
rooted in a secular/religious divide’ (Marks, Hooghe et al. 2006: 157). These two 
dimensions summarise how actors position themselves on major issues and on the basis 
of the finding that they cut across each other, four quadrants of a party’s ideological 
identity may be identified. These are clock-wise the libertarian-socialist, libertarian-
capitalist, authoritarian-capitalist and authoritarian-socialist.  
Given that positions such as left-libertarian and right-authoritarian are comparatively 
more common than intervention-authoritarian and free market-liberalism, scholars 
including Hix (1999) and Benoit and Laver (2006) have subsumed the two axes into a 
single left-right dimension. The left-right axis has been the traditional way to represent 
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deeply-entrenched views containing both positions on the economy and the structure of 
the community in a much simpler and parsimonious manner. There are advantages and 
disadvantages in subsuming party positions on both politics and economics in one axis. 
One the one hand, including the social and economic dimension into the left-right axis 
of political contestation tends to increase parsimony. On the other hand, breaking them 
into two dimensions undeniably increases accuracy and may indicate that there are 
growing numbers of conflicts that resist assimilation into a single dimension. For the 
purposes of this chapter and based on data availability, the positions of radical right 
parties will be spatially represented on all three dimensions. This may allow the 
researcher to discern whether these two types of representation tell a different or a 
similar story as far as radical right policy and ideology is concerned.  
Since the end of the 1990s with the beginning of party contestation over Europe, 
scholars increasingly employ a fourth dimension, namely the pro-anti integration 
dimension. This refers to parties’ overall orientation towards European integration. 
Actors are positioned on a continuum from ‘more’ to ‘less’ integration. The ‘process of 
political integration creates a (centre-periphery) division between groups whose identity 
and interests are threatened by integration and those whose identity and interests are 
protected’ (Hix 1999: 73) This dimension is somewhat an aggregate of party positions 
on a number of issues related to the EU, including among others the deepening of 
European integration, support for a number of EU policies, the transfer of power to EU 
institutions etc. It will be employed below in order to depict radical right party positions 
on European integration across Europe.  
4.1.2 Method and data  
For the spatial analysis, two types of data have been employed in two points in time 
during the 2000s. The first are the data provided by the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey 
(Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010), which collected information from expert surveys on party 
positions on different policy dimensions. This data measure party positions on a number 
of policies in Europe during the first part of the 2000s and are presented in terms of 
dimensions. The authors argue that ‘When the object of inquiry is complex, it makes 
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sense to rely on the evaluations of experts – that is, individuals who can access and 
process diverse sources of information.’ (Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010: 689). Expert 
surveys allow the researcher to construct dimensions deductively. This method can also 
summarize the judgements of experts in a systematic way (Benoit and Laver 2006: 9). It 
has been argued, however, that the approach may be treated with some caution (Mair 
2001).There may be potential pitfalls with the method regarding the expert selection, the 
question wording (Budge 2006) and the actual reliability of the estimates as some 
experts may provide information regarding the leadership rather than the party as a 
whole (Budge 2002).  
Given the potential criticisms of expert surveys, this data has been complemented by 
those from the 2009 European Parliament Election Study (EES 2009; Braun, Mikhaylov 
et al. 2010). This is a dataset emerging from the quantitative content analysis of party 
manifestos for the 2009 European Parliamentary Elections. The EES coding relies on 
the Comparative Manifesto Group’s (CMP) method (Budge 2001; Klingemann 2006) 
and it is very different to that of the Chapel Hill. It consists of breaking down the text of 
European party manifestos into ‘quasi-sentences’, which are defined as arguments or 
basic units of meaning. It proceeds by assigning each of these quasi-sentences into one 
of a number of pre-defined domains and issue categories (Klingemann 2006). Instead of 
measuring party positions on a specific dimension, this method is built around the 
assumption that ‘some policy issues are “important” to specified individuals in a given 
political context and others are not’ (Laver 2001: 69). It is based around a specific 
model of party competition, which assumes that parties compete ‘in terms of the 
salience of particular issues in the policy package that they put to voters’ (Laver 2001: 
72). This method measures the salience of an issue in a party’s agenda. It is 
operationalised not as the party’s substantive position on an issue but as the relative 
emphasis the party attaches to a given issue. Thus, the results of this coding are 
presented in terms of percentages, which intend to measure each party’s ‘relative 
emphasis’ on the predefined issues. By measuring issue salience, the CMP method seeks 
to ‘reflect both strategic considerations of how to shape policy positions in the current 
election so as to consolidate or attract votes, and the constraints imposed by long-
standing ideology’ (Klingemann 2006: 108; emphasis in original). The idea behind this 
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reasoning is that party programmes are not only a reflection of a party’s ideology. 
Instead it is the effect of a mixture of strategic and ideological calculations.  
To be sure, this approach has not been free from scholarly criticism either. Concerns 
have been raised, among others, regarding the theoretical groundings of the coding 
scheme and the reliability of the coding procedure (Benoit, Mikhaylov et al. 2008). This 
is the main reason behind the author’s choice to employ both datasets. If both datasets 
produce similar calculations of party policy in terms of (1) the pro-anti EU integration 
dimension and (2) the general left – right dimension, the author can safely argue in 
favour of reliability of the results.  
Before proceeding with the analysis, a few words must also be allocated to the sample. 
This section conducts a medium-N analysis and focuses on twelve political parties from 
ten European countries. These are the same radical right parties analysed in Chapter 3 of 
the thesis. The datasets employed here, however, do not include all these parties. The 
2006 Chapel Hill expert survey has estimated the positions of ten parties whereas the 
EES have coded nine. Fortunately, eight out of twelve parties are included in both 
datasets. As a result, there is scope for comparison. Table 4.1 below displays the parties 
considered by each approach.  
Table 4.1 Parties included in each dataset  
 
Party Name 2006 Chapel 
Hill Expert 
Survey 
2009 European 
Parliament 
Election Study  
National Alliance                √ - 
British National Party - √ 
Danish People’s Party √ √ 
French National Front √ √ 
Austrian Freedom Party √ √ 
Popular Orthodox Rally √ √ 
Northern League √ √ 
League of Polish Families √ - 
Attack  √ √ 
For Fatherland and 
Freedom              
√ √ 
Tricolour Flame - - 
Flemish Block                    √ √ 
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4.2.3 Radical right party mapping: Results and discussion  
Following from the above discussion on the dimensionality of European party systems 
and concerns over different approaches of estimating party positions, this section of the 
chapter maps the parties under investigation on the general left-right, pro-anti EU, 
socialist-capitalist and libertarian-authoritarian axes of political contestation. The 
importance of the party mapping lies in that it demonstrates whether and how the 
ideological profile of a party may be associated –if at all– to its position on Europe.  
Figure 4.1 below displays party scores on the two main dimensions on political 
contestation, including the libertarian-authoritarian and socialist-capitalist axes (for data 
see Appendix I). This visual representation of policy estimates is based on party 
estimates from the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey. On the socialist-capitalist dimension, 
value zero represents state-planned economy and egalitarian distribution of resources 
whereas value ten indicates support for complete market allocation of resources. On the 
libertarian-authoritarian axis, value ten suggests support for a paternalistic societal 
hierarchy whereas value zero the complete opposite. Figure 4.1 points to two important 
findings. First, the radical right economic agenda displays significant variation. No 
significant conclusion can be drawn from this finding as a party’s position on the 
socialist-capitalist axis does not seem to be correlated with its EU position. For instance, 
according to Chapter 3, both the League of Polish Families and the French National 
Front have been categorised as ‘rejectionist’ Eurosceptics. However, on the axis 
depicting their position on the economy, they are diametrically opposed. Note that 
variation in radical right positions on the economy is theoretically expected (Mudde 
2007: 119-137). In fact, the issue of the economy is a secondary feature in radical right 
ideology and receives little attention in their programmes and propaganda (Mudde 2007: 
133). This may be the reason why it does not seem to be correlated with radical right 
positions on European integration. Second, variation in radical right levels of 
authoritarianism is very small. Party values on the libertarian-authoritarian dimension 
vary from 7.63 for the Danish People’s Party to 10.00 for the French National Front. If 
one assumes that 7 can be a sensible cut-off point, then it can be reasonably argued that 
by and large radical right ideology is a constant variable among the cases.  
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Figure 4.1 Radical right party positions on the two main axes of political contestation  
Source: 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey  
Note: AN: National Alliance, DF: Danish People’s Party, FN: National Front, FPO: 
Austrian Freedom Party, LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally, LN: Northern League, LPR: 
League of Polish Families, NOA: Bulgarian Attack Party, TB-LNNK: For Fatherland 
and Freedom, VB: Flemish Block. 
 
For reasons of parsimony, in figure 4.2 the two axes have been subsumed into a general 
Left-Right dimension (for data see Appendix I). This figure illustrates additional 
information regarding the parties’ Euroscepticism again based on the 2006 Chapel Hill 
expert survey data. As argued in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the Chapel Hill estimates 
largely coincide with the author’s typology of radical right Euroscepticism. Value one in 
the pro-anti EU dimension indicates opposition whereas value ten support. In the left-
right axis, value zero indicates extreme left and value ten extreme right. The spatial 
analysis shows that, with the exception of the Bulgarian Attack (NOA) party, radical 
right parties are situated to the far right of the left-right dimension. If one excludes the 
Bulgarian Attack, values on this dimension vary from 7.67 for the Danish People’s Party 
to ten for the French National Front. In terms of party positions on the pro-anti EU axis 
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of political contestation, the analysis points to the fact that there exists a great degree of 
variation. The Italian National Alliance and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom 
both score 6.78 whereas the French National Front is the most anti-European radical 
right party scoring one.  
Figure 4.2 Radical right party positions  
 
Source: 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey  
Note: AN: National Alliance, DF: Danish People’s Party, FN: National Front, FPO: 
Austrian Freedom Party, LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally, LN: Northern League, LPR: 
League of Polish Families, NOA: Bulgarian Attack Party, TB-LNNK: For Fatherland 
and Freedom, VB: Flemish Block. 
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Figure 4.3 employs data from the EES study and depicts the parties on the pro-anti 
integration and left-right dimensions (for data see Appendix I)43. Given that it is the 
nature of this approach to measure issue salience, the spatial representation may be read 
in a different manner. What is important lies in the relative distance or absence of 
distance between the parties. Here, the same picture can be discerned. Again with the 
relative exception of the Bulgarian Attack party, on the left-right axis, the parties are 
situated very close together whereas on the pro-anti EU axis they are relatively further 
away from each other. The most positive references on the EU are recorded for the 
Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom whereas the most negative references are evident 
in the French National Front.  
Figure 4.3 Radical right party positions on the EU 
 
                                                
43 Note that the EES does not provide computed variables for the libertarian-authoritarian and socialist-
capitalist dimensions. As a result, only a general left-right and anti-pro European integration dimensions 
have been employed in the thesis.  
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Source: 2009 European Parliament Election Study   
Note: BNP: British National Party, DF: Danish People’s Party, FN: National Front, 
FPO: Austrian Freedom Party, LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally, LN: Northern League, 
NOA: Bulgarian Attack Party, TB-LNNK: For Fatherland and Freedom, VB: Flemish 
Block.  
 
The above figures should clearly point to two observations. First, radical right parties 
are generally ideologically similar across Europe. Second, their position on European 
integration varies to a large extent. These two observations corroborate arguments that 
have been made in Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. In summary, party ideology has been 
theoretically identified and empirically substantiated as a significant indicator of 
similarity among the parties under investigation. Moreover, party positions on European 
integration greatly diverge. The latter argument has been triangulated through the 
analysis of (1) expert surveys, (2) quantitative analysis of party manifestos and (3) the 
author’s own qualitative content analysis (the later in Chapter 3). Having substantiated 
the above arguments, the chapter proceeds by exploring in detail the thesis’ cases studies 
and their relative positions within their respective party systems.  
4.2 Estimating party positions: the Wordscores method   
4.2.1 Theoretical considerations  
Systematic information on the policies of key actors and parties enables the in-depth 
analysis of various forms of political competition. Thus, testing the hypotheses 
presented in Chapter 2 of the thesis requires that the case studies are clearly located in 
the political space within which they operate. To do so, the thesis departs from expert 
surveys and quantitative content analyses data. It analyses party manifestos using a 
novel approach, namely computerised content analysis (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003). This 
is an automated approach implemented in Benoit, Laver and Garry’s programme entitled 
‘Wordscores’, an application in STATA, a statistical software package. This 
methodological approach extracts policy positions from political texts. It estimates 
policy positions expressed in a text by treating the individual words ‘in that text as data 
to be scored rather than as words to be understood’ (Martin and Vanberg 2007: 93). This 
approach estimates party positions by comparing two sets of texts respectively called 
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reference and virgin texts. The first are a set of texts for which the researcher has 
estimated dimensions a priori based on independent sources. Using them as reference, 
the researcher estimates policy positions of the virgin texts. In particular, ‘we use the 
relative frequencies we observe for each of the different words in each of the reference 
texts to calculate the probability that we are reading a particular reference text, given 
that we are reading a particular word’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 313). The method 
treats words purely as data allocating them scores without considering their meanings. 
Using the word scores generated form the reference texts, it can successfully estimate 
the positions of virgin texts on a given policy dimension. This method has been 
successfully employed in a number of publications (see for instance Laver and Benoit 
2002; Proksch and Slapin 2006; Klemmensen, Hobolt et al. 2007). One of its main 
advantages lies in the ability of the researcher to estimate policy positions of texts 
written in any language, which is very relevant for the thesis as the cases involve the 
study of French, Greek and Italian.  
The method uses the reference texts in order to generate a dictionary of words on the 
basis of which it produces two important measures for the virgin texts, namely a raw 
score and a transformed score. The underlying assumption is that ‘the relative 
frequencies of word usage in the virgin texts are linked to policy positions in the same 
way as the relative frequencies of word usage in the reference texts’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 
2003: 316). The raw score is a numerical score representing the expected position of the 
virgin text on the dimension under investigation. The transformed score is central in the 
analysis as it enables the substantive interpretation of the raw score. Laver, Benoit and 
Garry have recommended their own transformed score method. This, however, has not 
come without controversy in the literature. The main argument against it comes from 
Martin and Vanberg (2007) who argue that Laver, Benoit and Garry’s rescaling 
procedure suffers from a number of shortcomings. They point out that the 
transformation procedure may be sensitive to the selection of virgin texts and that the 
transformation of the raw scores distorts the reference metric. The authors have 
produced their own transformation procedure in order to deal with these problems. They 
argue that ‘our transformation retains its key advantages over the LBG approach. It 
produces scores that are not sensitive to the set of virgin texts analysed and that 
accurately reflect the ideological positions of the texts as indicated by their word usage’ 
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(Martin and Vanberg 2007: 100). Admittedly, both transformation procedures can yield 
similar results. They are based on different assumptions and as a result none of them is 
necessarily better than the other. The Martin and Vanberg transformation is not sensitive 
to the virgin texts. However, ‘if more than two high-quality reference texts are available 
and transformation is motivated by a desire to compare like-for-like reference and 
virgin texts on the same metric, use the LBG transformation’ (Benoit and Laver 2008: 
110). For the purposes of the analysis, the LBG [Laver, Benoit, Garry] transformation is 
preferred as many reference texts are available.  
The transformed scores must be read with reference to each other and not based on a 
given metric with set boundaries. Once these scores are spatially represented, the 
researcher must analyse the results for each party in comparison to the other parties in 
the party system. For instance, a party may be situated at the right extreme of a 
dimension. This does not necessarily mean that the party is extremist on this dimension. 
What it does mean, however, is that it is more to the right compared to the other parties. 
The qualification of whether the party is extreme or not on this dimension depends on 
the wider knowledge of the researcher on this party and may be grounded on the wider 
literature.  
4.2.2 The process and design  
The selection of reference texts is a crucial aspect of the research design since 
Wordscores take an a priori approach to estimating policy positions. Very importantly, 
reference texts should extend over the two polar opposites of the dimension that the 
researcher is interested in. Ideally, the selection of reference texts ‘will contain texts that 
occupy extreme positions, as well as positions at the centre, of the dimension under 
investigation’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 315). For instance, in the analysis of the Italian 
party system, Communist Refoundation has been included in the reference category 
although it does not figure in the virgin category. This is because this party provides a 
trustworthy estimate for the extreme left position on the Italian spectrum. Moreover, ‘the 
set of reference texts should contain as many different words as possible’ (Laver, Benoit 
et al. 2003: 315). Since content analysis of the virgin texts is based on the word universe 
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of the reference texts, the greater the ‘word match’ between the two sets of texts, the 
better. This implies that to reduce the uncertainly of policy estimates, the texts used 
must be relatively long.  
The Wordscores method compares the word scoring results with a widely used 
benchmark. In using reference texts, the method assumes that ‘party manifestos in 
country c at election t are valid points of the reference for the analysis of party 
manifestos at election t+1 in the same country’ (Laver, Benoit et al. 2003: 314). The 
implication of this is two fold. First, reference and virgin texts must represent two 
different points in time and preferably two different elections. Second, it is rather 
important for the analysis that the researcher has access to confident estimates of party 
positions on the policy dimensions under investigation at a given point in time. As a 
result of the above, two points in time have been set for this analysis. The first is the 
2004 EP elections and the second the 2009 EP elections. Given that longer texts 
generate more confident estimates, it has been a conscious choice to include –where 
possible– a number of manifestos for these two points in time (see tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 
below for the manifestos employed in this study). The reference scores for this analysis 
have been taken form the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey on four dimensions, including 
general left-right, pro-anti European integration, economic left-right and libertarian-
authoritarian. 
  
Table 4.2 Total words used for reference and virgin texts in the French Case   
 
Note: Leg=Legislative elections, EP=European Parliamentary Elections, 
P/L=Presidential and Legislative elections  
 
 
 PCF PS UMP FN UDF/MoDem Verts 
Manifestos       
2002 P/L 2.000 53.800 2.500 99.000  16.550 16.900 
2004 EP 3.700 7.800 2.500 9.700 13.000 8.200 
2004 reference 
text 
9.086 61.600 5.000 109.000 29.500 25.000 
       
2007 P/L 20.000 2.500 5.900 29.700 7.700 38.600 
2009 EP - 3.000 8.124 2.100 2.800 14.200 
2009  
virgin text 
20.000 10.119 13.668 31.600 10.400 52.800 
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Table 4.3 Total words used for reference and virgin texts in the Greek Case   
Note: Leg=Legislative elections, EP=European Parliamentary Elections 
 
Table 4.4 Total words used for reference and virgin texts in the Italian Case   
 
 RC Left-wing 
parties 
UDC Italia dei 
Valori13 
Right-wing 
parties 
LN 
Manifestos       
2001 Leg 64.523 29.3181 - 28.845 14.3907  
2004 EP  41.413 20.5032 - - 50358 
26769 
8.733 
2004 reference text 106.083 49.821 - 28.842 22.101 8.733 
2006 Leg - 81.7213   386810  
2008 Leg - 379 + 26114 
18295 
3.350 455 348911 
 
 
2009 EP - 47136 506 348 110212 30.308 
2008 virgin text - 91.253 3.792 803 8.459 30.308 
Note (1): Leg=Legislative elections, EP=European Parliamentary Elections 
Note (2): 1. manifesto from Ulivo (Olive Tree coalition), 2. joint manifesto Ulivo & 
Margarita (pre-electoral coalition), 3, manifesto from Unione, 4. manifesto from Partito 
Democratico, 5. manifesto from La Sinistra arcobaleno, 6. manifesto from Partito 
Democratico, 7. manifesto from the Berlusconi coalition, 8. Forza Italia manifesto, 9. 
Alleanza Nazionale manifesto, 10. Case delle Libertà manifesto, 11. Popolo della 
Libertà manifesto, 12. Popolo della Libertà manifesto, 13. Italia dei Valori – Lista di 
Pietro. 
 
4.3 A spatial analysis of party competition in France, Greece and Italy  
In spatial analysis, ‘political competition takes place in a latent ideological space in 
which politicians (or political groups) are situated’ (Lin, Chu et al. 1996: 465). The 
underlying assumption is that parties or actors develop their positions in competition 
with others aiming to increase their electoral support. Thus ‘the objective of spatial 
analysis is to recover the dimensions of the ideological space, to construct maps of 
 KKE SYN PASOK ND LAOS 
Manifestos      
2000 Leg - 12,130 - - - 
2004 EP  12.965  3.950 3.223 13,381 899 
2004 Leg 11.700  2,500 69.100 57.900 5.483 
2004 reference text 23.500 18.574 72.340 71.281 6.382 
      
2007 Leg 5.160 584 41.200 40.360 38.309 
2009 EP 6.850 
 
13.100 3.568 2.132 1675 (1) 
2.542 (2) 
2009 Leg 4.700 8.000  23.000 - 145 
2008 virgin text 16.400 21.600 67.922 42.499 42.671 
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politicians’ […] ideal points in the space, and to interpret the dimensions of the space’ 
(Lin, Chu et al. 1996: 465). Based on this, this section uses the tools of spatial analysis 
in order to show how radical right party positions compare with the rest of the party 
system within which they operate. Although, as argued above, radical right parties 
broadly share common ideological features across Europe, these may play out in a 
distinct manner in different political systems. Parties with similar principles across 
Europe may be considered extreme or niche in one party system but closer to the median 
in another party system. This may depend on the general political culture, which issues 
are important or salient and how they are debated in each political system. It is thus 
arguable that a radical right party may occupy a different position in different political 
systems in comparison to the mainstream or other parties. This is one of the reasons 
behind the choice for the Wordscores approach. Whereas expert surveys and 
quantitative content analysis methods provide the researcher with objective dimensions 
that can be compared across Europe, Wordscores is a useful tool as it provides 
information regarding how parties relate to each other within a given political system. 
There are thus three reasons for performing spatial analysis (Rabinowitz 1978). First, 
spatial analysis is exploratory as it may produce new insights into the nature of 
competition in each political system. Second, it is a useful method for describing and 
summarizing party positions. Third, it helps the researcher to assess and evaluate the 
radical right party’s position within the political system it operates.  
4.3.1 France  
Figure 4.4 below paints a rather clear picture of French politics. The Union for a Popular 
Movement and the Democratic Movement44 are located very near the centre of the 
French political space. The French Socialist party is located slightly left of centre 
regarding its economic policy and around the centre on the libertarian-authoritarian 
dimension. Two parties are rather distinct from the rest. The Green party stands out as it 
scores quite low on the libertarian-authoritarian axis whereas the National Front scores 
quite high. Note that high values indicate being closer to the authoritarian end of the 
spectrum. In fact, the Greens and the National Front may be thought as the polar 
opposite parties in the party system. What is very relevant for the analysis is that the 
                                                
44 Note that this is a successor party of the Union for French Democracy (UDF). 
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National Front occupies a distinctively marginal position in comparison to the rest of the 
parties. The party’s spatial distance from the other parties is large, which indicates its 
niche position in the party system. The results have face validity as they conform 
previous findings regarding the French political space which suggest that since the end 
of the 1990s is essentially comprised by three poles, including the Left, the Right and 
the Far Right (Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003; Bornschier and Lachat 2009).  
Figure 4.4 The French political space in 2009 
 
Note: FN: National Front, MoDem: Democratic Movement, PCF: French Communist 
Party, PS: French Socialist Party, UMP: Union for a Popular Movement, Verts: 
Greens.  
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Figure 4.5 below tells a similar story as far as party positions on European integration 
are concerned. The Green and the Communist parties are located towards the centre of 
the pro-anti EU dimension. The French Socialist Party, the Democratic Movement and 
the Union for a Popular Movement are quite pro-European in comparison with the 
others. Again, the National Front stands out at the extreme bottom right end of the 
figure. The party’s distance from the other parties is large on both dimensions. This 
confirms previous research on French politics indicating that there is a clear segment of 
the French society identifying with the National Front’s positions on all dimensions 
(Mayer 2002a; Mayer 2002b; Grunberg and Schweisguth 2003; Mayer 2007). Given the 
Front’s great distance from the rest of the party system, it can be reasonably argued that 
the party has strong protest and anti-system elements and that it actively seeks to attract 
a niche segment of the society, which also shares its ‘niche’ views. In this respect, the 
spatial analysis conforms with the thesis’ hypothesis that if a radical right party has anti-
system elements, it is likely to adopt a European discourse antagonistic of European 
integration signifying strong policy divergence from the party system45.  
                                                
45 For detailed information on the parties scores from the computerised content analysis, see 
Appendix II. 
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Figure 4.5  The European dimension in France 2009 
 
Note: FN: National Front, MoDem: Democratic Movement, PCF: French Communist 
Party, PS: French Socialist Party, UMP: Union for a Popular Movement, Verts: 
Greens.  
4.3.2 Greece  
The overall picture is somewhat different in Greece (see figure 4.6 below). Contrary to 
France, Greek parties do not tend to cluster around the centre of the political space 
denoting a greater degree of polarisation. The comparative distance of the Greek parties 
is greater to that of the French parties and no party is clearly located in the centre of the 
political space. The only party that can be thought as comparatively centrist within the 
system is the Coalition of the Radical Left. The centre-right New Democracy is centrist 
on the libertarian-authoritarian axis and tilts towards the capitalist end of the socialist-
capitalist dimension. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) can be thought as 
a party with libertarian elements and a slightly capitalist economic agenda only 
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compared to the Communist Party and the Coalition of the Radical Left. The Greek 
Communist Party is located at the top left end of the political space, indicating support 
for state intervention in the economy and strong preference for a paternalistic 
hierarchical society. The Popular Orthodox Rally is located at the top right of the space 
which also suggests it prefers a society based on tradition but with support for capitalist 
economic structures, similar to New Democracy. The distance between centre-right and 
centre-left parties in Greece is much greater than either France or Italy.  
It is important to remind the reader that the Wordscores method does not provide scores 
based on a given metric with set boundaries. Thus the results for each party must be read 
with reference to each other. Practically, this means that the end point of the dimension 
in the figure is not the real end point. In other words, the fact that ND and the Popular 
Orthodox Rally are located towards the right end of horizontal axis does not mean that 
they are in favour of complete market allocation of resources. Rather their position on 
this axis indicates that they are to the right of other parties on this dimension, including 
the Coalition of the Radical Left, the Greek Communist Party and PASOK.  
For the purposes of the thesis, the most important finding of figure 4.6 below lies in that 
the distance of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally from the rest of the parties is not as 
great as that of the National Front. Although, similarly to the National Front, the party is 
clearly situated at the top right of the space, its relative distance from the centre-right 
New Democracy is smaller compared to the relative distance of the French radical right 
party from the Union for a Popular Movement. This denotes that the party can not be 
thought as being clearly distinct from the rest of the party system. Some of its policies 
tend to be close to the centre-right New Democracy, and in case of a potential need for 
coalition formation, the Popular Orthodox Rally shows [at least an apparent] policy 
convergence with the centre-right.  
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Figure 4.6 The Greek political space in 2009 
 
Note: KKE: Greek Communist Party, LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally, ND: New 
Democracy, PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement, SYN: Coalition of the Radical 
Left. 
Figure 4.7 below is the visual representation of how the European issue is debated in the 
Greek political system. Clearly, the Communist party is the most anti-European party in 
Greece whereas PASOK is the most pro-European. Interestingly, the Popular Orthodox 
Rally is situated towards the middle of the anti-pro EU dimension. If one considers the 
Communist party as the utmost Eurosceptic party in this political system and PASOK as 
the utmost EU supportive party, then the Popular Orthodox Rally’s position lies towards 
the middle of the party system and it is closer to New Democracy. 
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Figure 4.7 also points to another very interesting finding further corroborating the 
results from figure 4.6. On the general Left-Right axis, the Popular Orthodox Rally is 
spatially situated much closer to the mainstream New Democracy compared to the 
relevant distances in the French political space. These results largely confirm the 
literature which argues that ‘Despite the populist discourse with which it wraps its 
stance on these policies, LAOS does not substantively differ from the conservative 
policies advocated by the large party to its left, i.e. ND’ (Sotiropoulos 2010: 318). From 
this, it can be reasonably argued that, in contrast to the National Front, the Popular 
Orthodox Rally does not seek to attract a distinctive niche segment of the society that is 
socially dissimilar to the rest of the Greek society. Clearly, being radical right, its 
support may come from a nationalist electorate. However, given its position in the party 
system, the party can also be seen as expanding its electoral base. It can thus be argued 
that the party attempts to have a catch-all appeal, which explains its comparatively less 
strong Eurosceptic position46.  
                                                
46 For detailed information on the parties scores from the computerised content analysis, see 
Appendix II. 
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Figure 4.7  The European dimension in Greece 2009 
 
Note: KKE: Greek Communist Party, LAOS: Popular Orthodox Rally, ND: New 
Democracy, PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement, SYN: Coalition of the Radical 
Left. 
4.3.3 Italy 
Figure 4.8 below paints a different picture with regards to the Italian party system. In 
2009, it resembles more that of France rather than that of Greece. Mainstream parties 
tend to cluster close to each other rather than disperse around the political spectrum. 
However, unlike France these results do not reveal a clear pattern whereby a radical 
right party is situated in a large distance from other parties. The leftist populist party 
Italy of Values – Di Pietro List appears to be situated very far from the rest of the party 
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system47. The parties of the left and the Union of Christian and Centre Democrats tend 
to occupy a very similar space.  
The People of Freedom, created following a fusion between the National Alliance and 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia is situated on the top right end of the political system. The 
party is clearly situated to the right of all other parties in terms of its position on the 
economy and tends to be much more authoritarian when compared to all other parties 
within the Italian party system. The People of Freedom is clearly the utmost right-wing 
party in the Italian system. In comparison to the centre-right French Union for a Popular 
Movement and the Greek New Democracy, it also occupies a somewhat more right-
wing space. The People of Freedom’s relative distance from the parties of the left is 
similar to that of the Union for a Popular Movement with the French Socialist Party. It is 
worth noting however, that given the ‘outlier’ position of the French National Front, the 
French centre-right and centre-left parties are positioned towards the centre of the 
political system. In the Italian context, there is no party to the right of the People of 
Freedom48. Following from this, it may be reasonable to argue –and in accordance to the 
thesis’ propositions– that the National Alliance’s right-wing radicalism is appropriated 
within the People of Freedom. Merging with Forza Italia has given the party the 
opportunity to appear as mainstream and centre-right and has significantly contributed 
in the party’s cartelisation within the Italian party system. Nevertheless, the party 
(through the People of Freedom) continues to occupy the utmost right-wing end of the 
Italian spectrum49. 
                                                
47 The 2008 virgin text for this party is rather small – hence the relative large transformed 
standard errors and 95% confidence intervals – see appendix II. The percentage of the total 
words scored is relatively high (86.9 per cent). A longer text would be likely to produce results 
situating the party closer to the other parties in the party system. Thus the results with regards to 
IdV must be treated with caution.  
48 Note that other right-wing parties exist in Italy, including Tricolour Flame, that may be 
positioned to the right of PhD. These are not included in the spatial analysis for two reasons. 
First, they are of minor political significance and second, they tend to produce very small 
manifestos, which do not enable a rigorous computerised content analysis.  
49 For detailed information on the parties scores from the computerised content analysis, see 
Appendix II. 
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Figure 4.8 The Italian political space in 2009 
 
Note: IdV: Italy of Values – Di Pietro List, LN: Northern League, PdL: People of 
Freedom, UDC: Union of Christian and Centre Democrats.  
With regards to the Italian parties’ European positions, figure 4.9 below points to the 
fact that Italian mainstream parties are generally clustered together in their support for 
Europe. The clear outliers are Italy of Values and Northern League who are nearer the 
anti-European end of the spectrum. The People of Freedom seems to have a very similar 
position on Europe compared to the centrist Christian Democrats. In contrast to the 
French Union for a Popular Movement and the Greek New Democracy, the People of 
Freedom seems to be (with the Christian Democrats) the most pro-European party in 
Italy. The contrast is also clear in comparison with the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally, 
which occupies a median position on Europe, and the National Front’s anti-
Europeanism. On the left-right axis conflating the dimensions on 
 115
liberatarianism/authoritarianism and socialism/capitalism, there is no Italian party 
occupying the space to the right of the People of Freedom, reconfirming the analysis 
above. The National Alliance’s union with Forza Italia has enabled the party’s 
cartelisation within the domestic party system. Although it occupies the most right-wing 
political space, the fusion has allowed the party to present itself as part of the governing 
cartel and the mainstream Italian centre-right as well as attract mainstream conservative 
voters.  
Figure 4.9  The European dimension in Italy 2009 
 
Note: IdV: Italy of Values – Di Pietro List, LN: Northern League, PdL: People of 
Freedom, UDC: Union of Christian and Centre Democrats.  
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Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a spatial analysis of radical right positions on two levels. 
First, employing data both from a recent expert survey and the EES quantitative content 
analysis of political texts, it has provided an overview of the general patterns of radical 
right Euroscepticism in Europe. From this analysis, it is argued that in terms of broad 
ideological principles, radical right parties across Europe can be thought as similar. 
Despite these ideological similarities, their position on European integration varies to a 
large extent. These two observations corroborate arguments that have been made in 
Chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. Second, the chapter has used the tools of spatial analysis 
in order to provide a visual and spatial overview of the structure of electoral competition 
in France, Greece and Italy. It has employed a novel methodology in order to 
substantiate and cross-tabulate findings from different datasets. Using computerised 
content analysis of party manifestos during the 1999-2009 decade, the chapter presents 
the case studies’ positions in comparison to the rest of the party system within which 
they operate.  
The main argument put forward here is that although the National Front clearly occupies 
a marginal position in the French political space, the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally is 
situated comparatively closer to other Greek parties and especially the centre-right New 
Democracy. The Italian National Alliance has merged with Forza Italia to create the 
People of Freedom, which clearly occupies the centre-right space in the Italian party 
system. This spatial analysis can help generate expectations regarding the cases’ 
behaviour in the political system as well as the potential electorate they may appeal to. 
Linking to the thesis’ main hypotheses, it is argued that the National Front appeals to a 
specific electorate different to the rest of the French society, which explains its 
rejectionist position on European integration. In contrast, the Popular Orthodox Rally 
seeks to have a comparatively broader appeal much closer to the median linked to a 
comparatively milder EU position. The Italian National Alliance occupies a centre-right 
space in the Italian political system being fairly near the centre-left parties providing an 
indication towards the party’s attempt for cartelisation.  
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Having provided the ‘big picture’ of politics in France, Greece and Italy, the following 
three chapters of the thesis explore in detail how the issue of Europe is played out in 
each political system. Chapter 5 analyses the French National Front as a case of 
rejectionist Euroscepticism. Chapter 6 explores the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally as a 
case of conditional Euroscepticism. Chapter 7 looks at the Italian National Alliance as a 
case of compromising Euroscepticism. Viewing parties as strategic actors in their 
respective party systems, the following chapters test the thesis’ hypotheses arguing that 
party type largely influences its spatial location in the party system, and the structure 
and content of a party’s domestic agenda. This includes its discursive strategy towards 
the European issue and its overall position on European integration. A party’s European 
stance is conditional upon its position within the party system; namely whether a party is 
anti-system, seeks to have a catch-all appeal or strives to become part of the governing 
cartel. 
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Part 2 Three radical right Eurosceptic patterns 
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Chapter 5 
The pattern of Rejectionist Euroscepticism: the case of 
 the French National Front 
 
 
 
‘On a dans la cœur les choses qu’on défend. 
 C’est un credo, des valeurs morales, comme une religion’  
 
'We cherish what we stand for.  
It is a belief, a moral value, a type of religion' 
 
Interview with Lydia Scénardi, former NationalFront MEP, 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapters have identified three variants of radical right positions on 
European integration. This chapter studies the first pattern of radical right 
Euroscepticism whereby a party utterly ‘rejects’ the process of integration and seeks the 
repatriation of all competences from the EU to the nation state and, failing to do so, its 
country’s withdrawal from the EU. To further analyse this type of radical right 
Euroscepticism, this chapter uses the French National Front as a case study. As 
integration deepened during the past decades, the National Front’s vision of Europe 
clashed with the development of the European project. During the 1999-2009 decade, 
the party’s position crystallised into a complete ‘rejection’ of the EU and any 
cooperation within the EU framework.  
The chapter tests hypothesis 1 which proposes that if a radical right party has anti-
system elements, its primary goal will tend to lie in claiming ownership of specific 
policies or issues in order to differentiate itself from the rest of the party system. Based 
on this, the party is likely adopt a discourse antagonistic to European integration in order 
to portray its policy divergence within the political system (adversarial strategy). The 
party’s anti-European argumentation is likely to be articulated in a manner that will be 
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unique to its own worldview and dissimilar from all other parties in the domestic party 
system. 
In order to support this hypothesis, the chapter proceeds with a three-fold argument. It 
first confirms that the National Front is intrinsically an anti-system party whose main 
political strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based and its 
predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. Secondly, it argues 
that the National Front has adopted a clear ‘rejectionist’ position on European 
integration and contends that the party’s staunch anti-European argumentation is 
connected to its anti-globalisation agenda. Lastly, it puts forward that the party’s 
extremist policy on European integration is integral to its overall political strategy in its 
national party system. ‘Rejecting’ Europe provides the niche for differentiation from the 
French party system.  
The first section of this chapter presents an overview of the main characteristics and 
beliefs of the National Front confirming the existence of an ideological formula 
combining nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric. It also examines 
the party’s predominant political strategy. Section two analyses in detail the party’s anti-
European discourse with reference to the four indicators set out in Chapter 3, namely the 
definition of Europe, the principle of European integration, the practice of European 
policy integration and the future of the European polity. It also identifies the ways in 
which the party connects its anti-European argumentation to its greater anti-
globalisation agenda. The last section explores how the party uses its ‘rejectionist’ EU 
position as part of its general political strategy. It demonstrates that the party uses its 
policy on European integration as a differentiation tool from the rest of the party system 
with a view to polarising the political debate and appealing to a specific and distinct 
segment of the French electorate.  
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5.1 The French National Front 
5.1.1 What the party stands for  
The National Front was officially created in 1972. Then, the movement was a quite 
heterogeneous coalition bringing together disparate ideological factions (McCulloch 
2006), which were all united under the charismatic leadership of Jean Marie Le Pen. It 
first participated in the French Parliamentary elections in 1973 when it gained less than 
0.5 per cent of the vote. Its leader first ran for President in 1974 when his electoral 
results were equally poor. For approximately ten years the party experienced 
marginalisation and internal fragmentation. Its ascendancy in the French electoral arena 
commenced in the early 1980s. 1983 marked the Front’s first electoral success when 
Jean Pierre Stirbois, the party’s general secretary, gained 16.7 per cent of the votes in a 
local by-election in Dreux. Soon after this success in 1984, the National Front gained ten 
seats in the EP under Le Pen’s ‘Front of national opposition in favour of a Europe of 
nations’ (Mayer 1998: 13) 50 . The National Front’s national electoral breakthrough 
occurred in the 1986 legislative elections for which proportional representation replaced 
the two-ballot majoritiarian electoral system. The change of electoral system resulted in 
the party gaining 35 seats in the French National Assembly. From 1988 onwards, 
however, the system reverted back to majority preventing the National Front from 
holding more than one seat in the National Assembly. Presidential elections, on the 
other hand, have been much more promising in terms of electoral gains. The party’s 
charismatic leader has been receiving a significant percentage in the national 
Presidential elections reaching its highest in 2002 when he managed to participate in the 
second round of Presidential elections competing with Jacques Chirac for the French 
Presidency51.   
The National Front has often been thought as the archetypal radical right party. Its 
ideological stance is widely referred to as ‘national populism’ (Flood 1997). In the 
1970s and 1980s, the party attracted a number of intellectuals from different extreme 
                                                
50 Original text: ‘Front d’opposition nationale pour l’Europe des patries’ 
51 For a detailed account of Jean Marie Le Pen’s results in French Presidential elections, see 
Appendix IV.  
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right ideological factions including ‘French Algeria die-hards, revolutionary nationalists, 
wartime Vichyites, Holocaust revisionists, neo-fascists, neo-Nazis, monarchists, 
Catholic fundamentalists, […] and so on’ (Hainsworth 2000b: 18). This resulted in a 
degree of internal division. Since the 1990s its ideology has, however, crystallised into 
what Mudde calls the populist radical right (Mudde 2007: 23), namely an ideological 
formula combining nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric which 
are briefly explained below.  
Central to the party’s ideological make-up are the themes of the ‘nation’ and ‘identity’. 
As a result, ‘elements of party discourse relate directly to this nation-centred, identity-
conscious starting point’ (Davies 1999: 65). This is inextricably linked to the doctrine of 
national preference, which advocates the defence of French culture and identity 
(McCulloch 2006: 167) and can be summarised by the party’s well-known slogan ‘La 
France d’abord’. The right of the French nation to be different became crucial in the 
party’s ideological reformulation replacing earlier references to cultural superiority 
reminiscent of fascism (McCulloch 2006: 176). National preference entails among 
others hostility to multiculturalism, communism and internationalism. The doctrine of 
national preference coupled with a fear of French decline explain the party’s dislike of 
immigrants, calls for a stronger French demographic policy and the promotion of France 
and Francophonie in the world. It also accounts for the party’s progressive turn towards 
economic protectionism in the 1990s, the rejection of the ‘New World Order’ and the 
strong criticism of the US and international organisations such as the World Trade 
Organisation (Bastow 1997). Related to this, the principle of national sovereignty 
underpins the party’s discourse against globalisation and European integration. 
That the party is also highly authoritarian is demonstrated in its policies both on social 
issues and law and order. The National Front insists on the preservation of traditional 
lifestyles arguing that France lacks social cohesion. The party sees the family as an 
institution core to the social and moral values structuring the French society (National 
Front 2007: 15). As such, it supports the principle of ‘family preference’, which entails a 
national family policy that would revive the traditional family, boost the French birth 
rate, reduce French abortion rates and ban same sex marriages (National Front 2004; 
2007). Moreover, the party presents itself as a champion of law and order fighting for 
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the rights of respectable French citizens who are violated by criminals (Flood 1997: 
121). It supports a stronger justice system with increased numbers of magistrates, the 
reestablishment of the death penalty, the deportation of foreign criminals, the 
generalisation of ‘zero tolerance’ policies in a number of areas and the building of more 
prisons as well as the improvement of the status of prison guards (National Front 2004; 
2007). Calls for the restriction of immigration are also core to the National Front’s 
authoritarianism viewing immigrants as ‘culturally different [who] should be treated as 
such’ (Hainsworth 2000b: 25). In an effort to normalise their anti-immigrant discourse, 
‘key’ personalities in the party acknowledge that ‘We have the obligation to help the 
poor countries. But the French should come first’52 (interview with de Saint-Just 2010) 
and that ‘We want to help Africa. But we want to do so in their own country. Not in 
Europe’ (interview with Schénardi 2009) 53.  
Populism is integral to the party’s rhetoric. Flood (1997: 108) argues that its discourse 
‘operates on the basis of a classic binary scheme of us/them = right/wrong = god/evil’. 
The National Front claims that French society is undergoing a crisis at all cultural, 
economic and social levels, which ‘has accelerated the decomposition of the French 
social tissue and solidarity’ (National Front 2004: 151)54. Crisis has hit among others the 
institution of the family, the education system, local areas and French employment and 
impoverishes the French household, the French economy, and ultimately the French 
State (National Front 2007 preface by Jean Marie Le Pen). The National Front is calling 
for the ‘liberation of France’ arguing that the current French regime is totalitarianism 
with a ‘democratic mask’ (National Front 2004: 1). The support of plebiscitary politics 
becomes integral to the party’s distrust of the current system. The party supports the 
extensive use of referenda on issues that relate to the ‘future of our Nation’ as it is only 
by respecting the wishes of French people that France can become a true democracy 
(National Front 2004: 78). 
                                                
52 Wording in French: ‘On a le devoir d’aller aider les pays pauvres. Mais les Français d’abord. 
Les immigrés dans notre pays vivent mal. Aider les pays pauvres chez eux’ 
53 Wording in French: ‘Nous voulons aider l’Afrique. Mais nous voulons les aider chez eux. Non 
pas chez l’Europe’ 
54 Original text: ‘accélèrent la décomposition du tissu social et des solidarités naturelles’ 
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5.1.2 Issue ownership as the party’s predominant political strategy 
The National Front’s predominant strategy during the 1999-2009 decade has been to 
focus on particular issues in its political agenda that are not covered in a similar manner 
by other parties in the domestic political system. By disproportionally concentrating on 
specific policies or issues, it has the ability to claim ownership for them. This is used in 
order to undermine the legitimacy of the French political system as part of its effort for 
differentiation from the other parties in the French party system. The party's rigid 
Eurosceptic position as well as its insistence on an anti-Globalisation agenda have also 
become integral to this political strategy whereby the party claims that it is the only 
political force in France whose main purpose is to 'protect' the French people from 
external forces both European and global. This is not to say that the National Front does 
not have an incentive to be in office or gain votes. As will be shown below, the party 
does not view office as a pragmatic aspiration given the French system and votes can 
only be gained through a strategy of issue ownership and policy differentiation.  
The National Front can be thought of as one of the most politically successful and 
durable radical right parties in Western Europe (DeClair 1999: 115). Indeed since the 
mid-1980s, ‘this party has appeared as a powerful new actor on the political space, 
giving rise to a “tripolar” pattern of party competition’ (Bornschier and Lachat 2009: 
360). Its electoral gains have allowed it to consider itself as a major force in French 
domestic politics and to argue that depending on the elections, 'we are 3rd or 4th force in 
the system’ (interview with de Danne 2010)55. Party officials accept that 'we are a small 
party only from the point of view that we are not represented in the National Assembly' 
but 'in reality we are not small, we are important in setting the debate, we have influence 
on the society and we provide an intellectual challenge' (interview with de Danne 2010).  
However, unlike other radical right parties in Europe such as the Austrian Freedom 
Party, this success has not been translated into either significant numbers of legislative 
seats or political office through participation in a coalition government. This is partly 
due to the French institutional regime. The semi-presidential nature of the regime as 
well as the majoritarian style of politics do not encourage the formation of governmental 
coalitions. Moreover, the majoritarian two-round electoral system penalises smaller 
                                                
55 Interview largely held in English.  
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parties. In particular, although single-member district plurality systems disadvantage 
weak parties, the French two-round electoral system produces even stronger biases 
against weak parties and as a result small parties are systematically under-represented 
(Blais and Loewen 2009: 349). Blais and Loewen's analysis of the effects of the French 
electoral system, which examines the potential electoral pay-offs of pre-electoral 
coalitions, suggests that ‘being part of a [pre-electoral] coalition does not contribute to 
winning more seats, at least among small parties’ (Blais and Loewen 2009: 352). As a 
result, the incentive for small parties to enter into pre-electoral coalitions is very low and 
the National Front is effectively encouraged to compete as a single force in the political 
system.  
According to Golder ‘Pre-electoral coalitions are less likely to form when the 
ideological distance between potential coalition members increases’ (Golder 2006: 198), 
which is also confirmed in the French case (Blais and Loewen 2009: 354). The National 
Front has long been discredited for its extremist ideas and its protest anti-system 
character and as a result it has been excluded from running as part of an electoral block 
for the French legislative elections, which has effectively kept the party out of the 
National Assembly. This can be seen in sharp contrast to the pre-electoral behaviour of 
the Movement for France, which is an ultra-conservative but not an extremist or anti-
system party. In the 2007 legislative elections, the Movement for France ran as part of 
the ‘Presidential Majority’ electoral block and secured two seats in the National 
Assembly with obtaining only 1.2 per cent of the vote. The National Front, on the other 
hand, ran independently and obtained 4.2 per cent of the vote but did not secure any 
seats in the National Assembly. Due to its extremist views, the ideological distance 
between the National Front and other parties in France is great, which renders the 
potential for pre-electoral coalitions unlikely. For instance, according to the 2006 
Chapel Hill expert survey, which estimated party positions, the National Front is 
situated at the extreme right pole of the general left-right dimension where 0 signifies 
extreme left and 10 extreme right. The National Front scored 10 as opposed to 8.63 of 
the Movement for France and 7.44 of Nicolas Sarkozy’s Union for a Popular Movement 
(Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010). This finding is also largely confirmed by the analysis of 
the French political system in Chapter 4 of the thesis.  
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As mentioned above, the National Front has been increasingly successful in Presidential 
elections. However, this type of elections by definition entails a 'winner takes all' 
outcome. As a result of this institutional characteristic, candidates failing to be elected 
do not seize any concrete political gains in terms of effective power within the political 
system. The 2002 elections proved to be a significant victory for Jean Marie Le Pen and 
a major shock for the French electorate. The National Front, however, did not manage to 
gain any ‘real’ power through either office or parliamentary representation. This 
inability of the party to access power is realistically accepted by party officials who also 
argue that they are not willing to cooperate with any other French political force either 
pre- or post- elections (interviews with de Danne 2010; de la Tocnaye 2010; de Saint-
Just 2010; Salagnac 2010). The other French political forces are seen as responsible for 
the French decadence and decay (interview with Martin 2010) and as such coalitions are 
seen as compromise and treason (interview with de Danne 2010).  
The above institutional characteristics of the French political system as well as the 
National Front's own ideology that does not adhere to conventional politics have led to 
the party's effective exclusion from the party system. This has meant that competition 
between the National Front and the other parties has developed into a zero-sum game 
whereby the National Front is the player experiencing constant losses and is unlikely to 
receive any substantive gains in terms of actual political power. This exclusion provides 
an additional incentive to the party to engage in adversarial politics. As a result, the 
party takes a diametrically opposite view from the rest of the party system on particular 
issues over which it considers having a comparative advantage. This is in accordance 
with Mayer's evaluation of the National Front’s political strategy, which suggests that 
the party seeks ‘to polarise the political debate around their ideas, and replace the 
traditional left/right cleavage with a new one, which sets the National Front against the 
“gang of four”, as Front National likes to refer to the established parties, evoking the 
image of collusion’ (Mayer 1998: 17). This strategy becomes increasingly effective if 
the party treats the mainstream parties as a single block and 'reduces the differences of 
values, policies and practice between them to mere gradations’ (Flood 1997: 112). This 
issue-based logic of competition is confirmed by the party’s preference of the word 
‘doctrine’ as opposed to ‘ideology’ (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010). Doctrine refers 
to a particular policy, position or principle advocated by a party whereas ideology 
indicates the body of doctrine as a whole. It is only by selectively focusing on particular 
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policies that the National Front can polarise the debate and present its ideas as polar 
opposite to the other parties.   
As Mayer identified in 1998, this strategy is likely to become more effective if a party 
chooses to compete on a new political division that mainstream parties do not [yet] 
engage in. The National Front smartly identified new issues since the 1990s and as a 
result ‘Le Pen has actively sought to weaken the impact of economic issues by declaring 
that the socio-economic cleavage has lost any relevance, and had been replaced by the 
opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan and those of national identity’ 
(Perrineau 1997: 64; Bornschier 2008: 89). The National Front’s overall choice to 
openly engage in the authoritarianism versus libertarianism dimension of political 
competition can be seen in its adoption of policies including pushing for a halt to 
immigration, strong law and order and aversion to European integration and 
globalisation, which indicate the party’s choice to represent the authoritarian end of the 
spectrum. In its effort to appear adversarial, the National Front mostly competes on the 
new cleavage ‘winners and losers from globalisation’ and within this division it seeks to 
push for particular policies that are exclusive to its own agenda, different from the 
agendas of other parties and arise controversy, such as the effects of immigration, 
European integration and globalisation.  
The party's main political strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-based 
and its predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. The party's 
outright rejection of European integration fits comfortably within this overall political 
strategy. Insisting on a particular policy preference may provide the party the niche for 
differentiation from the party system. Strong criticism of the EU may thus be seen as 
part of the party’s wider agenda to choose a number of policies that it finds of primary 
importance to the French society and to try to push for them as hard as it can in order to 
demonstrate policy divergence. The next section analyses in detail the National Front’s 
European position.  
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5.2 Rejectionist Eurosecpticism and the issue of Globalisation 1999-2009 
 This section argues that during the 1999-2009 decade the National Front has adopted a 
‘rejectionist’ position on European integration. Although as most radical right parties, 
the National Front views Europe as a cultural entity, it is vehemently opposed to 
European integration within the current EU framework. In particular, the National Front 
rejects the ‘principle’ of European cooperation under the EU structures, the ‘practice’ of 
the current policy status quo at the EU level and the ‘future’ creation of a European 
polity. The party ultimately links this staunch opposition to European integration  to its 
anti-globalisation argumentation as both are perceived as contravening the party’s 
fervent support for national preference on all policies.  
It is worth noting, however, that the National Front was not anti-European all along. The 
party’s EU position has undergone radical transformation. It has evolved from an 
ambiguous stance to European cooperation during the 1980s (Flood 1997: 131-132), 
opposition to Maastricht and distrust of deeper integration in the 1990s (Fieschi, Shields 
et al. 1996: 247-248), to an outright hostility to and quest for withdrawal from the EU in 
the 2000s (Hainsworth, O'Brien et al. 2004: 48). The National Front’s European position 
and argumentation has not developed in a vacuum. In the 1980s, the party flaunted that 
‘we are first and foremost Europeans’ supporting a European project that would include 
‘a common European defence and nuclear strategy, a common foreign and security 
policy, common immigration controls and a “European Preference”’ (Hainsworth, 
O'Brien et al. 2004: 45). The National Front called for ‘European patriotism’ whereby 
the fusion between French and European identity could be achieved with a vision to 
jointly confront a common enemy: ‘What strikes at Europe strikes at France, and what 
strikes at France strikes at Europe’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 1984: 164). The party hardened 
its position towards European integration as EU powers increased and particularly since 
the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, which according to Mudde represented a ‘turning point’ 
resulting in a change of ’[radical right] parties’ positions on the European issue and its 
salience’ (Mudde 2007: 159). President Mitterand’s decision to put the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty to referendum in 1992 forced the National Front to articulate a clearer 
position on integration denouncing the Treaty as a ‘conspiracy against the peoples and 
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nations in Europe’ (quoted in Fieschi, Shields et al. 1996: 248) and to progressively 
abandon its European Patriotism arguments.  
The following section proceeds with a discussion of the National Front’s EU stance 
during the 1999-2009 period arguing that it has crystallised into an utter rejection of the 
EU system as a whole. In particular, the party’s European position is analysed with 
reference to the typology of radical right Euroscepticism identified in Chapter 3 of the 
thesis. This includes a discussion of the National Front’s ‘conception of Europe’, its 
position on the ‘principle’ of European integration, the current EU policy ‘practice’ and 
the ‘future’ creation of a European polity. Through an examination of these four 
indicators and the qualitative content analysis of the party’s MEP plenary speeches 
during the 5th and 6th EP terms, this section identifies the main points of the National 
Front’s EU criticism and in particular, it demonstrates how the issue of Europe is linked 
to its overall anti-globalisation agenda.  
5.2.1 Definition of Europe  
The National Front views Europe as a continent with a common cultural heritage and 
argues that Europeans share common western values and a common European identity 
(interview with de la Tocnaye 2010). The party is a self-proclaimed defender of 
identities and claims to ‘stand for a European Europe, just as it does for a French 
France’ (Flood 1997: 131). European tradition is based on four essential elements, 
namely ‘Greek philosophy, Roman Law, the Judeo-Christian values and the 
Enlightenment’ (Gollnisch 2007)56 . Europe should remain faithful to its moral and 
spiritual values, including its cultural and legal traditions emanating from Greece and 
Rome as well as its Christian origins. Europe is not only a cultural but also a human and 
geographic reality (National Front 2009: 4). Despite European wars throughout the 
centuries, a long common history has created strong ties amongst European peoples 
(interview with Martin 2010). The conception of common religious values essential to 
European identity is manifested in the party’s criticism of the European Constitution for 
not including any reference to Christianity (Marine Le Pen 2005). 
                                                
56 Original text: ‘notre tradition européenne, parmi lesquels quatre essentiellement: la 
philosophie grecque, le droit romain, la spiritualité judéo-chrétienne et les lumières’ 
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However, the National Front’s definition of Europe takes an exclusionist and insular 
form. This common European history ‘has invented the freedom and equality of 
Nations, self-governing without external interference, which is a unique model 
unparalleled elsewhere’ (National Front 2009: 4). Thus common cultural heritage serves 
as a justification for both nation-state self-determination and European independence 
from external intervention. It is only ‘free, strong and sovereign nations that can make 
European civilisation shine in the world’ (National Front 2002a: 28; 2004: 72)57. This 
idea is put forward with the implicit acceptance that France would serve as a model of 
the other European nations (National Front 2002a; 2004).  
It is precisely this European conception based on common values (National Front 2007: 
60) that is reflected in the National Front’s opposition to Turkey’s EU accession. Europe 
is a ‘club’ of equal and sovereign nation-states and there is clearly no space for a 
country that is ‘geographically, culturally, historically and demographically’ Asian 
(Gollnisch 2006b)58. Instead the National Front is motivated by the ‘hope that Europe as 
a whole, West and East, would at last discover its strength and forge a new collective 
role in the world’ (Flood 1997: 131). The party leader explains that Europeans should 
maintain strong and privileged links to Russia, which contrary to Turkey, ‘is a large 
European nation’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 2007) 59  that ‘belongs culturally, spiritually, 
geographically to the European space’ (Gollnisch 2009b)60. The National Front supports 
a ‘European Europe, thus without Turkey but linked to Russia’ (National Front 2008)61.  
  
                                                
57 Original text: ‘Seules des nations libres, puissantes et souveraines, rendront à la civilisation 
européenne son éclat dans le monde.’ 
58 Original text: ‘Cela nous permettrait pourtant de dire clairement que la Turquie est un grand 
pays, mais qu’elle est essentiellement, géographiquement, culturellement, historiquement, 
démographiquement, un pays asiatique’ 
59 Original text: ‘les Russes sont une grande nation européenne’ 
60 Original text: ‘Mais la Russie, contrairement à la Turquie, appartient culturellement, 
spirituellement, géographiquement à l’espace européen. C’est avec elle, en priorité, que nous 
devrions avoir des liens privilégiés’ 
61 Original text: ‘une Europe « européenne », donc sans la Turquie, mais liée à la Russie’ 
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5.2.2 Principle of European integration 
The National Front rejects the ‘principle’ of European integration, namely opposes any 
type of cooperation at a higher multilateral level. The way in which the EU has evolved 
during the past 20 years does not bear any resemblance to the party’s ideal model for 
cooperation. The latter includes bilateral or tri-lateral European nation-state cooperation 
on issues of mutual interest that is neither administered nor governed by a supra-national 
authority.  
This quest for withdrawal is confirmed in the party’s both 2002 and 2004 manifestos 
where the National Front urges the French people to choose their independence so that 
France exits the EU. The party renounces the Treaties that ‘link France to the Europe of 
Brussels’ (Rome, Single Act, Schengen, Maastricht, Amsterdam) (National Front 2002a: 
26; 2004: 70)62. Being an EU member and adopting policies originating from the EU 
means among others the end of political sovereignty, the end of economic prosperity, 
the end of food independence, the end of social protection, and of course the end of 
France (National Front 2002b; 2004). As a solution to the problems stemming from EU 
membership, the National Front proposes to re-establish French sovereignty on all 
spheres (National Front 2002a; 2002b; 2004). In the 2007 national manifesto, the party 
provides a more informed position whereby it suggests organising a tour of European 
capitals promoting the radical renegotiation of European Treaties. Only when this fails 
to bear any fruits, would the party organise a national referendum on French withdrawal 
asking the question ‘Should France regain its independence vis-à-vis the Europe of 
Brussels?’(National Front 2007: 61)63. Indeed the party argues that it does not envisage 
a ‘brutal’ exit from the EU (National Front 2008). The party’s policy reformulation does 
not appear to be a feasible option for France. Although in 2007 the party does not 
openly advocate withdrawal, this does not represent a substantive change in its 
European policy. Rather this marks a transformation of discourse in the way the position 
is put forward (interview with de Danne 2010). The party further substantiates its 
                                                
62 Original text (in both manifestos): ‘traités liant la France à l'Union européenne de Bruxelles 
(Rome, l'Acte Unique, Schengen, Maastricht, Amsterdam).’ 
63 Original text: ‘La France doit-elle reprendre son indépendance vis-à-vis de l’Europe de 
Bruxelles ?’ 
 132
position in favour of withdrawal by supporting popular ratification and the use of 
plebiscitary politics.  
The party mentions that it seeks to construct a ‘Europe of Nations’ (National Front 
2008). In the 1990s, this new Europe was envisaged as being ‘French dominated, 
Catholic and White’ (Benoit 1998: 21) and operating on the basis of the principle of 
community preference, which would ‘assure the prosperity of our peoples and the 
international influence of European nations’ (National Front 2008). Since it has been 
clear that the EU would neither be dominated by France nor pursue a strategy of 
community preference, what the party means during the 1999-2009 decade is that 
cooperation should take place outside the EU framework on a case by case basis. 
‘Cooperation should be undertaken project by project following a cost-benefit analysis 
managed by a secretary general without political forces’ (interview with Gollnisch 
2009a). In fact, the party argues that projects work much better outside the EU. 
Examples include the aircraft manufacturer Airbus, the satellites company ARIANE and 
the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (National Front 2009: 2). These three 
non-EU projects provide a yardstick for comparison since they are thought to work well 
or even better outside the EU. Within this frame of thought, the National Front would 
invite European cooperation in the areas of research and technology where cooperation 
is unlikely to have a political character. Economic or industrial cooperation should only 
take place at a bilateral or multilateral level (interview with Reveau 2010). Some party 
cadres have toyed with the idea of a common European Army independent from the 
North Atlantic Alliance and the United States of America (interviews with Schénardi 
2009; and de Saint-Just 2010). However, following the EU’s enlargement to Central and 
Eastern Europe, this no longer appears to be feasible as accord among 27 member states 
is thought to be difficult to achieve (interview with de Saint-Just 2010). 
5.2.3 Practice of European policy integration 
Since the National Front is adamantly opposed to the principle of European integration, 
it is hardly surprising to note that it does not support policy integration within the 
European framework. The party seeks to re-establish political authority and sovereignty 
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in a number of policies including among others, fiscal policy, border control and 
immigration policy, army deployment and food policy (National Front 2004). This 
preference for repatriation of competences is justified with reference to the democratic 
principle of national executive accountability to national parliaments as opposed to the 
dominance of an unaccountable executive at the EU level (interview with Salagnac 
2010). This is also reflected in the party’s opposition to the primacy of EU over national 
law and its quest for the empowerment of national legislation (National Front 2004).  
EU policies particularly prominent in the party’s criticisms include the European 
Monetary Union and the Single Currency, the Common Agricultural Policy, the Single 
Market, the Schengen agreement and EU citizenship. The party recommends that the 
European Central Bank (ECB) should be reformed by limiting the scope of its powers 
and by removing its authority to administer the Eurozone’s monetary policy (interview 
with de Danne 2010). In the case that this is not possible, it accepts that France should 
regain its monetary sovereignty (National Front 2008) in order to be able to vary the 
parity and interest rates of the currency (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010). The ECB 
is held responsible for speeding up the effects of the financial crisis in Europe by 
keeping the euro-currency parity stable and by not varying the interest rate of lending 
money. The Bank is thought to ‘create economic disparities and promote unfair 
competition among the European countries’ (interview with de Saint-Just 2010) 64 . 
Monetary policy is thought to be better managed at the domestic level whereby each 
country could cater for its financial needs. ‘EU Member states can manage the financial 
crisis by themselves [provided that] they can set their own exchange rates’ (interview 
with de la Tocnaye 2010)65. Far from strengthening the French economy, the Euro 
currency ‘accelerates the process of globalisation, namely structural instabilities’ 
(National Front 2004: 112)66. Note that the European issue as a whole and the euro in 
particular have a strategic importance for the party. Jean Marie Le Pen argues that ‘We 
have to recover our national currency in order to guarantee the purchasing power of our 
                                                
64 Wording in French: ‘L’euro crée les disparités et mène a la catastrophe. C’est la concurrence 
déloyale parmi les pays.’ 
65 Wording in French: ‘Les Etas membres de l’UE peuvent faire face à la crise eux-mêmes’ 
66 Original text: ‘Loin de conforter l’économie européenne et française, il en accélère la 
mondialisation, c’est-àdire la fragilité structurelle.’ 
 134
compatriots’ (Au Front 2008b: 4)67. It is acknowledged, however, that an outright exit 
from the Eurozone constitutes a bad marketing move for the party. As a result the 
party’s policy is to first try to reform the ECB and to exit the Eurozone only in the case 
its proposed reforms fail (interview with de Danne 2010). This demonstrates that the 
presentation of the European issue to the voter matters.  
The Common Agricultural Policy is also heavily criticised as subjugated to ultra-liberal 
principles of, among others, the World Trade Organisation, resulting in the isolation of 
rural areas and unemployment (Martinez 2006a; Martinez 2006d). The European 
Commission is criticised for gradually decreasing the budget for agriculture thus 
destroying this important industry to the benefit of third countries such as Brazil 
(Martinez 2006c). Jean Marie Le Pen (2005b: 3) argues that ‘European agriculture is 
dead’68. The EU’s commercial policy is condemned on a similar basis, namely that it 
promotes an ultra-liberal agenda failing to protect European industries to the benefit of 
other countries outside Europe, such as China (Jean Marie Le Pen 2005a), and 
dismantling traditional European industries such as textile, leather, farming, fishing and 
home appliances (Martinez 2006a). For these reasons, the EU’s commercial policy is a 
‘suicide’ as it does not promote protectionism (Jean Marie Le Pen 2005a: 3).  
The National Front is also against the EU’s most prominent policy, namely the Single 
Market. Although the party accepts that Europe’s internal market can lead to some level 
of development and prosperity, it maintains that it does not ensure the protection of 
European workers from worldwide competition (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). This 
policy is also seen as the cause of the de-industrialisation of France and the de-
localisation of French businesses (interview with de Saint-Just 2010). The Single Market 
is thus considered to be a ‘betrayal’ to the party’s core principles and interests as it 
entails the complete disappearance of internal borders both physical and economic 
(interview with Gollnisch 2009a). This rationale also explains the party’s staunch 
opposition to the Schengen accords. Open borders and the Single Market’s free 
                                                
67 Original text : ‘Il faut […]  retrouver notre monnaie nationale pour garantir le pouvoir d’achat 
de nos compatriotes’ 
68 Original text: ‘l’agriculture européenne est morte…’ 
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movement of people are thought to have encouraged increased levels of immigration 
both from within and outside the EU.  
As mentioned in the previous section, one of the main principles of the National Front’s 
ideology is ‘national preference’ (McCulloch 2006). Immigration and citizenship 
constitute the party’s prime concerns and should be dealt with only at the national level 
in order to ensure the defence of French culture and identity. The EU, however, is seen 
as failing to respect the French values by encouraging immigration (Marine Le Pen 
2009: 3). Moreover, citizenship and nationality are inextricably linked and the French 
state is the one responsible to decide who becomes French citizen. The National Front is 
against European citizenship arguing that ‘the only possible access to citizenship is 
nationality’ (Gollnisch 2006a) 69 . As a result, the party opposes any European 
competence on immigration policy, is against Schengen and favours the re-
establishment of control over French borders (National Front 2002a; 2004). European 
citizenship is seen as exogenous to the state and is rejected (National Front 2004: 71). 
5.2.4 The Future of the European Polity  
The National Front envisages ‘a Europe of Nations founded on state sovereignty, 
community preference and borders protecting her mostly from immigration and 
company relocations’ (National Front 2008)70. However, the values and principles upon 
which the EU has been built are antithetical to the party’s ideology and general raison 
d’être. For the party, Europe becomes stronger only when the European nation states 
remain sovereign, independent, strong, prosperous and respected (National Front 2009: 
1); not when they are governed by supranational institutions. The EU is seen as a 
bureaucratic state spending money on tedious legislation, such as ‘la taille des paquets 
de café’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 2005a: 1) which cannot be reconciled with the party’s 
strong anti-étatism credentials (National Front 2004: 115-116). The EU is perceived to 
be advocating ultra-liberal free-market economics, which contravene the National 
                                                
69 Original text: ‘Le seul accès possible à la citoyenneté d’un pays est d’avoir la nationalité de ce 
pays.’ 
70 Original text: ‘une Europe des patries fondée sur la souveraineté de ses Etats, sur la préférence 
communautaire et sur des frontières la protégeant notamment de l'immigration et des 
délocalisations.’ 
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Front’s ideas of economic patriotism. Jean Marie Le Pen accuses the EU for being 
economically mediocre and socially disastrous and that the Reform Treaty ‘is a crime 
against democracy’71. The European model has assumed power over policies that have 
traditionally been thought to belong to the realm of the ‘national’ rather than that of the 
‘international’. The superiority of EU legislation, EU laws on cultural issues, the 
common currency, the European defence policy as well as the European citizenship are 
clear examples of the European impact on all national spheres, including the economic, 
political and social domains.  
The National Front presents Europe in a dichotomous manner, i.e. ‘their’ Europe as 
opposed to ‘our’ Europe, meaning the EU versus a geographic continent of sovereign 
and independent nation states (National Front 2009). The version of Europe that the 
party promotes is, however, utopian given political developments that occurred at EU 
level since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and especially following the ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty in 2009. The National Front has admitted this during the mid-2000s by 
arguing that EU has become the ‘ultimate step before global governance’ (National 
Front 2004: 62)72 which plainly contradicts the party’s insistence for ‘national solutions 
to national issues’ (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). The EU does not promote the 
principles of Community or National Preference, and for this reason it is demonised for 
all social, cultural and economic problems that member states are facing. These include 
increased levels of immigration, the decrease of purchasing power, crime and company 
relocations outside France. Overall the relationship between France and the EU is seen 
to have resulted in a ‘negative balance’ for France (interview with de Danne 2010). 
Consequently, it can be reasonably argued that the National Front opposes the ‘making 
of a future European polity’ and does not see how France could fit in an organisation 
that is perceived as contravening all tenets of the party’s ideology and is sometimes 
compared to the Soviet Union. The National Front thus rejects the EU system as a 
whole. The party has been a fervent opponent of the Reform Treaty, his leader arguing 
in EP plenary that it is ‘a crime against democracy’.  
                                                
71 EP Press release 23/10/2007 in 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/008-12035-295-10-43-901-
20071019IPR11928-22-10-2007-2007-false/default_en.htm 
72 Original text: ‘ultime étape avant le gouvernement mondial’ 
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It is interesting to note, however, that interviews with party officials have revealed a 
degree of internal variation in terms of intensity of opposition to the EU. Although by 
and large all interviewees agreed on their disagreement with the EU project, there was a 
variation depending the degree of personal familiarity with the EP. Blunt opposition to 
European integration came mostly (but not exclusively) from those politicians that have 
in some capacity worked in the EP. The EP seems to have thus produced a negative 
socialisation effect to the party’s politicians (Kerr 1973; Hooghe 2001).  
5.2.5 The issue of globalisation within the National Front’s European discourse   
The above anti-European argumentation is ultimately linked to the party’s anti-
globalisation rhetoric, which since the 1990s is core to the party’s political agenda 
(Hainsworth 2004). For the National Front, globalisation is a threat to the nation state 
having a detrimental impact on both the social and economic spheres. The world is free 
from all state, economic and social constraints in favour of a model of free-market 
economics, which destroys French jobs and industries as well as the French welfare state 
(National Front 2007: 60). Globalisation also entails the weakening of physical border 
control and trade barriers contravening the very tenets of the party’s ideology, which is 
based on national sovereignty.  Globalisation is thus ‘seen as a series of outside forces 
posing direct threats to Frenchness at all levels – cultural, social as well as economic’ 
(Hanley 2001: 310) and is presented as a danger to French national identity eroding the 
integrity of nations (Hainsworth and Mitchell 2000: 445).  
The issue of Europe is inextricably connected to that of globalisation as the EU is seen 
as a type of regional globalisation. Thus globalisation is perceived as commencing ‘by 
the standardisation at the European level’ (Lang 2001)73. The EU, instead of protecting 
the European states from the dire consequences of globalisation, is seen as promoting 
those forces at regional/European level and it is often argued that the entire project is an 
American fabrication (interview with de Danne 2010). The National Front 
euphemistically calls this phenomenon ‘Euro-globalisation’ [in French ‘Euro-
mondialisme’]. The European elites are portrayed as having betrayed the people through 
                                                
73 Original text: ‘Nous voilà simplement devant une étape supplémentaire de la globalisation à 
marche forcée, qui commence par l'uniformisation au niveau européen.’ 
 138
unconditionally surrendering to unrestrained free-market economics and the forces of 
globalisation (National Front 2009: 1). This entails increased levels of immigration, the 
absence of social and worker protection from the EU, company delocalisations and 
outsourcing of production as well as the dismantling of both physical and economic 
borders. The party argues that the EU is run by delocalised industries in China (National 
Front 2009: 1). The negative effects of the credit crunch on both Europe and France 
exemplify that the party was ‘right’ to be against globalisation and European integration 
(National Front 2009: 1). Instead of providing protection for its workers, the EU has 
only made matters worse. According to the party’s leader, ‘Not only does Europe fail to 
constitute a protection for French businesses but also contributes to the acceleration of 
the processes of deregulation, liberalisation of services and the opening to global 
competition’ (Jean Marie Le Pen 2006: 2)74.  
Due to the above connection of the two issues in the party’s ideological toolkit, the 
party’s Eurosceptic discourse largely focuses on the issue of social and economic 
globalisation. All the problems that the National Front believes France is facing are due 
to the forces of globalisation and European integration as a form of regional 
globalisation. Jean Marie Le Pen (2005a: 2) is arguing that we need to ‘defend the 
Europe of Nations against the disastrous globalisation and the migratory waves’75. The 
EU is portrayed as a ‘Euro-globalising Super State’ contrary to the traditional 
conception of the European nation-state based on national sovereignty and the right to 
self-determination. This holistic criticism and rejection of the EU project can be 
captured by Gollnisch’s EP speech where he argues: 
[The EU is] a state without soul nor identity that denies its Greco-
Christian roots, accepts to integrate Turkey despite popular opposition 
and only believes in globalisation, competition and the market forces’ 
(Gollnisch 2005)76.  
 
                                                
74 Original text: ‘L'Europe, non seulement n'est pas une protection pour les entreprises 
françaises, mais elle contribute à accélérer la déréglementation, la libéralisation des services et 
l'ouverture à la concurrence mondiale.’ 
75 Original text: ‘défendre l'Europe des Patries face au mondialisme destructeur et à la déferlante 
migratoire.’ 
76 Original text: ‘État sans âme ni identité, enfin, qui renie ses racines helléno-chrétiennes, 
accepte d’intégrer la Turquie malgré l’opposition des peuples, ne croit qu’à la mondialisation, à 
la concurrence et au marché.’ 
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The party’s definition of globalisation is thus very complex and is linked to various 
social and economic phenomena.  
5.2.6 Analysis of the National Front’s European Parliamentary Speeches during the 5th 
& 6th Terms 
An analysis of the party’s EP speeches also demonstrates the comparative salience of 
issues relevant to the phenomenon of globalisation and the party’s opposition to it77. 
During the 5th Parliamentary Term, 1999-2004, the National Front elected five MEPs, 
including Jean Marie Le Pen, Jean Claude Martinez, Carl Lang, Bruno Gollnisch and 
Charles de Gaulle. Marie-France Stirbois replaced Jean Marie Le Pen in April 2003 
following the suspension of the latter’s EP mandate. In total, they gave 302 speeches. 
During the 6th Parliamentary Term, 2004-2009, the number of speeches more than 
doubled. The National Front elected seven MEPs. Whereas Lydia Schenardi, Fernand 
Le Rachinel and Marine Le Pen were elected for the first time, Jean Marie Le Pen, 
Bruno Gollnisch, Jean Claude Martinez and Carl Lang renewed their mandate. During 
this legislative term, party MEPs gave 778 speeches to the EP78.  
A qualitative content analysis of the total number of 1080 speeches reveals an 
interesting pattern in terms of the themes that party MEPs refer to when they address the 
EP. A number of themes recur in these speeches, which can be broadly grouped into two 
categories, including (1) comments specific to Europe and the EU and (2) points on 
general non-EU related themes and much general recommendations79. Table 5.1 below 
shows the percentage of recurring themes in each category. Interestingly, party MEPs 
overwhelmingly refer to EU issues in their speeches. In total, 82.5 per cent of themes 
                                                
77 These have been found on the EP’s online archives at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN 
78 Note that Carl Lang and Jean Claude Martinez left Front National shortly before 2009. They 
did so for party internal dissent reasons rather than change in ideology. As such their speeches 
have been included in the analysis as they both have been prominent figures of the party during 
the 1999-2009 period under investigation.  
79 For a detailed analysis of how speeches have been coded, see Appendix III.   
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refer to the politics and policies of the EU. 16.6 per cent of the themes are non-EU 
related themes80.  
Table 5.1 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 
5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms  
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes and criticisms 82.5 
Non-EU related themes & general recommendations 16.6 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
A comparison of these two thematic categories among the two EP Parliamentary Terms 
reveals a similar pattern. The reference to EU related themes remains overwhelming 
although it increases by 7.2 per cent from the 5th to the 6th Parliamentary term where it 
scored 77.2 and 84.4 per cent respectively. This corresponds to a relative decrease of 
references to non-EU related issues. During the 5th Parliamentary Term, party MEPs 
have referred to non-EU related issues by 22.6 per cent whereas in the 6th by only 14.8 
per cent. This indicates that although EU issues were overwhelmingly salient in both EP 
legislative terms, this salience increased even more during the latter part of the 2000s 
(see tables 5.2 & 5.3 below).  
Table 5.2 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 
5th Parliamentary Term 
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes and criticisms 77.2 
Non-EU related themes & general recommendations 22.6 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
 
 
 
                                                
80 This strong salience of the EU is corroborated by the 2006 Chapel Hill survey where Front 
National scores 3.22 where 1 indicates no importance of European integration in the party’s 
public stance and 4 indicates great importance. 
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Table 5.3 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes and criticisms 84.4 
Non-EU related themes & general recommendations 14.8 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
A more detailed account of the recurring themes shows the predominance of issues 
pertaining to the phenomenon of globalisation (see table 5.4 below). Of the total issues 
that MEPs raised in their EP speeches, more than a third (34.1%) constitute criticisms 
against the EU for either promoting globalisation at a regional level or failing to protect 
EU member states from the effects of globalisation. Within the category of issues 
specific to the EU which accounts for 82.5 per cent of the references, the EU promotes 
‘globalisation’ subcategory comprises 34.1 per cent, just under half of the total 
references to the EU (see table 5.4 below). Next is the subcategory of criticisms towards 
‘EU institutions and Treaties’ which accounts for 8 per cent of the overall occurrence of 
themes (see table 5.4 below). The party also marginally refers to a common European 
culture, which includes a common Greco-Roman Christian heritage among the 
European peoples. Particularly striking is also the fact that party MEPs barely use the 
EP platform to criticise their domestic opponents. Only 2 per cent of the total occurrence 
of themes openly express disapproval of the French Presidents Jacques Chirac and 
Nicolas Sarkozy (see table 5.4 below). The EP is predominantly employed as a platform 
to condemn EU-related policies and politics rather than to criticise the French elite. 
Within their EU criticisms, the consequences of ‘Globalisation’ are given more weight 
compared to other EU related politics.  
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Table 5.4 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 
5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms  
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
5th & 6th EP Term   
EU related themes and criticisms   
EU promotes Globalisation  34.1 
EU Economic policies  4.5 
EU Employment policies  2.1 
EU Institutions/Treaties  8 
EU Enlargement  3.8 
EP Procedures/Parliamentary immunity/ EU does not respect HR  7.8 
EU does not respect referenda/the people 3.3 
Against various EU policies/initiatives/reports  9.1 
EU bureaucracy/legislation 2.2 
Reference to common European culture  2.2 
In favour of Russia (as opposed to the EU) 0.5 
In favour of various EP initiatives/reports 4.9 
EU related themes sub-total  82.5 
  
Non-EU related themes & general recommendations  
General recommendations 8 
Criticism of Chirac/Sarkozy 2 
Non-EU specific issues  6.8 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  16.8 
  
Total  ≈ 100% 
Note: N=1443 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
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As mentioned above, the National Front defines the phenomenon of globalisation in a 
rather complex manner. Its consequences for both France and Europe are seen as both 
social and economic. Table 5.5 below summarises the themes recurring in the EP 
speeches that relate to the party’s definition of globalisation. This includes criticisms of 
the EU not only failing to protect the member states from globalising forces but also for 
being committed to the promotion of globalisation. The EU criticism for promoting 
economic liberalisation is the most salient and accounts for 11.4 per cent of the total 
recurring issues. This is followed by the issue of immigration, which is portrayed as the 
social consequence of globalisation and European integration and represents 8.7 per cent 
of the total issues. The party’s pleas for national and community preference are also 
included in this category as are the requests to restore both physical and border controls 
within the EU.  
Table 5.5 Breakdown of ‘EU promotes Globalisation’ subcategory (National Front) 
5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms  
 
Breakdown of ‘EU promotes Globalisation’ subcategory Percentage
5th & 6th EP Team  
EU promotes economic liberalisation 11.4 
EU promotes immigration: EU immigration policy  8.7 
National preference/protectionism 1.7 
Community preference/EU protectionism 3.3 
Restore physical border control 1.7 
Restore customs border control 1.4 
EU promotes the liberalisation of farming/fishing  4.2 
EU promotes the dismantling of physical borders: Schengen 1.7 
EU promotes Globalisation Total  34.1 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
 
A comparison of the two EP legislative terms shows that the pattern is rather similar 
between the two terms. Criticisms of the EU as promoting economic and social 
globalisation increase by 3.6 per cent (from 31.2 in the 5th to 34.8 per cent in the 6th EP 
term), criticisms of EU Treaties and Institutions largely remain constant and EU 
employment and enlargement polices are marginally more criticised during the 6th EP 
term (see tables 5.6 and 5.7 below). References to the EP procedures and MEPs 
parliamentary immunity have dropped from 13.9 to 5.5 per cent (see tables 5.6 and 5.7 
below). This is because the issue of Jean Marie Le Pen’s EP suspension was resolved 
after 2004. However, 5.5 is still not a negligible percentage and largely represents the 
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party’s disapproval of the EP procedures arguing that they disadvantage small parties. 
This links to the EP’s anti-socialisation effect on National Front politicians. Criticisms 
of the EU for not respecting the European peoples features largely as a new issue during 
the 6th EP term as well as the reference to Russia as a historically European country that 
should be treated as an equal partner (see tables 5.6 & 5.7 below)81.  
Table 5.6 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 
5th Parliamentary Term 
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
5th EP Term  
EU related themes and criticisms   
EU promotes Globalisation  31.2 
EU Economic policies  4.4 
EU Employment policies  1.1 
EU Institutions/Treaties  7.7 
EU Enlargement  3.1 
EP Procedures/Parliamentary immunity/ EU does not respect HR  13.9 
EU does not respect referenda/the people 0.8 
Against various EU policies/initiatives/reports  9.5 
EU bureaucracy/legislation 3.2 
Reference to common European culture  1.3 
In favour of Russia (as opposed to the EU) 0 
In favour of various EP initiatives/reports 1 
EU related themes sub-total 77.2 
  
Non-EU related themes & general recommendations  
General recommendations 7.3 
Criticism of Chirac/Sarkozy 1.3 
Non-EU specific issues  14 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  22.6 
  
Total  ≈ 100% 
N=381 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
 
                                                
81 Note that a simple word frequency in total 1080 speeches reveals a similar pattern whereby 
words such as immigration, liberal, borders, customs, agriculture and Turkey recur 
comparatively more often. For a frequency of words matrix, see Appendix V. 
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Table 5.7 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Front) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
6th EP Term  
EU related themes and criticisms   
EU promotes Globalisation  34.8 
EU Economic policies  4.6 
EU Employment policies  2.5 
EU Institutions/Treaties  8 
EU Enlargement  4 
EP Procedures/Parliamentary immunity/ EU does not respect HR  5.5 
EU does not respect referenda/the people 4.2 
Against various EU policies/initiatives/reports  9.8 
EU bureaucracy/legislation 1.8 
Reference to common European culture  2.4 
In favour of Russia (as opposed to the EU) 0.6 
In favour of various EP initiatives/reports 6.2 
EU related themes sub-total 84.4 
  
Non-EU related themes & general recommendations  
General recommendations 8.2 
Criticism of Chirac/Sarkozy 2.2 
Non-EU specific issues  4.4 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  14.8 
  
Total ≈ 100% 
N= 1062 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
5.3 The European issue as a differentiation tool  
The aim of this section is illustrate how the party’s decision to adopt a ‘rejectionist’ 
position on European integration and to actively focus on the issue of social and 
economic globalisation relates to its general strategy in the domestic party system. As 
mentioned above, the party’s strategy is adversarial, its logic of competition is issue-
based and its predominant goal is to claim ownership of specific policies or issues. Seen 
through this prism, this section argues that the party’s anti-EU position is integral to the 
party’s adversarial strategy. Since the party’s main logic of competition at the domestic 
level is ‘issue or policy based’, the party has increased incentives to delineate itself from 
the rest of the party system on specific policies in order to make itself heard in the 
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political arena and to represent a clear and different option for the electorate. The party's 
change of policy towards an outright rejection of European integration post-Maastricht 
and especially during the 1999-2009 decade fits comfortably within this overall political 
strategy. Strong criticism of the EU and the latter’s connection to the wider issue of 
globalisation become a strategic tool for the party in an effort to show to the French 
people that it represents a different, powerful and independent actor in the party system. 
The following section assesses the party’s strategy with reference to the electorate and 
the rest of the French parties giving particular attention to the 2005 French referendum 
on the European Constitution and the National Front’s 2009 EP elections’ campaign.  
5.3.1 Attracting a well-defined segment of the society   
The National Front attracts a particular segment of the society, which is rather dissimilar 
to the French society as a whole (Mayer 2002a; 2002b; 2007). The party’s electorate has 
an ethnocentric and authoritarian vision of the society. It is somewhat anti-Semitic and 
in favour of the reestablishment of the death penalty (Mayer 2002b). It overwhelmingly 
believes that there are many immigrants in France, that immigrants from North Africa 
will never become French and that the French people no longer feel at home in France 
(Mayer 2002b: 505-506). In fact, there is a strong correlation between the importance 
one attaches to the issue of immigration and the vote for the National Front (Mayer 
2007). The party’s core voters are poorly educated and predominantly male. In terms of 
professional characteristics, they are mostly unemployed, workers, small shopkeepers, 
craftsmen and low level employees. These voters come from different backgrounds but 
self-proclaim to be predominantly ‘right-wing’. Indicatively, only 16 per cent of the 
workers that intended to vote for Jean Marie Le Pen in the 2007 Presidential elections 
claimed to belong ‘mostly to the left’ (Mayer 2007: 438).   
The voters analysed above form a coherent core and have remained largely faithful to 
the party since the 1980s (Mayer 2002b: 511). The 2002 Presidential elections marked 
an electoral breakthrough for the party. The theme of insecurity was at the heart of the 
pre-electoral debate politicised by Jacques Chirac himself (Mayer 2002b; Cautrès 2003). 
This issue, integral to the party’s discursive toolkit, gave it the opportunity to enrich its 
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electoral make-up by attracting not only its core voters but also those from the 
‘traditional right’ (Mayer 2002b: 513). In 2002 the party gained votes from rural areas 
and small French towns mainly among farmers who are traditionally supporters of the 
centre-right Union for a Popular Movement. The positions of these voters largely 
resemble those of the core National Front supporters. They equally reject immigration, 
they have an authoritarian vision of the society and they are in favour of the death 
penalty (Mayer 2007: 439).  
It thus seems that during the 2000s, the National Front managed to mobilise two 
different segments of the French society, namely its core authoritarian and xenophobic 
electorate and some traditional right-wing voters. Given its profile, the party’s core 
electorate is the most affected by the liberalisation of markets and the arrival of 
immigrants. This segment of the French society is likely to consider itself as the victim 
of the process of globalisation. Both workers and right-wing traditional voters have 
become the ‘victims of globalisation’ as their professions are usually not sheltered from 
the forces of economic and social liberalisation. Company delocalisations and 
outsourcing of production affects professions such as low levels employees and workers. 
Economic liberalisation also has an adverse effect on farmers, small shopkeepers and 
craftsmen as cheaper products are imported from abroad. As a result of this process of 
economic and social globalisation both types of the electorate are likely to support 
parties that have succeeded in politicising these issues. For example, the traditional 
right-wing voters opted for Jean Marie Le Pen because they felt socially and 
economically insecure (Mayer 2007). Policy vote among those circles became a means 
to defend their socio-economic status in opposition to what are seen as ‘devastating’ 
European and global forces.  
The party is aware of the socio-economic situation of its voters. ‘Our electorate is poor 
and a victim of globalisation and European integration. We carry the questions and 
anxieties of the French’ (interview with de Saint-Just 2010)82. Voters ‘choose us for the 
consequences of globalisation, namely unemployment, immigration, low purchasing 
                                                
82 Wording in French: ‘Notre électorat est pauvre que souffre; victime de la mondialisation et de 
l’Europe. Nous somme porteurs des angoisses et interrogations des français’ 
 148
power, lost social gains and insecurity’ (interview with Schénardi 2009)83. The party’s 
anti-European discourse largely focusing on the effects of the markets and the European 
agriculture is clearly addressed to the two types of the French electorate. ‘Our position is 
really the position of our electorate’ (interview with Schénardi 2009)84 . The party 
criticises the EU for having ‘sacrificed the French agriculture to America’ and the single 
market ‘responding to its own logic’ (interview with Salagnac 2010)85. A speech of 
Jean-Claude Martinez in the EP captures the link the party makes between European 
integration and globalisation and how this is connected to the party’s core electorate and 
the swing voters, namely workers and farmers respectively. 
‘The French people’s will expressed by the 2005 referendum broke the 
wild wave of ultra-liberalism and unrestrained free-trade that for the 
past 20 years swept and destroyed our coal, steel, textile, leather, spare 
parts, home appliances and automobile industries. This wave sowed the 
desertification of our fishing ports, our Languedoc-Roussillon 
vineyards, our sheep, cattle and poultry breeding, our Caribbean 
bananas, our Reunion plantations, our farms and plunged the women, 
the men, the workers and labourers of our country into social insecurity’ 
(Martinez 2006a).86 
 
Globalisation is a rather vague phenomenon that is difficult to capture or measure. The 
EU, however, is a concrete project whose institutions can be seen and policies can be 
felt at the national level. In this manner, European integration becomes an easy and 
tangible scapegoat for the perceived negative consequences of globalisation. Instead of 
blaming a rather abstract phenomenon for fears of insecurity and unemployment, it 
becomes rather more effective to put the blame on a concrete project. Besides, the party 
argues that the EU is a type of regional globalisation. This link between globalisation 
                                                
83 Wording in French: ‘‘Ils nous votent pour les conséquences de la globalisation, c’est-à-dire 
chômage, immigration, bas pouvoir d’achat, acquis sociaux perdus et insécurité.’  
84 Wording in French: ‘notre position est vraiment la position de notre électorat’ 
85 Wording in French: ‘L’UE a sacrifié l’agriculture française à l’Amérique [et] le marché 
répond à sa propre logique.’ 
86 Original text: ‘La vague sauvage de l'ultralibéralisme et du libre-échange débridé qui, depuis 
20 ans, déferlait et cassait nos charbonnages, nos aciéries, nos industries du textile, du cuir, de la 
machine-outil, de l'électroménager ou de l'automobile et semait la désertification dans nos ports 
de pêche, nos vignobles du Languedoc-Roussillon, nos élevages ovins, bovins, aviaires, nos 
bananeraies des Antilles, nos plantations de la Réunion, nos fermes, plongeant les femmes, les 
hommes, les ouvrières et les travailleurs de nos pays dans l'insécurité sociale, s'est cassée elle-
même sur la volonté du peuple français exprimée par le référendum du 29 mai 2005.’ 
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and European integration appeals to both the party’s core electorate and the traditional 
right-wing voters, and has the power to mobilise them to go to the ballot box. Presenting 
this opposition in a very adversarial manner is also directed towards the voters that 
would potentially abstain. It can be said that in some ways the National Front actively 
formulates a latent anti-Europeaness linked to the electorate’s anti-globalisation 
instincts. For instance, in its monthly bulletin it is argued ‘Victims of globalisation, the 
French farmers pay the consequences of a disastrous European agricultural policy’ (Au 
Front 2008b: 6)87.  
The party’s adversarial political strategy demonstrated by, among others, its position on 
European integration is also facilitated by the features of the French electoral system. 
Research has shown that the two-round electoral system creates incentives for strategic 
voting and may encourage voters to support candidates with little chance of victory in 
the first round. This is because voters may choose to signal their preferences on a 
particular policy in the first round and ‘alter the policy position of the preferred 
candidate’ (Blais and Loewen 2009: 355). In this context, the National Front is more 
likely to attract strategic voting in the first round if it focuses its agenda on selected 
policies that differentiate it from the rest of the party system and/or on which the other 
parties have not formulated a clear position.  
The positions of the party’s electorate on immigration and on insecurity do not coincide 
with the positions of the general French electorate. Mayer (2007) finds that the distance 
of opinion between the National Front and the general electorate has increased during 
the last twenty years. Far from becoming more right-wing, the French society continues 
to evolve towards more ‘tolerance and openness’ (Mayer 2007: 431). As such, the 
employment of issue-based adversarial politics as part of its strategy for differentiation 
entails that the party does not seek to attract the median voter. The National Front aims 
to maintain its core voters and attract the disillusioned traditional right-wing voters by 
first, focusing on particular policies; second, actively seeking to polarise the debate; and 
third, treating the mainstream parties as a single block.  
                                                
87 Original text : ‘Victimes de la mondialisation, les agriculteurs français payent les 
conséquences d’une politique agricole européenne désastreuse.’ 
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5.3.2 Providing a unique yet extremist niche 
The active pursuit to polarise the debate by using a strong anti-European rhetoric and by 
connecting the latter to an anti-globalisation agenda was largely facilitated by the 2005 
French referendum campaign on the European Constitution. Although highly divided, 
the Socialist Party and the Greens supported the Constitution as did the Union for a 
Popular Movement. The ‘no’ campaign focused its criticisms mostly on socio-economic 
issues, which were linked to the wider global and domestic context. Supporters of the 
‘no’ campaign were diverse ranging from the left wing Workers’ Struggle, French 
Communist Party and Revolutionary Communist League to Philippe de Villiers’ right-
wing Movement for France and Debut la République, a break-away party from the 
Union for a Popular Movement led by Nicolas Dupont-Aignan.  
What united this rather disparate and cross-party campaign against the European 
Constitution was the discussion of ‘the negative socio-economic impact and cultural 
consequences of globalisation for France’s economic and political future’ (Startin 2008: 
94). The radical left condemned the European Constitution because they saw the EU as 
a capitalist project that runs counter to their vision of the ‘Socialist United States of 
Europe’ (Workers' Struggle 2004; Revolutionary Communist League 2006: 18) and that 
perpetuates the ultra-liberal logic of the Maastricht Treaty (French Communist Party 
2004). The right-wing opponents of the Constitution put forward a ‘variable geometry’ 
or ‘à la carte’ Europe whereby member states would be able to cooperate in an 
intergovernmental manner in large projects. Neither, however, advocated the 
repatriation of all competences, the renegotiation of all European Treaties or the 
organisation of a referendum on French EU membership as did the National Front. 
Additionally, although the right-wing Eurosceptics share the Front’s views on nation-
state sovereignty, they do not adopt its vision of Europe. The latter is based on the 
absolute supremacy of the European nation state over any other institution which entails 
that the nation state should not be bound by any international laws. Although the party’s 
campaign against the Constitution shared the concerns of all the above mentioned 
parties, it strove to present its positions as representing a unique but nevertheless 
extremist niche in the political system. This was achieved by engaging in an adversarial 
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political strategy whereby the National Front was the only party against the totality of 
EU policies and indirectly advocating EU withdrawal.  
The National Front sees both the radical left and ultra-conservative parties as its 
immediate competitors since sometimes the policies that they put forward and their 
electorate overlap. In this context, the National Front has an additional incentive to 
increase its differentiation and to be seen as providing a unique (albeit rather extremist) 
alternative. By claiming that ‘it was the first Eurosceptic party in France’88 (interview 
with Salagnac 2010), the party presents itself as being the ‘owner’ of Euroscepticism in 
France. It is self-proclaimed as different from the radical left because it does not only 
condemn the EU for being ultra-liberal. Rather it also criticises the EU for allegedly 
being conducive to increased levels of immigration (interview with Schénardi 2009). 
The party justifies its disapproval of the EU on the basis of its ‘economic patriotism’ 
doctrine89 (interview with de la Tocnaye 2010) and its ‘willingness to retain the nation’s 
prominence’ (interview with de Saint-Just 2010)90.  The party also contends that it is 
different from the ultra-conservative parties. ‘Philippe de Villers and Nicolas Dupont-
Aignan have been elected to the National Assembly thanks to the Union for a Popular 
Movement’ 91  (interview with de Danne 2010) and as a result they are tied to the 
mainstream. Regarding de Villiers, it is argued that ‘he has been sold to the Union for a 
Popular Movement’ (interview with Schénardi 2009)92. Thus the party’s ‘rejectionist’ 
position on European integration has a two-fold effect. It first serves to delineate the 
party from its immediate competitors both on the right and the left sides of the political 
spectrum. Second its discourse aids the party to present itself as providing a clear anti-
party and anti-mainstream alternative.  
This strategy becomes all the more pertinent given the zero-sum character of French 
politics. In a zero-sum environment, it makes sense that a party would not only aim to be 
as strong as possible, but also to be stronger than its opponents (Meguid 2008). The 
                                                
88 Wording in French: ‘nous ont été les premiers eurosceptiques en France.’ 
89 Wording in French: ‘on a la même position sur l’UE avec l’extrême gauche. Mais la 
justification est différente. A savoir, le patriotisme économique’ 
90 Wording in French: ‘la volonté de garder la proéminence de la nation’ 
91 Wording in French: ‘Philippe de Villiers et Nicolas Dupont-Aiganan sont élus aux législatives 
grâce a l’UMP’ 
92 Wording in French: ‘De Villiers est vendu à l’UMP’ 
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National Front has more to win, and very importantly increased media coverage, by 
being controversial than by being accommodating. The feeling of effective exclusion 
from the party system accentuates this need for the adoption of contentious policies. 
‘They do not let us speak. This has sharpened our claims’ (interview with Schénardi 
2009)93. In its effort for differentiation, the party discourse includes strong anti-EU 
words and phrases, including ‘We are imprisoned within the EU. It is a prison’, ‘We do 
not need a villain’, and ‘The European Parliament is a masquerade’ (interview with 
Salagnac 2010)94. 
This link between the party's effort for differentiation and the issue of Europe became 
even more prominent in the mid and later part of the 2000s. Nicolas Sarkozy, leader of 
the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement, openly politicised the issue of 
immigration and national identity in his 2007 Presidential campaign effectively 
hollowing out a large part of the National Front’s political agenda (Mayer 2007: 441). 
Indeed a number of party officials argue that Sarkozy won precisely because he 
borrowed the National Front’s ideas (interviews with Schénardi 2009; Gollnisch 2009a; 
de Danne 2010; de Saint-Just 2010). The leader of the Union for a Popular Movement 
adopted an ‘accommodative’ strategy whereby he increased the salience of the 
immigration issue and challenged the National Front’s issue-ownership of 
immigration95.  
Sarkozy’s strategy proved to be rather effective. The traditional right-wing voters 
returned to his party in 200796. The National Front received 10.44 per cent of the vote in 
the first round of the Presidential elections and approximately 1.600.000 less votes 
compared to the second round of the 2002 elections. This further motivated the National 
Front to use the issues of European integration and globalisation as part of its exclusive 
policy toolkit. The National Front mobilises voters on the authoritarian/libertarian 
dimension of political competition clearly focusing on the ‘identity and the national’ 
                                                
93 Wording in French: ‘‘On ne nous donne pas la parole. Ça a aiguisé notre revendication.’ 
94 Wording in French: ‘Nous sommes emprisonnés à l’intérieur de l’UE. C’est une prison’, 
‘Nous n’avons pas besoin d’un méchant’; and ‘Le PE, c’est une mascarade’.  
95 For a detailed analysis of mainstream parties’ strategies towards niche parties, see Meguid 
(2008).  
96 Another reason for this is that they saw Sarkozy as a more credible candidate compared to Le 
Pen (Mayer 2007: 441).  
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rather than the ‘community and the international’ (interviews with Schénardi 2009; 
Gollnisch 2009a). ‘We defend the “New Paradigm”. We are patriotic and social: we 
believe in the preservation of national identity and we stand out of the social rights of 
the people’ (interview with de Danne 2010). In this respect, the National Front is the 
only party in France ‘entitled’ to oppose European integration and globalisation. The 
party can claim ownership of these highly related issues as other parties and in particular 
the Union for a Popular Movement and Sarkozy being part of the 'cartel' cannot 
realistically adopt similar positions.   
The connection between Europe and globalisation became striking in the party’s 
campaign for the 2009 EP elections. The phrase ‘Euro-mondialisme’ figured 
prominently on the party’s electoral manifesto. The party argues that the ‘European 
Super State is not even truly European. It is instead a Euro-global space open to all 
winds, to all flows of people, products and capital’ (National Front 2009: 4)97. Bruno 
Gollnisch gave an interview to the party’s pre-electoral magazine where he argued that 
‘The World is sick. Europe is sick. France is sick’ (Au Front 2008b: 7) 98  clearly 
indicating that Europe is an intermediate level conveying the consequences of 
globalisation to the nation state. One of the party’s pre-electoral slogans was ‘Against 
the Europe of Banksters’ alluding that the EU is composed by bankers and gangsters 
who are only interested in their profits (Au Front 2008b: 5)99 . In 2009, the party 
supported the radical rupture with what it calls Euro-globalisation arguing that ‘The 
National Front embodies more than ever the only credible and coherent popular force 
which defends the independence, the sovereignty, the identity of France and which aims 
to preserve the security and prosperity of the French in Europe’ (Au Front 2009d: 3)100. 
                                                
97 Original text (slightly paraphrased’: ‘Mais ils sont résolument contre l’escroquerie qui 
consiste, sous le couvert de cette coopération, à edifier un Super-Etat destructeur de leurs 
identités particulières, de leurs souverainetés, de leurs libertés, sans meme pour autant édifier un 
ensemble véritablement européen, mais un espace euro-mondialiste ouvert à tous les vents, à 
tous les flux de personnes, de marchandises et de capitaux’ 
98 Original text: ‘Le Monde est malade, L’Europe est malade. La France est malade’ 
99 Original text: ‘Contre l’Europe des Banksters’ 
100 Original text: ‘le Front national incarne plus que jamais la seule force populaire crédible et 
cohérente qui défende l’indépendance, la souveraineté, l’identité de la France, qui entend 
préserver la sécurité et la prospérité des Français en Europe.’ 
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It is interesting to note that there was a degree of internal disagreement in the party 
regarding the official party EP election slogan. The choice was between the slogan 
‘Europe hurts’ and ‘Their Europe hurts’ with the first slogan being adopted at the 
insistence of Jean Marie le Pen (interview with Gollnisch 2009a). The approved slogan 
is rather more adversarial as it portrays Europe in a monolithic manner and argues that it 
has dramatic consequences on the member states. The party’s pamphlet below shows a 
statue representing France with a black eye having suffered a punch from Europe. The 
dismissed slogan can be thought as comparatively less adversarial because the word 
‘their’ shows that the party accepts the existence of two types of Europe: ‘their’ and 
‘ours’. It is significant that this vision of ‘two Europes’ was expressed in the European 
elections manifesto the headline of which was ‘Their Europe is not our Europe’ 
(National Front 2009: 1)101 . The manifesto argued that ‘The National Front has a 
different idea of Europe. It confirms that the road to follow is not that of Euro-
globalisation at the hands of a small co-opting caste, namely the Eurocracy [..] The good 
way ahead excludes neither the European dialogue nor the industrial, cultural or other 
types of cooperation. But it entails a radical break from the globalising system’ 
(National Front 2009: 1)102.  
                                                
101 Original text: ‘Leur Europe n’est pas la notre’  
102 Original text: ‘Le Front National a une autre idée de l’Europe. Il affirme que la voie à suivre 
n’est pas celle de l’Euromondialisme, aux mains d’une petite caste qui se recrute par cooptation 
: l’Eurocratie […] La bonne voie n’exclut ni la concertation européenne ni la coopération 
industrielle, culturelle, ou autre. Mais elle implique une rupture radicale avec le système 
mondialiste.’ 
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Figure 5.1 National Front 2009 EP elections pamphlet 
 
 
 
Note: ‘Europe hurts: Vote for Marine Le Pen’  
 
Conclusion  
The aim of the chapter has been to examine in detail the first type of party-based 
Euroscepticism, namely the ‘rejectionist’ pattern. It has also sought to explain the ways 
in which this variant of Euroscepticism may become integral to a radical right party’s 
political strategy at the domestic level. To illustrate this argument, the chapter has 
analysed the ideas, positions and strategic considerations of the French National Front 
during a ten-year period (1999-2009).  
Three main components constitute the chapter’s argument. Following a brief discussion 
of the party’s history and main ideological characteristics, the chapter suggests that the 
National Front is an intrinsically anti-system party whose predominant strategy is 
adversarial, its logic of competition issue-based and policy is its prime goal. Rather than 
having a full approach to the society, the party’s agenda is biased towards specific issues 
confirming its anti-system and anti-politics character. The chapter continues by arguing 
that the National Front has adopted a ‘rejectionist’ position on European integration. 
Although the party accepts Europe as a cultural and geographical entity, it rejects the 
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principle of integration at the EU level, is utterly against the EU policy status quo and 
the future building of a European federal state. The EU is rejected as a form of regional 
globalisation, which promotes ultra-liberal economic policies and encourages 
immigration. The party argues that European cooperation may only take place outside 
the EU framework on a bilateral or trilateral basis. Projects work much better outside the 
EU framework and nation-state cooperation should only take a case-by-case approach. 
The chapter concludes by illustrating the ways in which this staunch anti-European 
discourse has become a strategic tool in the party’s policy-based logic of competition. 
The party’s anti-EU and anti-globalisation positions enhance the party’s differentiation 
from the mainstream and facilitate its attempt to portray itself as the only party in France 
that provides a solution to new issues and problems that French people face.  
The empirical results of this chapter demonstrate that the National Front has used the 
European issue for party political gains. In its ultimate quest for political differentiation, 
the party opted for a strong anti-EU rhetoric advocating –albeit increasingly indirectly– 
French EU withdrawal. A ‘rejectionist’ EU stance as well as the latter’s connection to 
the wider issue of globalisation become a strategic tool for the party in an effort to 
demonstrate to the French people that it represents a different, powerful and independent 
actor in the party system. Europe is presented as some kind of intermediate political 
level, which mediates the allegedly dramatic consequences of globalisation to the nation 
state. This chapter confirms the thesis’ wider argument whereby radical right parties use 
the issue of Europe in their discursive toolkit for political purposes relevant to their 
domestic agenda. To shed further light on the thesis’ argument, the following chapter 
examines the second type of party-based Euroscepticism, namely the ‘conditional’ 
pattern.  
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Chapter 6 
The pattern of Conditional Euroscepticism: the case of 
 the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally 
 
 
 
 
‘Εμείς υιοθετούμε την Αριστοτέλεια λογική της μεσότητας’ 
 
‘We apply Aristotle’s logic of the median’,  
 
Interview with Asterios Rontoulis, LAOS MP, 2009.  
 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has explored in detail the first variant of radical right 
Euroscepticism identified in the thesis, i.e. the ‘rejecting’ position on European 
integration. This chapter proceeds by examining the second pattern of Euroscepticism. 
According to this pattern, a party is not against the principle of cooperation at a 
European multilateral level but it is against the current policy practice as well as the 
future building of a European polity. To shed more light on this type of radical right 
Euroscepticism, this chapter analyses the case of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally 
(LAOS)103. This party does not support Greek EU withdrawal and criticises any such 
argumentation. European nation states should cooperate in the context of a 
confederation whereby they would recognise and protect their historic, cultural and 
ethnic roots. LAOS supports European integration under conditions. These include the 
use of referenda for every grand EU decision or Treaty change, the predominance of 
intergovernmental decision-making and the maintenance of Europe’s cultural and 
religious homogeneity.  
                                                
103 This chapter refers to the Popular Orthodox Rally by its acronym, LAOS, for reasons of 
space. The full name of the party is otherwise used throughout the thesis.  
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The chapter tests hypothesis 2 of the thesis which suggests that if a radical right party 
seeks to have a catch-all appeal in order to increase its electoral percentages; it is likely 
to adopt a ‘conditional’ EU position. The party’s anti-European discourse will be 
portrayed in a way that de-emphasises its radicalism and is likely to focus on issues 
which the party perceives to be considered important by the general public so that it can 
portray itself as being close to the median voter (accommodative strategy). 
In order to test this hypothesis, the chapter proceeds with a three-fold argument. It first 
suggests that LAOS’ main political strategy is accommodative, its logic of competition 
of the ‘catch-all’ variant, and its predominant party goal is to increase its vote intake in 
order to ensure its survival in the Greek political system. Secondly, it puts forward that 
LAOS has adopted a ‘conditional’ position on European integration and maintains that 
in its European discourse the party overwhelmingly stresses issues of Greek security 
concerns. Third, it argues that the party’s stance on Europe is being used as a vote-
maximising tool in its effort to entrench its presence in the Greek party system.  
The main body of the chapter provides a detailed examination of LAOS’ position on 
European integration and its significance within the context of Greek domestic politics. 
It is divided into three sections. It starts with an overview of the party’s core ideology 
confirming that the latter is characterised by a combination of nationalist and 
authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric. It also places the party’s predominant 
strategy within the cultural, institutional, and historical constraints of the Greek party 
system. It proceeds by discussing the party’s position on European integration as well as 
the significance of Greek security concerns in the party’s European discourse. The third 
section shows how the party’s choice to adopt a ‘conditional’ position on European 
integration conforms with its general strategy within the Greek party system. It 
demonstrates that LAOS has adopted a ‘conditional’ EU position depicting Greek public 
opinion on the matter. LAOS has linked its European position to the issue of Greek 
security concerns portraying itself as occupying a unique niche in the Greek party 
system. 
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6.1 The Popular Orthodox Rally 
6.1.1 What the party stands for 
Georgios Karatzaferis established LAOS on September 14th 2000, after being expelled 
from the centre-right New Democracy on April 9th 2000104 for openly criticising its 
members including the then leader, Costas Karamanlis105. The establishment of LAOS 
marked Karatzaferis’ opposition to New Democracy’s ideological turn towards the 
centre of Greek politics as he represented the ultra-nationalist branch of the party 
(Georgiadou 2008; 2009). Since its establishment LAOS has enjoyed a piecemeal but 
constant rise in all types of elections, including local, national and European. LAOS’ 
electoral debut occurred in the 2002 local elections. The 2004 EP elections marked the 
party’s electoral breakthrough as with a 4.12 per cent of the Greek vote, the party leader 
became an MEP. The EP offered him political ‘office’ from which he could exert 
political power, develop a pan European political network, and increase his political 
status both domestically and abroad. In the 2007 national elections, the party gained ten 
seats in the national parliament and became the first radical right party to be represented 
nationally since 1977. This relative electoral success continued in both the 2009 EP and 
national elections when the party gained two and fifteen representatives respectively106.  
The party leader has consistently refused to be associated with the Greek 1967-1974 
dictatorship, neo-Nazi or neo-fascist movements arguing that the party belongs to the 
‘European right’ and that ‘Le Pen has a fascist mentality which I consider an enemy of 
society and democracy’ 107 . Despite several similar statements, the party can be 
characterised as belonging to the radical right party family (Mudde 2007: 306). LAOS 
articulates a ‘xenophobic, anti-immigrant, law and order and Eurosceptic discourse’ 
(Hainsworth 2008: 66) and shares the main defining ideological features of the radical 
                                                
104 www.in.gr news accessed on April 22nd 2010.  
105 Note that Costas Karamanlis was the Greek Prime Minister 2004-2007 and 2007-2009. Not 
to be confused with his uncle Kostantinos Karamanlis, Greek Prime Minister 1955-1958, 1958-
1961, 1961-1963 and 1974-1980 under various political alignments.  
106 For a detailed account of the party’s national and EP electoral results, see Appendix VI.  
107 Original text: ‘Ο Λεπέν εκφράζει μια ιδιάζουσα φασιστική νοοτροπία, την οποία εγώ θεωρώ 
εχθρό της κοινωνίας και της δημοκρατίας’ quoted in Greek Newspaper Eleftherotypia 
http://www.enet.gr/ 16/02/2006.  
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right which combine nationalist and authoritarian values with a populist rhetoric (Mudde 
2007: 20-23) outlined below.  
Nationalism and national identity feature prominently in the party’s ideology. The idea 
of the ‘nation’ constitutes the founding element of the party and all its subsequent ideas 
and policies derive from this core aspect. For instance, the party’s 2003 manifesto read:  
‘[LAOS] is a Greek centric party that advocates the long-term interests 
of the Greek people and the Greek nation. The Greek civilisation, the 
Greek spirit and the Greek values inspire the formulation and 
implementation of its policies’ (LAOS 2003: 7)108.  
 
The party assesses all issues affecting Greek society through the patriotic prism, 
including among others the economy, the environment and foreign affairs (interview 
with Rontoulis 8 April 2009). It seeks to provide an answer or what it calls the ‘middle 
ground’ between neo-liberalism and socialism arguing that its policy positions represent 
the logic of ‘patriotic interference’, namely the party puts the ‘nation’ first in every 
policy decision (Karatzaferis 2009).  
That LAOS is also highly authoritarian is illustrated in its policies and attitudes on law 
and order as well as immigration. Policing and defence are both particularly salient 
policies within the party. LAOS argues in favour of a strong Greek army and a raised 
morale of the armed forces (LAOS 2003: 13) as well as for the effective action of Greek 
security forces (LAOS 2003: 27). Furthermore, LAOS views Greece as having a serious  
demographic problem but argues that the latter should not be managed by increasing the 
number of immigrants since ‘Greece has a small number of inhabitants and the 
proportion of the population has already been altered [by high levels of immigration]’ 
(LAOS 2007).109 Immigration should be strictly controlled and immigrants must be 
                                                
108  Original text: Είναι ένα κόμμα ελληνοκεντρικό, που προτάσσει τα μακροπρόθεσμα 
συμφέροντα του ελληνικού λαού, και του έθνους, διαπνέεται από τον ελληνικό πολιτισμό, το 
ελληνικό πνεύμα και τις ελληνικές αξίες στην χάραξη και εφαρμογή της πολιτικής του. 
109 Original text: ‘λόγω του μικρού αριθμού των κατοίκων της, έχει ήδη αλλοιωθεί σημαντικά η 
αναλογία του πληθυσμού της.’ 
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assimilated in order to be ‘Greeks both in the soul and the spirit’ (LAOS 2007: 44).110 
The party is against illegal immigration claiming that ‘it plagues Greek society and is 
catastrophic in many areas’ (LAOS 2003: 23)111. Indicatively, LAOS scores 9.63 on the 
GAL/TAN axis of the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey where 1 marks a stance fully 
supportive of expanded personal freedoms and 10 marks ‘traditional’ or ‘authoritarian’ 
parties that reject these ideas and value order, tradition and stability (Hooghe, Bakker et 
al. 2010). Analysis of the Greek political system in Chapter 4 also points to a similar 
finding.  
LAOS adopts a populist rhetoric. The party tends to see society as divided into two 
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, i.e. the people and the corrupt elite (Taggart 
1998; Mudde 2007: 23). LAOS claims that democracy should lie in the hands of the 
people rather than what it sees as the corrupted elite. Politics should be the expression of 
the general will through plebiscitary politics. This explains its consistent attempt to 
promote the use of referendums for issues that it describes ‘of high national importance’. 
The party seeks to institutionalise in the Greek Constitution the government’s obligation 
to carry out a referendum through MP requests and signed petitions from the public 
(LAOS 2003: 9; 2007: 16). Examples where LAOS advocates a referendum include 
Turkish and FYROM’s EU entry (LAOS 2007: 22), Greek immigration policy (LAOS 
2007: 44), the euro (LAOS 2007: 45), Greek labour policy (LAOS 2007: 60) and 
FYROM’s official name (LAOS 2007: 84) 
Taggart (2000: 2) has defined populism as ‘a chameleon, adopting the colours of its 
environment’. This entails adapting one’s discourse depending on the context in order to 
suit one’s political needs. This characteristic of populism is particularly prominent in 
LAOS which consistently avoids defining itself along the left – right spectrum of 
political ideology. One of the party’s slogans is ‘Greece is what unites us all’ (LAOS 
2003: 1) 112. LAOS MPs and party officials discard the characterisation ‘right’ arguing 
that they do not consider LAOS as belonging to the ‘patriotic right’ (interviews with 
Aivaliotis 2009; Chrisanthakopoulos 2009; Polatides 2009; Rontoulis 2009). Rather, 
                                                
110 Original text: ‘να είναι Έλληνες στη ψυχή και στο πνεύμα’ 
111 Original text: ‘Αποτελούν τη σοβαρότερη πληγή που ταλανίζει αυτήν τη στιγμή την ελληνική 
κοινωνία με πολλαπλές καταστροφικές συνέπειες σε διάφορους τομείς.’ 
112 Original text: ‘’Ολους εμάς ενώνει η Ελλάς’ 
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they characterise LAOS as the party of ‘patriotic rebirth’ in Greece further arguing that 
the left-right division is obsolete especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This 
is true with the considerable exception of two LAOS MPs, Voridis and Georgiadis, who 
self-identify as right-wing politicians. In particular, on a scale from one to ten where one 
signifies extreme left and ten extreme right, Voridis places himself between 7 and 7.5 
(interview with Voridis 2009). Georgiadis admits that there are two types of political 
division. He argues that according to the traditional left-right political division, LAOS 
belongs to the right. On the other hand, according to the modern political division, 
namely the division between the ‘nationalists’ and the ‘internationalists’, LAOS is 
clearly a party against the New World Order (interview with Georgiadis 2009). 
However, even if these two politicians are comparatively more explicit regarding where 
they think the party or themselves may belong, their underlying concept is that the 
significance of patriotism in politics should be a continuous and uniting factor regardless 
of ideological background. In this respect, ideology becomes blurred and core 
ideological values are difficult to identify.  
6.1.2 Vote maximisation as the party’s predominant political strategy  
The party’s predominant strategy since its establishment in 2000 has been to increase its 
votes by portraying itself not as an extreme but rather as a ‘median’ party. The radical 
right in Greece has been discredited over the past decades largely but not exclusively 
due to the country’s dictatorial past. As a result the radical right has been constrained to 
small youth movements and minor parties that have been receiving much less than one 
per cent of the national vote since the beginning of the 1980s (see table 6.1 below). In 
this context, the first priority of a new and small radical right party is to become 
established in the Greek political landscape by aiming to consistently receive relatively 
high electoral results. This can only be achieved by appearing to be mainstream. This is 
not to say that a radical right party in Greece would not be concerned with gaining office 
or pushing particular policies of its interest. As will be shown below, LAOS’ political 
strategy is constrained by the country’s political culture, institutions and history. The 
party can be either policy or office seeking only after electoral support has entrenched it 
in the Greek party system.  
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Greek politics since the establishment of democracy in the mid-1970s and in particular 
since PASOK’s political success in the 1980s are characterised by the ‘polarisation of 
political conflict and rhetoric’ (Legg and Roberts 1997: 142). Political culture is typified 
by an adversarial style which encourages sharp division of opinion between the two 
main competitors, namely the conservative and the socialist party. The 1981 elections 
have been seen as an ‘earthquake’ in Greek politics because they signified the ‘passage 
from party fragmentation to the high concentration of political forces’ (Pappas 2003: 98) 
and led to ‘crystallisation of a new political system’ (Diamandouros 1998: 193). 
Following these elections, the Greek party system has been characterised as polarised 
pluralism, either ‘limited’ (Mavrogordatos 1984) or ‘extreme’ (Seferiades 1986). It has 
evolved especially until the end of the 1990s into a two-and-a-half party system where 
two major parties had been associated with the left and right respectively and an 
additional third small party had been associated with the radical left (Legg and Roberts 
1997: 132). Based on Sartori’s classification of party systems (Sartori and Mair 2005: 
164-170), Pappas (2003) concludes that post 1981 Greece is a classic two-party system. 
This is because no third party can prevent any of the two major parties from governing 
alone. Small parties do not have a blackmailing potential and government coalitions are 
unnecessary. Whether we classify the Greek party system as two-and-a-half or classic 
two party system, political culture remains adversarial and politics are largely focused 
on the two major political forces thus undermining the role and survival of small 
political parties.  
The electoral system is a form of reinforced proportional representation favouring the 
ability of the winner to achieve an absolute majority and discouraging electoral or 
governmental coalitions (Legg and Roberts 1997). This, coupled with a three per cent 
electoral threshold, produces a largely disproportional effect in terms of the translation 
of votes into seats by penalising small parties. This electoral system produces both a 
psychological and a mechanical effect on voting behaviour and the number of effective 
parties in the Greek party system (Duverger 1954). Greece scores 7.4 in the index of 
disproportionality (Gallagher and Mitchell 2004), has 2.2 effective number of parties at 
the legislative level and 2.7 effective number of parties at elective level (Gallagher, 
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Laver et al. 2006: 364).113 As a result, ‘No splinter party has gained much support across 
the country or elected more than a handful of deputies; they tend to last one or two 
elections at the most’  (Legg and Roberts 1997: 147) 114 and the radical right has been 
recording low electoral scores (Carter 2002: 134).  
Partly as a result of the two above-mentioned reasons, radical right parties have been 
unsuccessful in Greece since the restoration of the democratic regime in the mid-1970s. 
As seen in table 6.1 below, the radical right has failed electorally during the twenty year 
period 1985-2004. Prior to 1985, three radical right parties, including the National 
Alignment, the Progressive Party and the National Political Union, won seats in three 
elections, namely the 1977 Parliamentary, 1981 and 1984 European respectively. The 
success of these three parties is explained by particular events occurring during these 
years. The National Alignment’s success in 1977 was largely due to reasons specific to 
the post-1974 transition period, namely the legalisation of the Communist party and the 
purge of the public sector of people collaborating with the 1967-1974 military regime by 
the then Greek Prime Minister, Kostantinos Karamanlis (Clogg 1987: 184; Dimitras 
1992: 260). The relative success of the Progressive Party and the National Political 
Union in the EP elections at the beginning of the 1980s was mostly a consequence of the 
demand ‘for the release of the junta leaders’ from prison (Clogg 1987: 185; Dimitras 
1992: 266). In 1984 the National Political Union invited Jean Marie Le Pen, the leader 
of the French radical right National Front, to Athens, which provoked violent 
demonstrations. Clogg (1987: 185) argues that ‘this highly polarised climate in which 
the 1985 [national] elections took place made it predictable that the EPEN [National 
Political Union] vote, at 0.6%, was substantially less than the 2.3% it had achieved in 
the 1984 Euroelections’. Moreover, as Davis argues, ‘perhaps the greatest impediment 
to the rise of neo-populist parties has been the tremendous growth of the Greek welfare 
state and the populist actions of the PASOK party during the 1980s’ (Davis 1998: 168). 
                                                
113 Disproportionality refers to vote-seat disproportionality as measured the least squares index 
(Gallagher and Mitchell 2004: Appendix B). This is a 0 to 100 scale, 0 being full proportionality 
and 100 full disproportionality. The Greek 7.4 score runs somewhere in between in Europe with 
the United Kingdom scoring 17.7 and Austria scoring 1.3 (Gallagher, Laver et al. 2006: 364).  
114 Examples during the 1990s of splinter parties that did not last very long in the Greek political 
landscape include Political Spring and the Democratic Social Movement (splinter parties from 
ND and PASOK respectively).   
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This led a number of scholars to predict that unless there were dramatic developments 
the radical right in Greece was unlikely to rise (Dimitras 1996; Davis 1998).  
Table 6. 1 Radical right electoral results in Greece post-1974  
Year Election Name of Party Percentage Seats 
1974 Parliamentary National Democratic Union  1.1 0 
1977 Parliamentary National Alignment  6.8 5 
1981 Parliamentary Progressive Party  1.7 0 
1981 European Progressive Party  2 1 
  Movement of Greek Reformers  0.9 0 
1984 European National Political Union  2.3 1 
  Progressive Party  0.2 0 
  United Nationalist Movement  0.1 0 
1985 Parliamentary National Political Union  0.5 0 
Jun-89 Parliamentary National Political Union  0.3 0 
1989 European National Political Union  1.2 0 
  United Nationalist Movement  0.2 0 
  New Politicians 0.2 0 
  European Economic Movement  0.1 0 
  National Militants 0.1 0 
Nov-89 Parliamentary  - - - 
1990 Parliamentary  National Party  0.1 0 
  Nationalist Alignment   0.03 0 
1993 Parliamentary National Party  0.14 0 
1994 European Golden Dawn  0.11 0 
1996 Parliamentary National Political Union  0.24 0 
  Hellenism Party  0.18 0 
  Golden Dawn  0.07 0 
1999 European  Front Line  0.75 0 
  Hellenism Party  0.26 0 
  Hellenic Front  0.2 0 
2000 Parliamentary  National Coalition 0.21 0 
  Front Line  0.18 0 
  Hellenism Party  0.09 0 
2004 Parliamentary  Popular Orthodox Rally  2.17 0 
  Hellenic Front  0.09 0 
2004 European  Popular Orthodox Rally  4.12 1 
  Hellenic Front  0.25 0 
  Patriotic Alliance  0.17 0 
2007 Parliamentary Popular Orthodox Rally  3.8 10 
2009 European  Popular Orthodox Rally  7.15 2 
  Golden Dawn  0.46 0 
  Greek Union 0.06 0 
2009 Parliamentary Popular Orthodox Rally  5.63 15 
  Golden Dawn  0.29 0 
Source: Dimitras 1992 up to 1990 elections; 1993 to 2009 updated by the author  
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The Greek political culture, institutions and history are not conducive to the creation or 
the survival of a radical right party. Politics are mostly centred around the two major 
parties, the electoral system does not advantage small parties and radical right ideas are 
not welcome in the public. As a result, the radical right has not been successful in 
Greece since the early 1980s and in this respect the emergence of LAOS is rather 
puzzling115. Given these constraints, the major challenge a new, small and radical right 
party would face lies in ensuring its survival in the party system. This can only be 
attained by the consistent gaining of seats in the National Parliament. Given that Greece 
is a polarised society where debate takes mostly place between the two major parties, a 
party’s inability to enter the National Parliament automatically signifies its political 
demise. Unlike other European countries, parties that remain outside the Greek 
Parliament usually cease to operate or become exceptionally weak.  
As a result, since its establishment in 2000, the major challenge for LAOS has been to 
find a way to embed itself in the Greek party system. Although the ideological premise 
of the party lies in radical right populism, the party has increased incentives to downplay 
its radical elements in order to appear as representing the ‘mainstream’ of Greek 
politics. This can be facilitated by the adoption of a populist rhetoric. In this context, 
adopting an ‘accommodative’ political rhetoric entails that the party portrays itself as 
espousing ‘median’ (rather than extreme) positions. Appearing to be mainstream may 
have an effect on its electoral results. If LAOS increases its votes over successive 
elections, it avoids becoming a ‘flash party’. Consistently high electoral results may 
provide LAOS the opportunity to ‘break’ the two-party system. In this case, one of the 
two main parties may need to cooperate with LAOS in order to pass legislation. If this 
occurs, LAOS has successfully overcome the political, institutional and historic 
constraints of the Greek political system and is very likely to become a legitimised and 
established Greek political force.  
Party officials have confirmed this strategy. For instance, they have argued that ‘we 
apply Aristotle’s logic of the median’ indicating that the positions LAOS adopts are not 
                                                
115 Note that it is outside the scope of the chapter to discuss the initial rise of LAOS. Taking this 
relative success for granted and the constraints provided by the Greek party system, it seeks to 
explain how the issue of European integration sits within the party’s wider strategy. For a short 
discussion on LAOS’ success, see Gemenis, K. and E. Dinas (2010). 
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extremist (interview with Rontoulis 2009) 116. Moreover, ‘LAOS represents the average 
Greek person’, which entails a feeling that the party’s policies somewhat cut across 
party lines (interview with Georgiou 2009) 117 . LAOS is portrayed as a serious 
‘government party’ that could participate in a coalition with either major parties. In fact, 
participation in a governmental coalition would mark the party’s entrance to the Greek 
mainstream. ‘We may not be mainstream, just because we have not governed. We have, 
however, mainstream ideas.’ (interview with Polatides 2009)118. The two party system is 
seen as an impediment to the ‘mainstreamisation’ of LAOS and the predominance of 
two Greek families in power is seen as insanity (interview with Georgiou 2009). The 
party is in favour of a coalition government and has expressed an interest in cooperating 
not only with the most ideologically proximate New Democracy but also with PASOK 
(interview with Rontoulis 2009). Although it is accepted that cooperation with ND is a 
much more feasible scenario given the two parties’ ideological proximity (interview 
with Georgiadis 2009; also see Chapter 4 findings), it is argued that ‘we can cooperate 
with New Democracy but only under conditions. We say no to a privileged partnership 
with New Democracy. We can cooperate with other parties’ (interview with Polatides 
2009) 119 . LAOS views its participation in a governmental coalition as a likely 
development only if the party manages to transcend the bi-polar political culture. The 
party’s leader has argued:  
‘Greece is no longer a bi-polar society. This has already been tried. 
Our political discourse is positively received all the way from the 
Communist left to the radical right. Everyone listens to us because we 
are saying what is obvious […] We do not have restrictions. We accept 
what is good. All parties have patriots’ (Karatzaferis 2006)120.  
 
                                                
116 Wording in Greek: ‘Εμείς υιοθετούμε την Αριστοτέλεια λογική της μεσότητας’ 
117 Wording in Greek: ‘Το ΛΑΟΣ αντιπροσωπεύει το μέσο Έλληνα’.  
118 Wording in Greek: ‘Μπορεί να μην είμαστε mainstream, λόγω του ότι δεν έχουμε 
κυβερνήσει. Έχουμε όμως mainstream ιδέες.’ 
119 Wording in Greek: ‘Συνεργασία με τη ΝΔ θα μπορέσει να υπάρξει με όρους. Όχι στην 
προνομιακή συνεργασία με τη ΝΔ. Μπορούμε να συνεργαστούμε και με άλλους.’ 
120 Original text: ‘Δεν υπάρχει λοιπόν διπολισμός. Tους δοκίμασαν. O δικός μας ο λόγος έχει 
ευήκοα ώτα από την κομμουνιστική Aριστερά και αριστερότερα αυτής, μέχρι την άκρα Δεξιά. 
Mας ακούνε όλοι γιατί λέμε τα αυτονόητα.[…] Eμείς δεν έχουμε αγκυλώσεις, ό,τι καλό το 
παίρνουμε. Πατριώτες υπάρχουν σε όλα τα κόμματα.’ 
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LAOS’ official newspaper has also confirmed the party’s willingness to become 
entrenched in Greek politics as well as the political uncertainty small Greek parties face. 
Shortly after the 2009 EP elections, the party leader argued that LAOS’ victory should 
not be confused with Political Spring’s short-term electoral success in the 1990s. ‘We 
are here to stay, and we will stay’ (Karatzaferis quoted in A1 2009b: 5)121.  
Note that the predominant type of party competition in Greece is that of the catch-all 
variant. Although the left-right is the main division in Greek politics (Lyrintzis 2005: 
244) this polarisation is not necessarily based on cleavages as these are understood in 
the Western European context, namely historical divisions between clearly defined 
societal groups that are in opposition with one another (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). This 
is because Greece experienced limited industrialisation (Featherstone 1990) and ‘civil 
society is not composed of independent groups or cohesive classes’; rather the political 
world has historically been based on clientage structures (Legg and Roberts 1997: 144). 
Notwithstanding, the Greek parties have manipulated this left-right divide 'according to 
the exigencies of the political conjuncture’ in order to appeal to every Greek voter 
(Lyrintzis 2005: 244). In this respect, although New Democracy and PASOK clearly 
place themselves in the centre-right and centre-left ideological space respectively, they 
are essentially ‘catch-all’ parties (Legg and Roberts 1997: 144), namely they seek to 
‘make broader appeals, trying to catch support from all classes’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 
12).  
Since the party seeks to appear to be mainstream, it is incentivised to adopt the prevalent 
type of party competition and endeavour to become ‘catch-all’ in its appeal.  This can be 
observed in LAOS’ leader attempt to recruit politicians from both the left and the right 
of the political spectrum as well as non-experienced politicians either from the civil 
service or famous celebrities. For instance, Chrysanthakopoulos (party official and from 
October 2009 MP) was elected as a PASOK MP in the 1996 and 2000 elections. Voridis 
(MP) was the President of the radical right party Greek Front. Polatides (MP) was a 
President of the Prefectural Committee of New Democracy’s youth club. Georgiou 
(MEP) was a high ranking civil servant and Anatolakis (post October 2009 MP) was a 
famous footballer. ‘Regardless of political beliefs, i.e. New Democracy, PASOK, etc, 
                                                
121 Original text: ‘Ήρθαμε για να μείνουμε και θα μείνουμε!’ 
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we accept whoever agrees with our patriotic analysis of Greek politics’ (interview with 
Rontoulis 2009)122. 
This catch-all agenda is largely confirmed by the party leader himself, who following 
the 2009 EP elections argued that ‘LAOS’ voters come from all political streams. The 
analysis we have is that 45 per cent are from New Democracy, 25 per cent from PASOK 
and 15 per cent from KKE.’123 (A1 2009b: 5). The political make-up of LAOS’ voters is 
indeed quite diverse. The 2009 EP election survey by Public Issue found that apart from 
24 per cent of LAOS voters claiming to be nationalists, 13 per cent positioned 
themselves as ideologically conservatives, 10 per cent as socialists and a surprising 16 
per cent claimed to be ecologists (see figure 6.1 below)124.  
Figure 6.1 Ideological self-placement of LAOS voters  
Self placement of LAOS voters 2009
Nationalists
24%
Conservative/Christi
an Democrats
13%
Liberals
6%Ecologists/Green
16%
Socialists/Social 
Democrats
10%
Anti-Capitalists/Anti-
Authority
6%
None of the above
14%
Other
3%
Don't know 
8%
 
Source: Public issue survey for the 2009 EP elections  
 
                                                
122 Wording in Greek: ‘Όποιος αποδέχεται αυτή την ανάλυση είναι ενταγμένοι στον πατριωτικό 
χώρο ανεξαρτήτως πολιτικής πεποίθησης πχ. ΝΔ, ΠΑΣΟΚ κτλ. Ανεξαρτήτως πολιτικού χώρου, 
αν αποδέχεται τη μήτρα της γέννησης, εμείς τον δεχόμαστε. Είναι αποδεκτός.’ 
123 Original text: ‘Οι ψηφοφόροι του ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. προέρχονται απ’όλα τα πολιτικά ρεύματα. Η 
ανάλυση που έχουμε είναι ότι είναι 45% ΝΔ, 25% ΠΑΣΟΚ και 15% ΚΚΕ.’ 
124 For further information on the sociology of LAOS’ voters, see Appendix VII.  
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The party’s main strategy is accommodative, its logic of competition is catch-all and its 
predominant goal is to increase its electoral potential. The adoption of a ‘conditional’ 
position on European integration can be situated within this overall strategy. The 
European issue and the EU as a whole have become a strategic tool serving as a means 
to present itself as a trustworthy partner at both the domestic and European levels. 
Adopting a ‘conditional’ position on Europe may thus be seen as integral to the party’s 
political agenda at the domestic level. The party endeavours to appear mainstream in the 
eyes of the Greek people in order to increase its electoral appeal and ultimately entrench 
its presence in the Greek party system. The next section documents LAOS’ European 
argumentation and explains the ways in which the latter is linked to the party’s 
preoccupation over Greek security concerns.  
6.2 Conditional Eurosecpticism and the issue of Greek Security 1999-2009 
This section provides an account of LAOS’ position on European integration. It argues 
that LAOS sees Europe as an entity sharing common cultural, historical and religious 
characteristics and for this reason the party supports European solidarity and 
cooperation at a higher multilateral level. Although LAOS presents strong criticisms 
against the current form of European integration, it accepts the existence of issues that 
can be better managed at a European rather than national level. The party acknowledges 
that Greece has benefited highly from EU membership and stands categorically against 
Greek EU withdrawal. While it is against the creation of a federal union, it accepts that a 
confederation is the ideal framework for European cooperation. In particular, the party 
supports the ‘principle’ of European cooperation but disapproves of the current 
‘practice’ of policy cooperation at the EU level and the ‘future’ creation of a European 
polity.  
In mapping LAOS’ European argumentation, this section argues that the party has 
adopted a ‘conditional’ position on European integration. While it supports continuing 
Greek participation in the EU project, it sets a number of conditions under which it 
would encourage European integration. These are the supremacy of intergovernmental 
decision-making whereby member states maintain their status quo at all times, the wider 
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use of referenda and the EU’s active effort to maintain and protect Europe’s cultural and 
religious homogeneity. LAOS’ Euroscepticism is analysed through the prism of the 
typology of radical right Euroscepticism presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis. This 
consists of a discussion of LAOS’ ‘definition of Europe’, its stance on the ‘principle’ of 
European integration, the policy ‘practice’ of the EU and the ‘future’ construction of a 
European polity. Through a detailed investigation of these four indicators of 
Euroscepticism and the qualitative analysis of LAOS’s MEP plenary speeches during 
the 6th EP term, this section identifies LAOS’ main points of anti-European rhetoric and 
in particular, it shows how the issue of Europe is connected to the party’s concern over 
Greek security.   
6.2.1 Definition of Europe  
LAOS sees Europe as a cultural entity largely based on Greek civilisation. In particular, 
it views Europe as standing on a tripod composed by ancient Greek democracy, Roman 
legal tradition and Christianity, which are the necessary constituent elements of Europe. 
If one of these ‘legs’ is somehow broken, the European construction is very likely to 
collapse (interview with Rontoulis 2009). LAOS openly accepts Greece’s European 
identity. ‘The West belongs to Greece because it has been established on the virtues 
born by our civilisation, including democracy, humanism, research, lack of excess and 
harmony’ (LAOS 2003: 8)125. Since Europe has been built on Greek values, European 
identity is also thought to have been built on Greek values, which makes Greece an 
integral part of the European past, present and future. In this respect, LAOS views 
Greece’s relationship with the EU as a necessary coexistence. Since the EU is the major 
political and economic organisation of the continent, Greece has no choice but to 
cooperate in this framework. Otherwise, it would be denying its European identity.  
This cultural definition of Europe is closely related to a spatial/border definition. Since 
Christianity is one of the constitutive elements of Europe, its borders must stop at the 
                                                
125 Original text: ‘Η Δύση άλλωστε ανήκει στην Ελλάδα, αφού θεμελιώθηκε πάνω στις αρετές 
που γέννησε ο δικός μας πολιτισμός, όπως η Δημοκρατία, ο ανθρωπισμός, η έρευνα, το μέτρο 
και η αρμονία.’ 
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Urals and the Mediterranean thus excluding any non- Christian country to the east and 
the south, including Turkey. If the EU accepted a religiously dissimilar country such as 
Turkey, then the European construction would lose one of its essential characteristics 
and would ultimately collapse. ‘Turkey does not belong to the EU for geographic, 
cultural, religious and political reasons’ (LAOS 2007: 22)126. This definition of Europe 
provides one of the explanations behind LAOS’ opposition to Turkey’s EU accession. 
LAOS suggests that European cooperation should occur only after the European nation 
states have clearly defined Europe both spatially and culturally (interview with 
Rontoulis 2009). This entails delineating what unites them internally meaning their 
culture and what defines them externally meaning the borders of the organisation.  
6.2.2 Principle of European integration 
LAOS is in favour of the ‘principle’ of European integration and it supports Greek 
cooperation at a European multilateral level. The party openly supports Greek EU 
membership and criticises any political argumentation in favour of withdrawal. Its 2007 
manifesto confirms the party’s belief that:  
[Greece is] a country that recognises the tendency for a Union of 
Europe and understands that it does not make sense to change the 
current European map’ (LAOS 2007: 25)127.  
 
Having substantiated its European vocation, the party is in favour of a ‘united Europe of 
Nations’ (LAOS 2003: 8)128 because it is only ‘the nation that can produce civilisation’ 
(interview with Rontoulis 2009)129. The party supports a type of multilateral European 
collaboration where all decision-making would be held in an intergovernmental fashion 
among free and sovereign nations. LAOS argues that it is not ‘dogmatically anti-
                                                
126 Original text: ‘η Τουρκία δεν έχει θέση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση για γεωγραφικούς, 
πολιτισμικούς, θρησκευτικούς και πολιτικούς λόγους.’ 
127 Original text: ‘μια χώρα που αναγνωρίζει την τάση για Ένωση της Ευρώπης και 
καταλαβαίνει ότι δεν έχουν νόημα σκέψεις για αλλαγές στον σημερινό Ευρωπαϊκό χάρτη’ 
128 Original text: ‘Ο ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. είναι υπέρ την ενωμένης Ευρώπης των ΕΘΝΩΝ’ 
129 Wording in Greek: ‘Μόνο το έθνος μπορεί να παράγει πολιτισμό’ 
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European but at the same time it does not accept that “we have to surrender to the 
European Union powers that erode our national sovereignty” (LAOS 2007: 4)130. 
Although LAOS is clearly against the loss of national sovereignty, it recognises that the 
future of Greece is to a great extent linked to the EU. ‘Greek EU integration can only 
occur within the context of a Confederation and only under the condition that our 
national specificities would be protected’ (LAOS 2003: 12)131 and ‘where there would 
be recognition and protection of the historic, cultural and ethnic roots as well as the 
ethnic characteristics of the European peoples’ (LAOS 2007: 23)132 . ‘We accept a 
system promoting the cooperation of European peoples in the economic, social policy 
and cultural policies’ (LAOS 2004: 2)133. LAOS ‘does not deny Greece’s European 
identity’134 (LAOS 2003: 8). It argues that a European confederation would be the only 
viable framework for cooperation whereby member states can preserve their distinct 
roles (interview with Polatides 2009). Only within this framework, Greece and the other 
member states would be able to preserve ‘the veto power for issues considered to be of 
national importance’ (LAOS 2003: 12) 135 . Issues of national importance are not 
necessarily only the ones that have traditionally been in the realm of the nation state, 
including currency or foreign policy. They could also differ from one member state to 
the other suggesting that different states attach different priority on different issues. 
Note that the word ‘confederation’ is used to contrast with the word ‘federation’ used by 
some political elites as a synonym of supranationalism. The EU must not become a 
federal super state (interview with Georgiadis 2009). Unaccountable supranational 
institutions such as the Commission must be devoid of their powers. The member states 
should have distinct roles and decision making should be intergovernmental based on 
the principle of unanimity (interview with Polatides 2009).  
                                                
130 Original text: ‘Δεν είναι ένα δογματικά αντί-ευρωπαϊκό κόμμα, χωρίς ωστόσο να αποδέχεται 
ότι «θα πρέπει να εκχωρήσουμε στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ακόμα και εξουσίες που ακυρώνουν 
την εθνική μας κυριαρχία».’ 
131 Original text: ‘Η ενσωμάτωση επομένως της χώρας μας στη Ε.Ε. μπορεί να γίνει μόνο στα 
πλαίσια μιας Συνομοσπονδίας και υπό τον όρο ότι θα προστατεύεται η ιδιαιτερότητά μας’ 
132 Original text: ‘όπου θα αναγνωρίζονται και θα προστατεύονται οι ιστορικές τόσο οι 
πολιτισμικές και οι εθνικές ρίζες όσο και τα ιδιαίτερα εθνικά χαρακτηριστικά των Ευρωπαϊκών 
λαών.’ 
133 Original text: ‘Δεχόμαστε δηλαδή ένα σύστημα που θα προάγει την συνεργασία των 
Ευρωπαϊκών Λαών στον τομέα της οικονομίας, της κοινωνικής πολιτικής και του πολιτισμού’ 
134 Original text: ‘Ο ΛΑ.Ο.Σ. δεν αρνείται την ευρωπαϊκή ταυτότητα της Ελλάδος,’ 
135 Original text: ‘το δικαίωμα του βέτο για τα ζωτικά της θέματα’ 
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6.2.3 Practice of European policy integration 
Despite the party’s support that a number of policies should be dealt with at the 
European level, LAOS presents strong criticisms on the EU’s policy ‘practice’. From 
these criticisms derive the three conditions under which LAOS would be allegedly 
willing to support the European project. These include intergovernmental decision-
making, the wide use of plebiscitary politics for all major EU decisions and Treaty 
changes and the maintenance of each country’s cultural uniqueness.  
LAOS supports policy cooperation within the EU framework, including policies such as 
immigration, energy, economy, development, defence, security and foreign policy 
(LAOS 2007). The main issue for the party, however, is which decision-making 
framework would apply. The party is an adamant supporter of unanimity and the 
preservation of veto power especially as far as national issues are concerned (interview 
with Voridis 2009). LAOS is against any additional policy transfer to the EU level 
unless unanimity is preserved. This argumentation forms the first condition under which 
LAOS would be supportive of the EU project, namely a change in the decision-making 
arrangements. Decisions should be taken in an intergovernmental fashion so that each 
member state can safeguard its national interests.  
The party’s position on the European Monetary Union is an indicative example here. 
Although LAOS is an active supporter of Greek economy convergence towards the 
economies of the most developed EU countries (LAOS 2007: 40), it is rather ambivalent 
regarding European monetary policy and the euro. ‘We believe that our country’s 
accession to the Eurozone did not only bring benefits to Greece but it also resulted in a 
series of problems’ (LAOS 2007: 45)136 . LAOS argues that the euro has negative 
consequences on Greek development policy, exports and tourism and is responsible for 
the significant increase of the prices of all consumer products. ‘We suffer the 
consequences of rapid and misguided acceptance of the euro’ (LAOS 2004: 2)137 . 
However, the party does not overtly advocate Greek exit from the Eurozone. Instead, it 
                                                
136 Original text: ‘Θεωρούμε ότι η ένταξη της χώρας μας στη ζώνη του ΕΥΡΩ δεν προσέφερε 
μόνον οφέλη για την Ελλάδα αλλά, παράλληλα, επέφερε μια σειρά από προβλήματα’ 
137 Original text: ‘υφιστάμεθα τις συνέπειες της γρήγορης και ασύνετης αποδοχής του ευρώ’ 
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supports a referendum where the Greek people can decide whether ‘they prefer to 
remain in the Eurozone or whether they favour the restoration of the Drachma’ (LAOS 
2007: 45)138. Again the issue for the party is mostly ‘whether decisions on Greek 
national economic policy should be taken in Greece rather than in Brussels’ (LAOS 
2007: 31)139 
LAOS sees itself as a political force whose purpose is to promote democracy and 
safeguard Greek national interests within the EU. Being part of the  
Independence/Democracy group during the 2004-2009 EP parliamentary period, it  
subscribes to the promotion of transparency, democracy and accountability within the 
EU and the respect for national differences and interests (Ind/Dem 2004). In an effort to 
increase accountability, LAOS seeks to introduce more popular democracy through the 
frequent use of plebiscitary politics (LAOS 2007). The citizens should be involved in 
issues that affect their everyday life. Citizen participation is likely to become a positive 
learning process that would ultimately lead to citizen support of integration. The party is 
open about its Eurosceptic position and argues that ‘In fact, through Euroscepticism, the 
EU will be re-established on the basis of popular consent’ (interview with Rontoulis 
2009)140. The introduction of pan European referenda for the ratification of every major 
decision and Treaty change at the EU level, including the European Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty, would lead to more transparency and accountability at the EU level and 
would ultimately encourage LAOS’ EU support.   
The cultural issue is of outmost importance to LAOS and is inextricably linked to its 
definition of Europe. Whereas accepting the common culture of European peoples, 
LAOS believes that the peoples of Europe should be able to maintain their national 
differences. The EU should not attempt to produce policies that cast a shadow on the 
cultural and national differences of its member states. The EU should respect the history 
and traditions of each member state. Being part of the globalisation wave, the EU is seen 
                                                
138 Original text: ‘να αποφασίσουν με δημοψήφισμα το εάν επιθυμούν την παραμονή της χώρας 
μας στην Ευρωζώνη ή την επαναφορά της Δραχμής’ 
139 Original text: ‘θέλουμε οι αποφάσεις για την εθνική οικονομική μας πολιτική να παίρνονται 
στην Ελλάδα ή στις Βρυξέλλες;’ 
140 Quote from the interview in Greek: ‘εμείς υποστηρίζουμε ότι μέσω του Ευρωσκεπτικισμού 
πηγάζουν ποτελέσματα που θα κάνουν οικεία την ΕΕ στους πολίτες. Ενθεμελίωση της ΕΕ με 
βάση τους πολίτες’ 
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as attempting to make a cultural ‘mishmash’ of its member states. The party actively 
says no to a ‘European mishmash’ (Karatzaferis 2005) and is in favour of the 
preservation of the nation, religion, tradition and national languages (interview with 
Georgiou 2009). The EU is encouraged to establish policies that seek to maintain the 
European cultural wealth by promoting the mutual respect of each member state’s 
histories, traditions and civilisations. LAOS supports the EU only if it ensures that each 
country is able to preserve its national, religious (meaning Christian) and linguistic 
particularities. 
6.2.4 The Future of the European Polity  
LAOS is opposed to the policy ‘practice’ of European integration and ‘sets’ the EU 
conditions under which it would support integration. These conditions reveal a vision of 
Europe, which according to the party, is different to that promoted by the European 
Treaties and institutions. This opposition to the ‘future’ construction of a European 
polity can be seen through LAOS’ rejection of both the European Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty. Both European projects go in the opposite direction to that which the 
party aspires. The Lisbon Treaty includes ninety per cent of the text and stipulations of 
the European Constitution (Chrisanthakopoulos 2008). As such, both projects are 
rejected for similar reasons, which are closely linked to the ‘conditions’ the party sets to 
the EU.  
Both the European Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty promote supranational 
institutions, including a European President and a Foreign Minister, which are thought 
to be above member state law (LAOS 2005). The Lisbon Treaty is thought to give birth 
to a super state as it transfers judiciary, executive and legislative powers to the EU. The 
Treaty confers a high legal status on the EU which entails the weakening of national 
parliaments in favour of the ‘Brussels Directorate’ (Karatzaferis 2008a: 3). Since veto 
power is not maintained in a number of areas, the Treaty is seen as compromising the 
principle of unanimity. ‘It is uncertain whether after the ratification of the treaty we will 
still be able to maintain our veto power regarding Skopje’s EU accession’ (Karatzaferis 
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2008b: 2)141. The European public has not been given the chance to ratify either project 
through national referenda because national governments, including the Greek, fear that 
people are likely to reject them. LAOS supports that the Greek government refuses a 
public referendum on the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, although the public supports 
it (Karatzaferis 2008b: 1). Both projects are seen as rendering Europe into a cultural 
‘melting pot’ where all different cultures will not be distinguished and member states 
will be downgraded into the ‘provinces’ of a European federation governed only by 
strong states (LAOS 2005: 5). The party leader argues that ‘Peoples are not animals and 
it is a crime to treat them as minced meat’ (Karatzaferis 2005)142 insinuating that these 
European projects treat them as such. The European Constitution is thought to promote 
the weakening of national identities and the differences of the peoples in favour of an 
‘American style cultural melting pot’ (LAOS 2005: 6)143. Given that the Constitution 
does not include a reference to Christianity, the EU is also seen as ‘promoting the de-
christianisation of Europe’ (interview with Rontoulis 2009)144, which runs counter to the 
party’s basic values and principles. For these reasons, the leader of LAOS argued in 
front of the Greek Parliament that the Lisbon Treaty is the ‘greatest fraud against the 
peoples of Europe’ (Karatzaferis 2008a)145. 
The EU is seen as becoming a Commonwealth of sovereign regions. This entails the 
disempowerment of the nation state to the benefit of Brussels. The fading away of the 
nation state is likely to lead to the development of multi-cultural consciousness whereby 
the Greek people would forget concepts such as the nation, motherland, national heroes 
and Greek literature (Chrisanthakopoulos 2008). The party’s position on European 
integration can be summarized as follows: ‘We do not want a federation. We want a 
confederation of nation states. We are not against the EU. Neither do we believe in 
Greek withdrawal. Greece has benefited from the EU. We do not want to abolish nation 
state independence in issues of national importance, e.g. Skopje and Turkey’ (interview 
                                                
141 Original text: ‘Και ποιος εγγυάται, κύριε Υφυπουργέ, ότι αν αύριο το πρωί με τη Συνθήκη 
επικυρωμένη θα έχετε ξανά το δικαίωμα του βέτο απέναντι στα Σκόπια.’ 
142 Original text: ‘Μα οι Λαοί δεν είναι ζώα και είναι Έγκλημα η αντιμετώπισή τους ως Κιμά’.  
143 Original text: ‘όχι η κατάργησή τους μέσα σε ένα Αμερικανικού τύπου χωνευτήρι των λαών’ 
144  Quote from the interview in Greek: ‘Η ΕΕ θέλει τον αποχριστιανισμό της Ευρώπης’. 
145 Original text: ‘Η μεγαλύτερη απάτη σε βάρος των λαών της Ευρώπης’ 
 178
with Georgiadis 2009) 146 . Given that, following Lisbon Treaty ratification the EU 
requires deeper European state cooperation and greater use of qualified majority voting, 
it can be reasonably argued that LAOS is against the making of a ‘future’ European 
polity. 
6.2.5 The issue of Greek Security within LAOS’ European discourse   
The above ‘conditional’ position on European integration is ultimately linked to issues 
of Greek security, which are core to LAOS’ agenda. These include the name of the 
Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the perceived constant threat 
from Turkey147, Greek borders, the situation in Northern Cyprus as well as Greece’s 
relations with Albania and Kosovo (LAOS 2009). For LAOS, all Greek problems stem 
from the fact that Greek security concerns, which are thought to be of high national 
importance, remain unresolved. Greece should be independent from other international 
organisations in dealing with those issues (LAOS 2007: 21). Foreign policy should have 
a national and long-term character independent from domestic party politics (LAOS 
2003: 11).  
‘We believe that our country should have a supra-partisan national 
foreign policy with continuation, dynamism, consistency and mainly an 
enduring strategy. This would be formulated on the basis of the sole 
criterion of the interest of the country and the Greek nation.’ (LAOS 
2007: 21)148. 
 
                                                
146 Wording in Greek: ‘Εμείς δεν θέλουμε ομοσπονδία. Θέλουμε συνομοσπονδία εθνών κρατών. 
Δεν είμαστε κατά της ΕΕ. Ούτε πιστεύουμε στην αποχώρηση της Ελλάδας. Η Ελλάδα έχει 
ωφεληθεί από την ΕΕ. Δεν θέλουμε την κατάργηση της ανεξαρτησίας για θέματα εθνικά πχ. 
Σκόπια και Τουρκία.’ 
147 Note that when the party refers to Turkey as a security, it refers to the perceived problem of 
Turkey as a whole. This includes among others EU enlargement given the problem of cultural 
and territorial differences with Greece, EU funds to the Turkish part of Cyprus, the Armenian 
genocide, Turkish occupation army in Cyprus and the status of the Grey Wolves organisation. 
148 Original text: ‘Πιστεύουμε ότι η χώρα μας πρέπει να έχει μία υπερκομματική εθνική 
Εξωτερική πολιτική, με συνέχεια, με δυναμική, με συνέπεια και, κυρίως, με διαχρονική 
στρατηγική που θα διαμορφώνεται με αποκλειστικό κριτήριο το Συμφέρον της χώρας μας και 
του Ελληνικού Έθνους.’ 
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For LAOS, security issues strongly affect any other problem pertaining to the Greek 
society. If these remain unresolved, the country cannot proceed in dealing with 
economic and social concerns. This is especially true since the Greek government 
spends a great share of the budget for defence against potential threats to Greece from 
its neighbours. If Greece resolves its security issues, the defence budget could be 
allocated to different projects including education, welfare, road construction and school 
building (interview with Rontoulis 2009).  
Issues of security have been increasingly salient in LAOS’ both national and European 
agenda. One of the reasons why LAOS has a ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic agenda is the 
fear that if Greece loses its veto power in the EU, it will no longer be able to decide on 
these vital issues of national importance (interview with Georgiadis 2009). A 2008 
seventeen page party document entitled ‘The documentation of shame’ and addressed to 
the national public outlined in detail how Greek MEPs voted in the EP on issues 
predominantly related to Greek security concerns (LAOS 2008). The purpose of this 
pamphlet was to inform Greek citizens on ‘Which MEPs have openly and without 
shame or inhibitions supported Turkish or Skopje’s interests’ (LAOS 2008: 2)149. 
The 2009 EP election manifesto was equally devoted to issues relating to Greek security 
concerns. Nineteen out of the twenty four pages of the 2009 EP election manifesto 
criticise the other Greek parties in the EP for not promoting Greek security interests at 
the European level (LAOS 2009). The front cover depicts a Greek man dressed up in the 
traditional uniform reminiscent of the Greek War of Independence from Turkey (see 
figure 6.2 below). Sitting on a locked ballot box, he looks depressed and disheartened 
and his attire is crinkled and soiled. The slogan on the front page reads ‘Fellow 
compatriot, some people humiliated you in Europe..! Learn the truth and forget the fairy 
tales!’(LAOS 2009)150. This was used as a strong communication tactic to convey that 
Greeks have been internationally humiliated without being able to react. The underlying 
message is to criticise the two main Greek parties for having supported Turkey’s EU 
                                                
149 Original text: ‘Ποιοί Ευρωβουλευτές χωρίς αιδώ απροκάλυπτα και χωρίς αναστολές 
προασπίζοντα τα συμφέροντα Τούρκων και Σκοπιανών!’ 
150 Original text: ‘Φίλε Πατριώτη, κάποιοι σε ταπείνωσαν στην Ευρώπη..! Μάθε την αλήθεια, 
ξέχνα τα παραμύθια!’ 
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accession insinuating that LAOS is the only Greek party that takes these matters 
seriously.  
Figure 6.2 LAOS 2009 EP elections manifesto  
 
   
Note: ‘Euro elections 2009: Fellow compatriot, some people humiliated you in 
Europe..! Learn the truth and forget the fairy tales! LAOS The strong voice in Europe’ 
Source: www.laos.gr  
 
6.2.6 Analysis of LAOS European Parliamentary Speeches during the 6th Term 
An analysis of the party’s EP speeches is a further manifestation of the comparative 
salience of Greek security concerns in LAOS’ European agenda as well as the fact that 
LAOS seeks to promote those issues to the European level. During the 6th parliamentary 
period 2004-2009, LAOS elected one MEP. Karatzaferis, in his capacity as the party’s 
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first MEP gave 101 plenary speeches from October 2004 until July 2007151. After the 
September 2007 Greek national elections, he was elected as in the National Parliament 
and handed over his EP seat to Georgiou, a former Greek ambassador who gave 22 
speeches from October 2007 to April 2009152.  
A qualitative content analysis of a total of 123 speeches reveals a very interesting result. 
A number of themes recur, which can be broadly grouped into two categories, including 
(1) references specific to the EU and Europe and (2) various issues that refer to either 
domestic politics or some more general matters. References that belong to these 
categories are approximately equally distributed with 50.2 per cent and 49.8 per cent 
respectively (see table 6.2)153. This indicates that although references to themes related 
to Europe and the EU are very frequent, they do not constitute the overwhelming 
majority of issues. LAOS has employed the EP platform not only to present and 
promote its positions on European integration, EU policies and Treaties. It has also used 
the time allocated in Plenary in order to discuss and raise awareness of a variety of non-
EU related issues.  
Table 6.2 General categories of themes in EP speeches (LAOS) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes and criticisms 50.2 
Various issues  49.8 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
A detailed analysis of the above two categories reveals that the issue of Europe is salient 
within the party but it is equally as important as other issues154. Although a number of 
EU policies are severely criticised, including economic policies and enlargement, a 
                                                
151 Note that the party did not run for the 1999 EP elections and was not represented during the 
5th EP term.  
152 These have been found on the EP’s online archives at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN  
153 For a detailed analysis of how speeches have been coded, see Appendix III. 
154 This relative salience of the EU is corroborated by the 2006 Chapel Hill survey where LAOS 
scores 2.86 where 1 indicates no importance of European integration in the party’s public stance 
and 4 indicates great importance.  
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significant 9 per cent of the overall occurrences of themes present requests to the EU to 
assist Greece in a number of internal matters (see table 6.3 below). This indicates that 
albeit a number of criticisms, the EU is seen as a potential source of positive influence 
on Greece and is associated with the party’s acceptance of the ‘principle’ of European 
integration discussed in section 6.2.2. A considerable 14.6 per cent of references 
concern the issue of Turkey and in particular the prospect of Turkish EU accession (see 
table 6.3 below). Note that those references are not only directed against the EU for 
discussing enlargement to Turkey. They are also directed against Turkey for not being 
‘eligible’ for EU membership as it occupies the Northern part of Cyprus and fails to 
respect the European borders. Particularly surprising is the fact that the party, although 
having an anti-immigration and anti-globalisation agenda did not give much weight on 
these two topics with 1.6 and 2 per cent respectively (see table 6.3 below)155. 
MEP speeches refer to the relationship between the EU and the US with a proportion of 
14.6 per cent. In addition to this, LAOS MEPs mention the US independently of its 
relations with the EU a further 10.2 per cent (see table 6.3). Adding these two 
subcategories results in a total reference to the US of 24.8, which accounts for 
approximately one quarter of the entire occurrence of themes. References to the US are 
inextricably linked to LAOS’ anti-Americanism and can by extension be linked to the 
general issue of Greek security concerns. For instance, Stavridis argues that ‘Anti-
Americanism is also very common, even among elites […], and among most Greeks 
because of the support that the Americans gave the Greek junta (1967-1974), their role 
in the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and generally speaking their pro-Turkish stance 
over the years.’ (Stavridis 2003: 12-13)156.  
 
                                                
155 Note that, unlike Front National, LAOS refers to the phenomenon of globalisation in a rather 
vague and abstract manner and does not explicitly link it to the process of European integration. 
Indicatively, the party refers to the global consequences of cheap imports from China, and the 
financial impact on small and medium enterprises of the opening of international home products 
retailer IKEA in Greece and calls for the ‘reversal of the new world order’.  
156 Note that both radical and mainstream right-wing parties in Greece have traditionally been 
pro-American. LAOS’ anti-Americanism can be thought of as an adaptation of PASOK’s strong 
anti-Western message in the 1980s and its ‘spirited national chauvinism’ (Legg and Roberts 
1997: 141).  
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Table 6.3 Salience of themes in EP speeches (LAOS) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
6th EP Term   
EU related themes and criticisms   
EU Economic Policies 12 
EU Referenda 2.4 
EU Enlargement  3.2 
EU Borders 9 
EU Constitution 6.5 
EU should help Greece 9 
Reference to common European culture  4.9 
FYROM & the EU 4.9 
Albania & the EU 0.8 
Turkey & the EU 14.6 
In favour of Russia 6.5 
National Preference 0.8 
Community Preference 0.8 
US & EU relations 14.6 
Various EU criticisms  10 
EU related themes sub-total  50.2 
  
Non-EU related themes  
Greek Security Concerns 20.8 
Domestic criticisms 1.2 
Domestic issues 4.5 
Immigration 1.6 
Terrorism 2.5 
USA  10.2 
Globalisation 2 
General 7 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  49.8 
  
Total ≈ 100% 
Note: N=245 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
Within the category of non-EU related themes, the issue of Greek security concerns 
occupies an important 20.8 per cent of the total issues (see table 6.3). This indicates that 
LAOS MEPs employed the time allocated to them in EP Plenary with a view to 
promoting Greek security interests. Within this sub-category, 9.3 per cent of the total 
occurrence of themes refers to Turkey, 5.3 per cent refers to Cyprus, 3.5 per cent refers 
to FYROM’s name and 1.2 to Greek borders. The issue of Albania and Kosovo jointly 
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receive 1.5 per cent of the references (see table 6.4 below). Note that the qualitative 
analysis of the speeches reveals that when the two MEPs have referred to Greek security 
concerns, they have avoided blaming or criticising the EU. As in the pamphlet ‘The 
documentation of shame’ analysed above, they have mostly focused their criticisms on 
the Greek elite for failing to manage these issues in an appropriate manner.  
Table 6.4 Breakdown of ‘Greek Security Concerns’ subcategory (LAOS) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Breakdown of ‘Greek Security Concerns’ subcategory Percentage
6th EP Team  
Turkey 9.3 
Cyprus 5.3 
FYROM 3.5 
Kosovo 1.1 
Albania 0.4 
Greek borders  1.2 
Greek Security Concerns Total  20.8 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
It is evident from the analysis that LAOS has sought to ‘upload’ Greek security concerns 
to the EU level. The EU-related themes category contains sub-categories that are very 
relevant to Greek security interests. These include the issue of the EU borders, which 
directly relates to Greece’s dispute with Turkey over the Aegean.  They also refer to the 
relationship between the EU and Greece’s neighbours FYROM, Albania and Turkey 
discussed within the context of European enlargement policy. Adding all these 
categories results in a total of 50.1 per cent of occurrences of themes. This indicates a 
strong salience of this theme in the party’s rhetoric discussed both independently and in 
relation to the EU (see table 6.5 below)157.  
                                                
157 Note that a simple word frequency in the two MEPs total 123 speeches reveals a similar 
pattern whereby words such as Turkey, Cyprus, FYROM, Borders, Russia and USA recur 
comparatively more often. For a frequency of words matrix, see Appendix VIII.  
 185
Table 6.5 References to ‘Greek Security Concerns’ subcategory (LAOS) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
 ‘Greek Security Concerns’  Percentage
6th EP Team  
Turkey 9.3 
Cyprus 5.3 
FYROM 3.5 
Kosovo 1.1 
Albania 0.4 
Greek borders 1.2 
  
EU Borders 9 
FYROM & the EU 4.9 
Albania & the EU 0.8 
Turkey & the EU 14.6 
  
Greek Security Concerns Total  50.1 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
 6.3 The European issue as a vote-maximising tool   
The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the party’s choice to adopt a ‘conditional’ 
position on European integration conforms with its general strategy within the Greek 
party system. As analysed in section 6.1.2, LAOS’ main political strategy is 
accommodative, its logic of competition of the ‘catch-all’ variant, and its predominant 
party goal lies in increasing its vote intake in order to ensure its survival in the Greek 
political system. This has also been largely confirmed by the analysis of the Greek party 
system in Chapter 4 of the thesis. Section 4.3.2 demonstrated that LAOS occupies a 
spatial position not distinctively separate from the rest of the Greek party system further 
corroborating the party’s willingness to portray relative policy convergence with the 
mainstream.  
In its quest for respectability, the party has adopted a flexible communication strategy 
by rejecting extremism in order to construct an image that appears to be near the 
‘median voter’. In the context of a largely pro-European public opinion, a vote-
maximising party, such as LAOS, is provided with fewer incentives to present a strongly 
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anti-European rhetoric. Instead the party presents a much more accommodative stance to 
the European issue aiming at portraying a ‘mainstream’ image to the Greek public. In an 
effort to increase its electoral potential, the party has sought to capitalise on the issue of 
Greek security concerns, which resonate well with the Greek public. The party’s 
‘conditional’ Euroscepticism becomes a strategic tool serving to differentiate LAOS 
from every other party in the Greek party system including the radical right, splinters 
from the conservative New Democracy, the radical left or the mainstream and to 
demonstrate that it occupies the middle ground in Greek politics.  
6.3.1 Seeking to attract the median voter  
LAOS endeavours to draw votes from across the Greek party system rather than a 
clearly predefined segment of the society. In its quest for political entrenchment, the 
party seeks to be seen as offering an agenda that has the potential to attract Greek voters 
irrespective of ideology, social background and economic status. Its ‘conditional’ 
Euroscepticism can be seen as an attempt to depict Greek public opinion on the matter. 
Greeks have been increasingly pro EU membership since the mid-1980s but from 2003 
onwards they have become somewhat reluctant towards the European project. Although 
feelings of indifference towards the project are rising, the public continues to view EU 
membership as a major source of benefit, especially with regards to issues arising 
security concerns. LAOS’ EU position clearly reflects this trend of Greek public 
opinion. The EU project is not rejected but becomes questioned and somehow 
distrusted. At the same time, membership is still considered necessary and the EU is 
thought as a source of positive impact on Greece.  
Greek public opinion was sceptical about European Community (EC) membership until 
the mid-1980s when it underwent a major shift and witnessed a strong rising trend. This 
decisive shift occurred in 1985 and coincided with the securing of EC loans and the 
change of the governing PASOK’s rhetoric on membership (Featherstone 1994a: 155). 
Although the initial elite drive for accession was political, Greek public Europhilia has 
been utilitarian and linked to expectations of economic development and modernisation 
(Vernardakis 2007: 153). Greek European support emanated from a general preference 
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for ‘EC-level action to overcome the shortcoming of their own conditions’ including a 
strong monetary regime (Featherstone 1994a: 156). The Greek voter has seen the 
European project as a solution to the problems pertaining to the Greek society, including 
a higher quality of life and the elimination of the perceived social backwardness of the 
country. There is a wider feeling that, being an EU member, Greece has both 
Westernised and modernised (for an example on Greek foreign policy see Economides 
2005).  
A small but steady decline in public EU support has been observed from 2004 onwards. 
Eurobarometer surveys show that support for EU membership has been declining to the 
point that in four surveys (Spring 2006, Spring 2007, Spring 2008, Autumn 2008 and 
Spring 2009) the Greek score is lower than the EU average (see figure 6.3 below). This 
can also be verified by the 2009 European elections exit poll whereby only 23 per cent 
of the respondents viewed the European project with feelings of hope. Indifference 
levels reached 27 per cent whereas reservation and fear attained 28 and 14 per cent 
respectively (see figure 6.4 below). Despite this rising reluctance towards the EU, 
Greeks overwhelmingly believe that the country has benefited and continues to benefit 
from membership largely confirming that the Greeks view the EU from a utilitarian 
perspective (see figure 6.5 below).  
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Figure 6.3 Support for EU membership in Greece (2002-2008) 
EU membership is a good thing
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Question: Generally speaking, do you think that Greek membership of the European 
Community (Common Market) is ...?  
Source: Eurobarometer survey (2002-2009) 
 
Figure 6.4 What is your general feeling on the current Europe? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Public issue, European elections 2009 exit poll158 
                                                
158 All Public issue opinion polls have been found at 
http://www.publicissue.gr/category/pi/analysis/polls/  
Indifference, 27%
Hope, 23%
Reservation, 28%
Fear, 14%
Don't know  , 8%
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Figure 6.5 Benefit from EU membership (2002-2008) 
Question: Taking everything into account, would you say that Greece has on balance 
benefited or not from being a member of the European Union? 
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Source: Eurobarometer survey (2002-2009) 
 
This tendency of Greek public opinion whereby support for membership is dropping 
whereas at the same time the perception of benefit from EU membership remains high is 
reflected in LAOS’ ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism. Karatzaferis has argued in the party’s 
newspaper that ‘At a political level, LAOS’ agenda coincides with the real agenda of 
Greek society’ (A1 2009b: 4)159. Appreciating the benefits Greece has derived from the 
EU and supporting the project under conditions seems to better capture the Greek public 
opinion, and by extension the Greek ‘median’ voter. Given that Greek positions on 
European integration are largely utilitarian, LAOS seeks to portray itself as the only 
Greek party that promotes Greek national interests at the EU level. For instance, the 
                                                
159 Original text: ‘σε πολιτικό επίπεδο, έχει κατορθώσει η ατζέντα του να συμπίπτει με την 
πραγματική αντζέντα της κοινωνίας’ 
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party leader has argued that ‘We go to Europe with specific goals and objectives!’ (A1 
2009a: 4)160.  
6.3.2 Capitalising on Greek security concerns  
Security constitutes a major concern of the Greek citizens and public opinion on this 
issue cuts across party lines. Turkey and to a lesser extent FYROM are perceived as 
constantly threatening the Greek territory. For instance, according to a survey carried 
out by VPRC in June 2006, 60 per cent of Greeks are against Turkish EU entry161. In 
2008, this opposition has reached an overwhelming 78.1 per cent of the population (see 
table 6.6 below). As stated by another survey carried out by VPRC in December 2006, 
66 per cent of the Greeks are in favour of vetoing FYROM’s EU membership unless the 
name issue is resolved162.  
Table 6.6 Support for Turkish EU membership 
 
Support for Turkish EU 
membership Frequency Per cent 
In favour 217 21.5
Against 788 78.1
Don't know 4 0.4
Total 1009 100
Source: Eurobarometer 69.2, National and European identity, European elections, 
European values and climate change, March-May 2008  
 
The European issue is not salient in Greek politics (Vernardakis 2007). Party elites are 
aware of this and do not expect the electorate to cast its vote on the basis of European 
politics (interview with Georgiadis 2009). This provides LAOS with an additional 
incentive to link its European position to domestic issues. As seen in section 6.2.6 the 
party has used the EP platform in order to promote issues relevant to Greek security 
concerns including FRYOM’s name, Cyprus and Turkey. The party views these issues 
as remaining unresolved, which largely coincides with the views of the Greek electorate. 
                                                
160 Original text: ‘Και στην Ευρώπη πηγαίνουμε με στόχους’ 
161 VPRC survey published in Kathimerini June 11th 2006, 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_11/06/2006_187245  
162 VPRC survey published in Kathimerini December 31st 2006, 
http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_politics_2_31/12/2006_210754  
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Especially since the two mainstream parties are strong supporters of Turkish EU entry 
(Ker-Lindsay 2007: 74), LAOS sees its role as the essential guardian of Greek national 
interests at the European level.  
LAOS’ choice to focus on Greek security issues in its European discourse has been a 
conscious communication tactic within the context of its vote-seeking party strategy. 
Issues pertaining to Greek security concerns are closely linked to feelings of national 
identity, cut across party lines and can be easily stirred up by politicians. A vivid 
example of this has been the public demonstrations on FYROM’s name in the mid-
1990s (Featherstone 1994b: 288). Territory, the country and the homeland are very 
important in the hearts and minds of Greeks as demonstrated by the October 2007 Public 
issue survey, which indicates that an overwhelming 82 per cent of Greeks would give 
their life for their borders and homeland (see figure 6.6 below). As indicated by another 
Public issue survey in 2008, a significant 84 per cent of Greeks believe that the Greek 
government should veto FYROM’s EU and NATO accession in the case of no 
agreement on the country’s name (see table 6.7).  
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Figure 6.6 For which of the following reasons would you give your life for? 
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Source: Public issue, October 2007, on the national celebration of 28th October  
 
 
Table 6.7 If there is no agreement on the name, what do you think that Greece should 
do? Do you think that the Greek government should or should not veto FYROM's EU 
and NATO accession? 
 
Support for vetoing FYROM’s 
EU and NATO accession  Per cent 
In favour 84
Against 9
Don't know 7
Total 100
Source: Public issue, February 2008 
 
Greek support for European integration is partly due to the citizen insecurity regarding 
the Greco-Turkish relations and the feeling of external threat from Turkey (Vernardakis 
2007: 153-154). This can be seen by the fact that 50 per cent of the Greek electorate 
feels that the EU is an important power on which Greece can rely in order to resolve its 
security issues (see table 6.8). Overall, 59 per cent of Greeks trust the EU institutions, 
which is 9 percentage points higher compared to the 50 per cent EU average 
(Eurobarometer 2008).  
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Table 6.8 Which power should Greece rely on regarding its foreign policy? 
 
Which power should Greece rely 
on regarding its foreign policy? Per cent 
EU 50
Russia 16
US 4
All three 14
None 11
Other  2
Don’t know 3
Total  100
Source: Public issue, February 2008  
 
Without rejecting Europe, LAOS has linked its Euroscepticism to a mainstream issue in 
Greece that can be thought of as cutting across party lines. This is consistent with 
LAOS’ adoption of a catch-all type of party competition. By linking its ‘conditional’ 
Eurosceptic position to Greek security concerns, LAOS can make its policy relevant to 
the average Greek person independent of party identification and can appear to represent 
public opinion. In a speech during the 2009 EP electoral campaign, the party leader 
mentioned:  
‘They ask me, why do you insist on Turkey not becoming an EU 
member? Because I listen to the Greek heart, soul and consciousness, 
which has been reported in a survey as being 78 per cent against Turkish 
EU accession’ (Karatzaferis quoted in A1 2009a: 5)163. 
 
The party increases its potential to attract voters across the party system and eventually 
become entrenched in the Greek political landscape. The above surveys have shown that 
the issue of security remains largely uncontested in the Greek society. Greeks 
irrespective of ideological background tend to relate to the issue of Turkey and 
FYROM. The insistence on these issues is not only core to LAOS’ agenda but also is 
likely to mobilise voters in its favour, especially given that the mainstream governing 
                                                
163 Original text: ‘Μου λένε, γιατί επιμένεις και λες να μην μπει η Τουρκία στην Ευρώπη; Γιατί 
ακούω, αφουγκράζομαι την καρδιά, την ψυχή και τη συνείδηση του ‘Ελληνα, που σε 
δημοσκόπηση σε μεγάλη εφημερίδα είπε, το 78%, δεν θέλουμε την Τουρκία στην Ευρώπη’.  
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parties in Greece have increasingly adopted a much more conciliatory agenda on these 
issues (Ker-Lindsay 2007). ‘We express the people’s ideas as seen in public opinion 
surveys in issues such as FYROM’s name’ (interview with Polatides 2009)164. LAOS 
sells its Eurosceptic agenda as being the only means to sustain the Greek veto power in 
security policy issues. ‘We are neither against the EU nor do we believe in Greek 
withdrawal. Greece has benefited from the EU. Rather, we are against giving away our 
sovereignty on national issues, for instance Skopje and Turkey’ (interview with 
Georgiadis 2009)165.  
These issues also bring LAOS to the unique position to criticise the other parties in 
Greece for failing to protect Greek national interests at the European level. The party 
portrays itself as the only Greek ‘voice’ not intending to surrender the national interest 
at the European level:   
‘‘Our voice in the European Parliament will shake other Europeans 
[…] a voice against injustice and defeat, a voice addressed not only to 
Europeans but also to Greeks who with their compliance have risked 
writing the bleakest page of Greek history yet. Generations of Greeks 
have kept Greece upright with sacrifice. They have given her dignity, 
recognition, respect and prestige. These properties are unfortunately 
sacrificed on the altar of selfish goals. We should neither settle nor 
become compliant. Both here and in Europe! Greece first! With this 
slogan we will give our battle in Europe.’ (LAOS 2004: 5)166. 
 
                                                
164 Original text: ‘Εκφράζουμε τις ιδέες του λαού στις δημοσκοπήσεις, σε θέματα Σκόπια κ.τ.λ.’ 
165 Original text: ‘Δεν είμαστε κατά της ΕΕ. Ούτε πιστεύουμε στην αποχώρηση της Ελλάδας. Η 
Ελλάδα έχει οφεληθεί από την ΕΕ. Δεν θέλουμε την κατάργηση της ανεξαρτησίας για θέματα 
εθνικά πχ. Σκόπια και Τουρκία’ 
166 Original text: ‘Αυτή η φωνή θα υψωθεί και θα συγκλονίσει τους Ευρωπαίους μέσα στο 
Ευρωκοινοβούλιο από τους βουλευτάς του Λαικού Ορθόδοξου Συναγερμού που εσείς με την 
ψήφο σας θα στείλετε στις Βρυξέλλες και το Στρασβούργο. Μια φωνή που θα ξαναφωνάζει όχι 
στην αδικία, όχι στον ενδοτισμό. Μία φωνή που θα ακούσουν όχι μόνο οι Ευρωπαίοι αλλά και 
οι Έλληνες υπεύθυνοι που με την υποχωρητικότητα και τον ενδοτισμό τους κινδυνεύουν να 
γράψουν την πιο μαύρη σελίδα της Ελληνικής ιστορίας. Γενιές Ελλήνων με θυσίες μεγάλωσαν 
και κράτησαν όρθια την Ελλάδα. Της χάρισαν αξιοπρέπεια, αναγνώριση, σεβασμό και γόητρο. 
Ιδιότητες που δυστυχώς σήμερα θυσιάζονται στο βωμό ιδιοτελών σκοπιμοτήτων. Στόχος όλων 
μας πρέπει να είναι η απομόνωση των συμβιβασμών και υποχωρητικών συνειδήσεων. Εδώ και 
στη Ευρώπη! Πρώτα η Ελλάδα.Μ’ αυτό το σύνθημα εμείς θα δώσουμε την μάχη μας στην 
Ευρώπη.’ 
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Towards the end of the 2000s, these criticisms transformed into outright condemnation 
against the other Greek parties for neither being committed to nor supporting the Greek 
national interest at the European level, and more specifically, in the EP.  
‘The vote of a large majority of our national partisan representatives in 
the European Parliament is evidence of surrender and national 
degradation. […] Greek MEP votes have become arrows against our 
homeland. We do not blame them for their foolishness. But we do call 
on them to explain under whose orders and with the promise of what in 
return they carried out their blasphemy against Macedonia’ (LAOS 
2008: 6)167. 
 
It is noteworthy that the underlying impression one gets after reading the party’s 
manifestos and general literature is that LAOS has accepted a potential resolution of 
Greek national issues within the EU framework. The party does not use the EU as a 
scapegoat for the absence of resolution of the Greek national issues. LAOS views the 
EU as a potential friend of Greece, accepts that Greek domestic problems may be 
resolved at the European level and indeed in some cases it actively asks EU’s help (see 
table 6.3 above). This once again demonstrates that the party reads and follows public 
opinion surveys (see for example figure 6.4 on Greek perceptions of benefit from the 
EU). Instead of mostly placing the blame on the EU for the lack of solution on various 
security issues, LAOS criticises Greek parties for not being able to rightly promote 
Greek interests at the EU level (LAOS 2008). ‘We are the only party that gives a battle 
in the EU’ (interview with Aivaliotis 2009)168. LAOS’ criticism of PASOK and New 
Democracy lies in having failed to strengthen Greek bargaining power within the EU 
and by extension acting against Greek national interest. This is how LAOS portrays 
itself as the only ‘guardian’ of Greek national interests both at the domestic and at the 
                                                
167 Original text: ‘Μνημείο υποχωρητικότητας, ύμνο εις την ποδολειχία και έπαινο εις την 
εθνική μειοδοσία, αποτελεί η ψήφος μεγάλου μέρους των εθνικών κομματικών αντιπροσώπων 
μας στο Ευρωπαικό Κοινοβούλιο. […] Ψήφοι Ελλήνων Ευρωβουλευτών μεταβλήθηκαν σε 
βέλη κατά της πατρίδας. Δεν τους κατηγορούμε για αργυροφρενίτιδα. Δεν τους κατηγορούμε 
για εγγενή ολιγοφρένεια. Τους καλούμε όμως να εξηγήσουν με ποίου την εντολή και έναντι 
ποίου ανταλλάγματος με την ψήφο τους ελάκτισαν ή εσύλησαν το ιερό σώμα της Μακεδονίας.’ 
168 Original text: ‘Είμαστε το μόνο κόμμα που δίνει μάχη στην ΕΕ’ 
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European level. ‘LAOS today convincingly expresses the policies that satisfy the 
common sentiment’ (Papadopoulos 2009: 18)169.  
6.3.3 Appearing to provide a unique yet ‘median’ niche   
This active pursuit to show to the electorate that its positions have an accommodative 
rather than an extremist character is also seen in the party’s attempt to show that its EU 
position is largely different to that of any other political party in the Greek party system, 
including radical right, mainstream and left wing.  
LAOS argues that Greek party policies on the EU are distinctively three. On the one 
hand, there is the Greek Communist Party’s ‘rejecting policy’, according to which 
Greece should not partake to any type of cooperation as it is seen as a product of 
capitalism and imperialism. On the other hand, there are the Europhile parties, namely 
PASOK and New Democracy. Being pro-European they both accept Treaties, laws and 
regulation deriving from the EU (interview with Rontoulis 2009). These positions are 
both seen as the two ends of the spectrum because according to LAOS parties in Greece 
would either unconditionally accept and welcome European integration in all domains 
or blindly reject any type of cooperation. Since these two positions are seen as lying in 
the extremes of a pro/anti-European dimension, LAOS promotes its position as being 
centrist. There are ‘two opposing poles in Greece, eurorejection versus Europhilia, 
LAOS reconciles these two and stands in the middle’ (interview with Voridis 2009). By 
adopting this kind of ‘conditional’ argumentation on the EU, LAOS portrays its 
European stance as a unique median position compared to the two polar opposite 
positions represented by the Greek Communist Party on the one hand and PASOK and 
New Democracy on the other. By showing that it is neither an unconditional EU 
supporter nor a fervent Eurosceptic, it depicts itself as a centrist party occupying the 
middle ground in Greek politics.  
                                                
169 Original text: ‘Ο «ΛΑ.Ο.Σ.» σήμερα εκφράζει πειστικά τις πολιτικές εκείνες θέσεις που 
ικανοποιούν το κοινό αίσθημα.’ 
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Party officials argue that LAOS’ position is not a ‘sterile rejection of the EU but a 
constructive criticism’ (interview with Chrisanthakopoulos 2009) or that they prefer the 
term  ‘Eurosensitive’ over the term ‘Eurosceptic’ (interview with Aivaliotis 2009). The 
term ‘Eurosensitive’ has a positive connotation and insinuates that the party does not 
reject the EU project as a whole but is sensitive towards Treaties and decisions 
surrendering member state sovereignty. The party’s European orientation is actively 
confirmed (interview with Georgiadis 2009) but in this process ‘Eurorealism’ needs to 
be pursued (interview with Georgiou 2009).  
Note that although the party aspires to give the impression that it is a centrist party 
appealing to the ‘median’ Greek voter, this is not necessarily true. LAOS is a 
Eurosceptic party opposing a number of EU initiatives. Moreover, it has a radical right 
ideology demonstrated by its extremist positions on other policy dimensions including 
immigration and law and order (see for example party scores in the Chapel Hill survey 
Hooghe, Bakker et al. 2010).  
This type of differentiation that LAOS actively pursues is beneficial to the party and 
integral to its vote-seeking strategy. It conveys to the electorate the message that the 
party does not hold extreme views and that it can be trusted as a centrist political actor. 
In doing so, it also serves as an indirect criticism against the Communist Party, a 
significant political opponent in the margins of the Greek party system. Moreover, 
adopting a ‘conditional’ stance on European integration also becomes a strong criticism 
against both the Europhile PASOK and New Democracy that are seen as having failed 
to promote Greek interests at the EU level. In this respect, LAOS’ ‘conditional’ 
Euroscepticism serves as a tool of differentiation from the rest of the party system.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to analyse the second type of radical right 
Euroscepticism identified in Chapter 3 of the thesis, namely the ‘conditional’ 
Euroscepticism. To evaluate the different components of this Eurosceptic pattern and 
examine how this position is couched within a party’s overall strategy in the domestic 
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party system, the chapter has analysed the case of LAOS, a Greek radical right party 
during the 1999-2009 period.  
The chapter has presented a three-fold argument. It has first assessed LAOS’ 
predominant strategy in the Greek party system arguing that the party’s strategy is 
accommodative, its logic of competition ‘catch-all’, and its predominant party goal vote-
maximisation. Second, it has analysed in detail LAOS’ Euroscepticism. It has illustrated 
that LAOS is against Greek EU withdrawal and accepts the principle of European 
integration at a higher multilateral level. It is however against the current practice of EU 
policy cooperation since intergovernmental decision-making is not prevalent. The party 
is also against the future making of a European polity. LAOS supports European 
integration under the condition that member states can keep their veto power in issues of 
national importance, Europe retains its cultural homogeneity and the people have more 
stake in the decision-making process through plebiscitary politics. The chapter has 
contended that the issue of Greek security concerns figures prominently within LAOS’ 
European agenda. Finally, the chapter has argued that LAOS’ ‘conditional’ 
Euroscepticism is an active attempt to depict Greek public opinion on the matter. Given 
that issues related to Greek security concerns can provoke political sentiments that cut 
across party lines, the selection of security policy as a prime discussion issue serves as a 
tool in its effort to increase its appeal. LAOS ‘conditional’ EU position represents a new 
and different policy on Europe sharply differentiating itself from other parties in Greek 
politics. In this respect, adopting a ‘conditional’ EU position and linking it with the 
issue of Greek security concerns, LAOS portrays itself as occupying a unique niche in 
the Greek party system. By doing so, it seeks to give the impression of being a ‘median’ 
centrist party having a broader appeal, which adds to LAOS’ overall vote-maximising 
catch-all style of competition.  
In its quest for vote-maximisation, ultimately leading to respectability and political 
entrenchment, the party has adopted a flexible communication strategy presenting a 
moderate language. LAOS has rejected verbal extremism in order to construct an image 
of apparent policy convergence towards the ‘median voter’ thus enhancing its 
probability to increase its vote intake. Its ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism can be thought as 
a marketing decision serving to differentiate LAOS from both the margins and the 
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mainstream, and to demonstrate that it occupies the middle ground in Greek politics. 
The party has made a discursive choice to focus on the issue of Greek security concerns 
in order to appear as the sole ‘guardian’ of Greek national interests at the European 
level. These issues resonate well within Greek public opinion and are likely to produce 
high electoral results. This is especially true given that the mainstream Greek parties 
have left a political gap choosing not to address and openly debate issues pertaining to 
Greek security, which appear to be important within the electorate. In sum, this chapter 
confirms once again that Euroscepticism may be employed as part of a party’s agenda in 
the wider domestic party system. To further illustrate the thesis’s argument, which views 
Euroscepticism as part of a party’s strategic toolkit, the following chapter proceeds with 
an analysis of ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism, the third and last type identified in 
Chapter 3 of the thesis.  
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Chapter 7 The pattern of Compromising Euroscepticism: the case of 
the Italian National Alliance   
 
 
 
 
‘Sarebbe eccessivo dire che è la destra che ha contribuito a scrivere la Costituzione 
europea. Diciamo che il governo italiano, un governo di centrodestra, è  stato 
impegnato in questo obiettivo’. 
 
‘It would be excessive to say that the Right contributed to the  writing  
 of the European Constitution. Let us say that the centre-right   
Italian Government was politically committed to this goal.’ 
 
 Gianfranco Fini, leader of the National Alliance, 2003.170  
 
 
Introduction  
The previous chapters have examined the first two patterns of radical right 
Euroscepticism by conducting a detailed analysis of the French National Front and the 
Greek Popular Orthodox Rally. This constitutes the last empirical chapter of the thesis. 
It explores the final variant of radical right Euroscepticism, namely the ‘compromising’ 
position on European integration. This variant expects a radical right party to adopt a 
position which entails acceptance of a common European culture, support for the 
principle and the practice of European integration but qualified opposition to the future 
building of a European polity. To further explore this Eurosceptic variant, this chapter 
examines the Italian National Alliance.  
This party is the offspring of the neo-fascist MSI. It was disbanded in 2008 during the 
writing of the PhD thesis following a Berlusconi-Fini agreement to join under the 
banner People of Freedom. In 2010, Fini left the joint party with Berlusconi but a 
significant part of the National Alliance has remained inside the People of Freedom. The 
inclusion of this case study in this research design has been purposeful as it provides the 
                                                
170 In Fini, G., C. Fusi, et al. (2003), p. 47-48.  
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opportunity to explore the various dynamics behind a radical right party’s decision to 
change and soften its stance on European integration over time.  
The chapter tests the third hypothesis of the thesis which purports that if a party’s 
primary goal is to become part of the governing cartel and a major player within it, it is 
likely to downplay the issue of Europe and adopt a conciliatory position on European 
integration. In its quest for power, it is likely to avoid controversial statements or 
policies. It downplays the issue with a view to decreasing its salience and avoiding 
contestation on the matter (dismissive strategy). Given that –being part of the cartel– it 
would have participated in decision-making at the EU level, its criticisms towards 
aspects of European integration are likely to have a constructive and practical character. 
Its European discourse may be connected with another issue associated with ‘high 
politics’ with which governmental parties are primarily concerned.  
In order to provide evidence for the above hypothesis, the chapter proceeds with a three-
fold argument. It first suggests that the party’s primary political strategy was 
‘dismissive’ in the sense used by Meguid (2008; see discussion in Chapter 2), namely 
avoiding taking an open and clear position on the European issue. The party was 
predominantly office-seeking and its main goal in the national party system was to lead 
the Italian centre-right. The chapter proceeds by arguing that the National Alliance 
adopted a ‘compromising’ position on European integration which was largely 
connected to the party’s vision for a strong EU presence in the world. Third, it puts 
forward that the party’s modest support for European integration was integral to its 
leader’s overall political strategy of becoming the head of the Italian centre-right 
political cartel. Adopting a ‘compromising’ position on Europe provided the National 
Alliance the opportunity to portray an image of pro-Europeaness similar to that of its 
centre-right counterparts in other European capitals boosting the party’s standing not 
only nationally but also internationally. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism became a 
political tool for its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with 
other centre-right leaders abroad. During the process of the party’s transition from a 
radical right party towards a mainstream conservative party, Europe was used as a 
‘litmus test’ to prove this shift.  
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Following the above argument, this chapter is divided into three constituent sections. It 
first explores in detail the party’s transformation from the MSI to National Alliance 
during the 1990s and how this impacted upon the party’s ideological makeup. In doing 
so, it provides an account of the party’s predominant political strategy within the context 
of Italian competitive politics. It proceeds by analysing the party’s European discourse 
with reference to the four European indicators set out in chapter 3, namely the definition 
of Europe, the principle of European integration, the practice of European policy 
integration and the future of the European polity. It also discusses EU foreign policy and 
Italy’s international relations role as a salient issue in the National Alliance’s EU 
agenda. The last section demonstrates that once the party’s reputation was rehabilitated 
towards the end of the 1990s, the European issue became a tool for national and 
international entrenchment in the wider quest for a central role within the Italian centre-
right cartel and ultimately leadership of the latter.  
7.1 The Italian National Alliance   
7.1.1What the party stands for 
The National Alliance was the offspring of the neo-fascist MSI.  The latter had been 
founded in 1946 by a group of supporters of Mussolini’s Italian Social Republic. The 
party had been essentially anti-system. It opposed liberal democracy and its institutions 
‘which had put a seal on Fascism’s destruction’ (Newell 2000: 469). During the post-
war decades, the MSI had oscillated between a strategy of insertion (inserimento) and 
one of re-radicalisation as a result of the diverging factions within the party. The first 
was anti-bourgeois, anti-capitalist, non-conformist and revolutionary while the second 
was authoritarian, clerical and corporatist (Ignazi 1994). Essentially there was a division 
between a radical, violent, hard-line MSI and a moderate faction inclined to cooperate 
with conservative forces in order to re-insert itself into ‘normal’ Italian politics (Ignazi 
2003: 36-37). These differences aside, both factions’ ideological and cultural references 
as well as the party’s personnel had been characterised by a nostalgia for fascism. As a 
result, under the post-war democratic anti-fascist regime, the party’s legitimacy was 
heavily questioned. Despite being viewed as outside the constitutional arc, however, the 
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MSI had been one of the most electorally successful radical right parties in Europe. 
From the 1950s onwards, its electoral results had spanned from 4.8 to 8.7 per cent of the 
Italian vote in national and European elections, indicating that its strategy of insertion 
had been to an extent successful.  
Until the early 1990s the dominant culture in Italy was one of political compromise and  
lack of alteration of power (Fabbrini 2006: 146). This resulted in the predominance in 
office of a single party (Christian Democracy) (Bull 2004: 550) with the strongest 
communist party of the Western world in opposition (Roux and Verzichelli 2010: 12). 
The MSI had been the only party in post-war Italy overtly claiming a right-wing 
position. For fear of being associated with fascism, no other party wished to be confused 
with the term ‘the right’. However, a number of changes in the party’s external 
environment during the beginning of the 1990s were conducive to the re-branding of the 
MSI into the National Alliance (Ignazi 1994: 65; Bianchi 2007: 84; Morini 2007: 150). 
The reconsideration of fascism in Italian society, the collapse of the post-war regime, 
the break-up of the centrist Christian Democracy, the MSI’s non-involvement in the 
‘Clean Hands’ investigations and the change of the electoral law in 1993 from 
proportional to a partially compensatory mixed-member system (Renwick, Hanretty et 
al. 2009) introduced a somewhat majoritarian logic in the Italian party system. From 
consensual politics ‘there was a shift in emphasis towards strong political leadership that 
has marked the evolution of the new bipolar party system’ (Fella 2006: 13-14). This 
divided the political landscape into two camps broadly associated with the ‘left’ and the 
‘right’ ending the ostracism of the ‘right’ and by extension that of the MSI (Ignazi 2005: 
334). The presence of Berlusconi’s newly established Forza Italia was pivotal in the 
party’s legitimation. Having no links with the old regime, Berlusconi offered political 
back-up to the MSI during the 1993 local elections endorsing its leader, Gianfranco Fini, 
for the Rome mayoralty. The MSI’s resounding success during these elections increased 
the party’s coalition potential. Berlusconi recognised that ‘if the left was to be beaten’ 
(Fella 2006: 12), the MSI was to be considered as a legitimate electoral partner. Such a 
belief led him to coalesce with the MSI for the 1994 elections when the MSI scored an 
unprecedented 13.5 per cent of the Italian vote.  
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The impressive electoral result was not due to the MSI providing a radically new 
message to the electorate. Fini openly supported his belief that Mussolini was Italy’s 
greatest statesman as late as 1994 provoking strong international criticism (Locatelli and 
Martini 1994: 143). At the 1995 Fiuggi Congress, the party officially changed its name 
into the National Alliance. But this was no more than a change in the name rather than 
political personnel, organisation and ideology (Ignazi 2003; Tarchi 2003). The Theses of 
the Congress ‘failed to acquire the status of a historic, path-breaking “manifesto” of the 
new party’ (Ignazi 2005: 337). An overwhelming majority of the 1995 Congress 
participants continued to positively evaluate fascism (Baldini and Vignati 1996; Ignazi 
2003: 46). The new party also presented elements of continuity with regards to its 
organisational structure (Morini 2007: 160; Ignazi, Bardi et al. 2010: 200).  
Since the mid-1990s, its leader was in a constant quest for the ‘winning ideological 
formula’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006). The party’s ideology constantly changed conditional 
upon its electoral fortunes and whether it would participate in government or would 
remain in opposition171. Incrementally during the 2000s, the party showed a dramatic 
drive to distance itself from the past with a view to becoming a considerable force of the 
Italian centre-right. This reached its apogee with the party’s fusion with Forza Italia to 
create the People of Freedom launched in 2007 and officially established in 2009 in the 
run-up to the 2009 European elections. This, however, did not imply that the role of the 
nation would cease to be instrumental in its ideology. History, tradition, customs, 
collective memory and common religious sentiment are the ‘founding elements of the 
Nation’ (National Alliance 2000: 2). The party argues that ‘a people without national 
                                                
171 During the period of the rise and fall of the first Berlusconi government (1994-1995), MSI-
Alleanza Nazionale sought to consolidate its newly-found legitimacy and centrality to the new 
centre-right ground. In doing so, the party adopted positions generally associated with the 
conservative right, maintained traditional themes of law and order and declared its fidelity to the 
tenets of liberal democracy. While in opposition (1996-1999), the party’s policies underwent a 
radical change. With a view to challenging Berlusconi and as part of its modernisation strategy, 
the National Alliance put forward neo-liberal policies and supported limited state intervention 
(National Alliance 1998). These were alien to its fascist past and very similar to the rhetoric of 
Berlusconi’s Forza Italia. Poor performance in the 1999 European elections proved that the 
adoption of these policies was not electorally fruitful as it failed to draw voters away from Forza 
Italia. As a result, the National Alliance shifted back to more traditional positions presenting 
itself as the ‘socially advanced wing of the centre-right’ (National Alliance 2001; Tarchi 2003: 
163). At the beginning of the 2000s, the party cadres showed ‘an evolution towards 
conservative-democratic positions rather than right-extremist ones’ but were also prone to 
nostalgia for the fascist regime (Ignazi 2003: 51), which indicates the perpetuation of 
ambivalence within the party.  
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conscience not only forgets its past but also lacks cohesiveness in the present and is 
deprived from a future’ (National Alliance 2000: 2-3)172.  
The party’s nationalism in the 2000s was not one that focused on race and ethnicity. 
Rather, it was ‘based on a belief in the nation-as-empire’ (Spruce 2007: 101). The party 
argued that it felt a ‘healthy national sentiment that should not be confused with 
nationalism’ 173  (National Alliance 2002: 11) meaning nationalism associated with 
violence and aggression (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 17; Campi 2006: 
95). The party viewed Italy not as a state created during the 19th century Risorgimento 
but as a nation or ‘fatherland’ (patria) dating back to the era of Ancient Rome and 
Ancient Greece (National Alliance 2002: 11). In fact, the party claimed ownership of the 
nationalist term ‘patria’ (Spruce 2007: 106) and presented a strong sense of pride in 
Italy’s long past: :  
‘Italy is the place that has best emulated Greek philosophy, mediated 
by Christianity, the Roman political and legal tradition, the medieval 
social expression and the best insights of humanism into an organic 
whole not prejudiced by language nor religion’ (National Alliance 
2001: 2)174 
 
This imperial vision of Italy could also be seen through a portrayal of its civilising 
mission in the world. ‘Italian wit has helped diffuse European intelligence in the world, 
shaping the politics and culture of other territories’ (National Alliance 2001: 2-3)175. 
Empire carries within the notion of diversity. The party’s insistence on the principle of 
subsidiarity was related to its imperial vision of the nation. The wealth of the latter is 
conditional upon respecting its internal specificities. This, however, does not imply 
                                                
172 Original text: ‘Un popolo senza coscienza nazionale non solo è dimentico del proprio 
passato, ma è disgregato nel presente e privo di avvenire.’ 
173 Original text: ‘un sano sentimento di nazionalità non va confuso con il nazionalismo’ 
174 Original text: ‘L’Italia è il luogo che ha sintetizzato meglio di altri la filosofia greca, inverata 
dal cristianesimo, la tradizione giuridica e politica romana, l’articolazione sociale medievale, le 
migliori intuizioni dell’Umanesimo, in un insieme organico e non confuso di lingua e di 
religione’ 
175 Original text: ‘il genio italiano ha contribuito a diffondere il genio europeo nel mondo, dando 
forma politica e sostanza culturale ad altri territori.’ 
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federalism as it is thought to disintegrate the nation-state. The state should always 
intervene in emergency situations (National Alliance 2000: 3).  
The imperial –rather than ethnic– vision of the nation explains why although the party 
was tough on immigration, it avoided ‘ethno-populist frames’ such as that immigrants 
steal jobs from Italians (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 195). The 2002 Bossi-Fini law was a 
pertinent example here. The law set out rules for immigrants’ entering the country and 
clandestine immigration. It reduced regular entrance into the country and made the 
granting of resident permits conditional upon a contract of employment on the part of 
the immigrant. The party’s primary focus was on rules governing immigrants rather than 
their perceived threat to the nation (Fella 2006: 16). The law helped cement the National 
Alliance’s tough stance on immigration but also dissociated it from the hard-line 
inflammatory rhetoric of the Northern League. Having said that, some National Alliance 
politicians associated immigration with criminality and lack of citizen safety (La Russa 
2005). The party maintained traditional authoritarian positions on issues relating to 
security and law and order; and attached importance to traditional family and catholic 
values (Fella 2006: 13; Ruzza and Fella 2009: 155 & 164). Security remained a prime 
electoral theme during the party’s 2008 electoral campaign (National Alliance 2008b) 
when the party hardened its positions with Fini declaring that if elected he would make 
the Bossi-Fini law even stricter (Fini 2007a).  
In its quest to carve out a political identity distinct from the populism of its centre-right 
competitors, the National Alliance avoided populist appeals post-1998 (Ruzza and Fella 
2009: 166). This would mark a clear break from the party’s past but would also provide 
an alternative to the Northern League and Forza Italia. Fini’s calm and measured 
presence in Italian politics was antithetical to that of Berlusconi and Bossi. To further 
develop the party’s electoral appeal, ‘Fini sought to distinguish the AN from the 
populism and neo-liberalism of the LN and FI […] presenting the party as the social 
conscience of the right’ (Fella 2006: 15). Ignazi has argued that the party was on the 
fringe of the contemporary radical right (Ignazi 2003: 52) especially after merging with 
Forza Italia towards the end of the 2000s. However, ‘elements of anti-political and 
exclusionist discourse remain important […] despite the apparent adoption of a quite 
conventional conservative and state welfare interventionist programme’ (Ruzza and 
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Fella 2009: 142). The party’s policies lacked coherence, the MSI symbol continued to 
feature in party literature, the party’s visual propaganda covertly celebrated elements of 
fascism (Cheles 2010) and the party ‘struggled to define exactly what it stands for and 
what holds it together’ (Fella 2006: 22). 
7.1.2 Institutional entrenchment as the party’s predominant political strategy 
Since the collapse of the old regime at the beginning of the 1990s, the National Alliance 
went through two distinct phases. The first commenced roughly in 1993 when it enjoyed 
unprecedented electoral success in the local elections and spanned until the beginning of 
the second Berlusconi coalition government in 2001. During these years, the party 
pursued a ‘rehabilitation’ strategy in order to partake in ‘normal’ Italian politics as a 
respectable and legitimate partner of the right. As mentioned in the previous section, this 
entailed re-naming the party and re-branding it from neo-fascist into post-
fascist/conservative. This strategy was not new and paralleled that of inserimento during 
the 1950s and 1960s (Bianchi 2007: 75) when the MSI had portrayed itself as ‘a 
“national” force striving to defend the common national interest, Christian civilisation 
and the struggle against communism’ (Ignazi 1994: 21)176. The underlying goal of this 
moderation during the first Italian Republic had been a potential coalition with Christian 
Democracy and ultimately insertion in the Italian political system. This was only 
successful during the Second Republic as was demonstrated in the re-election of the 
party’s electoral coalition and access to government for the second time. Once the party 
was rehabilitated in the political system, its predominant goal changed. From 2001 
onwards, not only was the party no longer marginalised but it also enjoyed 
governmental status. This marked a decisive break from the past and stimulated a 
motivation for cartelisation, institutional entrenchment and a drive for a leading position 
within the electoral coalition (confirming the findings from Chapter 4).  
Fini’s role in guiding the party’s ideological evolution was crucial as he was able to 
respond to opportunities provided by changing political circumstances (Campi 2006: VI; 
Fella and Ruzza 2006: 183). Ideological change did not occur without internal 
                                                
176 Original text: ‘Il Msi si presenta alla Democrazia cristiana come una forza “nazionale” che si 
batte per la difesa dei comuni interessi, la civiltà cristiana e la lotta al materialismo comunista’ 
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opposition (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 144 & 153) but was facilitated by the centralised 
organisation of the party whereby the President enjoyed ample powers and 
incrementally made ‘any real control over him by collective bodies a highly remote 
possibility’ (Ignazi, Bardi et al. 2010: 207). Fini was playing a game in Italian politics 
both at party and individual levels. On the one hand, he wished to retain leadership of 
the party, which led him to occasionally adopt hard-line positions. On the other hand, 
Fini competed as a potential heir to Berlusconi and aspired to become President of the 
Republic, which explained his expressed moderation (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 158) and 
general ‘dismissive’ strategy avoiding taking clear positions. As a result of this dual 
political agenda, the party seemed to put forward two different types of right-wing 
political culture (Campi 2006: 62-63).  
Circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the party and its leader sought to become 
an entrenched force in Italy by leading Italian centre-right politics. The party’s electoral 
coalition with Forza Italia and the Northern League did not consistently enjoy amicable 
relations. As early as the 1998 Verona Congress, the National Alliance evoked neo-
liberal policies overtly borrowing from Forza Italia (National Alliance 1998). In the 
1999 European elections, the party stood on a joint list with the Christian democratic  
Patto Segni party against Berlusconi, which did not succeed electorally. This led the 
party to shift its focus from the economy to more traditional security and law and order 
positions and to re-join the Forza Italia – Northern League ‘House of Freedoms’ 
coalition for the 2001 elections. Following the coalition’s electoral victory in 2001, the 
opportunity appeared for Fini to ‘position himself as a possible future leader of the post-
Berlusconi centre-right’ (Fella 2006: 15). A rift between Fini and Tremonti, the Italian 
Treasury Minister, over the economic policy of the governmental coalition became a 
dispute between Forza Italia and the Northern League on the one side and the National 
Alliance and Christian Democracy on the other (Fella 2006: 18). The National Alliance 
expressed a feeling of resentment as it appeared that the political priorities of the 
coalition were dominated by ‘the personal interests of Berlusconi and the political 
priorities of LN’ (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 154). Choosing to run alone in the 1996 
elections, the Northern League had proven to be indispensible to Forza Italia (Pasquino 
2008: 346) and gave the impression that it was more important in the coalition than the 
National Alliance.  
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Berlusconi’s decreased popularity towards the end of the 2001-2006 government and a 
sceptical climate within the coalition (De Sio 2007: 98) brought about a discussion of 
leadership change as well as the probability of moving towards a European-style centre-
right that would not ally with extremist parties. Prior to the 2006 elections there was 
open discussion regarding Berlusconi’s replacement given the expected defeat. ‘The 
leadership change was expected to lead the coalition to assume a more centrist 
orientation, making it more similar to moderate centre-right blocks in other European 
countries’ (De Sio 2007: 107). This provided the perfect opportunity for Fini to portray 
himself as the future leader of the centre-right. His choice was backed-up by a series of 
positive public evaluations of Fini as a politician (Ruzza and Fella 2009: 147) and a 
future leader of the coalition (Campi 2006: 29). Adopting policies that would 
differentiate the party from both the Northern League and Forza Italia, the National 
Alliance depicted the image of a respectable right-wing force resembling parties of the 
European right lacking the populist rhetoric observed in both Bossi and Berlusconi. The 
rift with Tremonti revealed that the National Alliance was not a hard neo-liberal party; 
and the various disputes with Bossi served as a reminder that the party had an engaging 
approach towards immigration. Indeed, the party’s policies on immigration, economics 
and welfare reform resembled those of the Unione di Centro, a party with strong roots in 
the old centrist Christian Democracy (Fella 2006: 18).  
The discussion over the post-Berlusconi leadership of the centre-right, however, did not 
last very long. Despite losing the 2006 elections, Berlusconi was thought to have won 
the electoral campaign which contributed to his re-empowerment within the coalition 
(De Sio 2007). Berlusconi’s strong charismatic personality came in the way of Fini’s 
leadership aspirations. However, despite various disputes the two parties officially 
merged in 2009 to create the People of Freedom. This clearly indicated that various 
policy differences and past disagreements were not considered strong enough to deter a 
future right-wing governmental alliance. Particularly within the context of Italian 
politics where two layers of party system can be detected, the first at electoral and the 
second at parliamentary levels (Bardi 2007), office-seeking alliances are encouraged 
especially at the electoral level.  
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From an anti-system party during the first Italian republic, the National Alliance 
progressed into a rehabilitated mainstream party in the Second Republic. Its political 
survival and success, however, were conditional upon the party’s institutional 
entrenchment in the Italian political landscape. Being part of the centre-right coalition 
cartel was not enough in this respect. The party viewed its role as creating a right-wing 
alliance over and above the current parties that would be pivotal to the future 
development of the country.  
‘We want to create a grand Alliance for Italy which would act in the 
present but also would look to the future in order to restore hope for 
those who think that Italy has no prospects and has been relegated to 
the margins of history’ (National Alliance 2008a: 1)177.  
 
This Grand Alliance would only survive if right-wing political values became its 
reference culture. This project was not only political but also cultural and would ‘re-
affirm the Italian model that derives from our history, our culture and out identity’ 
(National Alliance 2008a: 2)178. The party’s insistence on creating this Alliance to rule 
the ‘Nuova Italia’ (National Alliance 2008a: 3) also implied a wish for radical change in 
Italian politics. As the collapse of the First Republic led to the party’s rehabilitation and 
insertion in Italian politics, the creation of a Grand Alliance under the aegis of the 
National Alliance would have been likely to result in the party’s entrenchment in the 
Italian political establishment. Again, the use of the idea of a great Alliance that would 
bring the Italian right-wing forces together based on cultural references paralleled the 
previous MSI project of the ‘Grande Destra’ (Ignazi 1994: 7) according to which right-
wing parties should coalesce in order to combat communism.  
The party’s main strategy was dismissive avoiding controversial statements or policies, 
its logic of competition is cartelisation/institutional entrenchment and its predominant 
goal is pursuit of office. The above discussion demonstrated that the centre-right 
                                                
177 Original text: ‘Vogliamo creare una grande Alleanza per l’Italia che agisca nell’immediato 
ma guardi al futuro, per ridare speranza, per uscire dalla sindrome di chi pensa ad una Italia 
priva di prospettive e relegata ai margini della Storia.’ 
178 Original text: ‘Un progetto politico culturale che passa attraverso la riaffermazione del 
Modello Italiano che deriva dalla nostra storia, dalla nostra cultura e dalla nostra identità’ 
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coalition was based on a shaky agreement over policies and broad ideas with which the 
National Alliance was not always in agreement. Political developments suggest that 
Forza Italia and the Northern League were on better terms with each other than with the 
National Alliance repeatedly questioning the importance of the latter in the centre-right 
Italian political landscape. The National Alliance was likely to increase its significance 
in the party system only through the means of institutionalising its presence through 
assuming leadership of the centre-right cartel. Failing to do so, the National Alliance 
and its leader were likely to be continuously overshadowed by Berlusconi’s charismatic 
personality. Additionally, during the post-Berlusconi era, the probability for the 
Northern League to lead the centre-right coalition was perceived as low given the 
party’s extremist, anti-European and regional character. This may be seen as opening a 
window of opportunity for Gianfranco Fini in his quest for absolute power and 
institutionalisation within the Italian political system. Adopting a ‘compromising’ 
position on Europe may thus be seen as integral to the party’s political agenda at the 
domestic level. The next section analyses the party’s European position explaining how 
it was related to the party’s vision of a strong Italy.  
7.2 Compromising Eurosecpticism and the issue of Italy’s international role 1999-
2009 
This section provides an analysis of the National Alliance’s European position. It argues 
that during the 1999-2009 period the party’s stance on European integration has 
crystallised into a ‘compromising’ position. It must be noted, however, that the party’s 
position on Europe has changed during the years. The party’s transformation from the 
neo-fascist MSI into the post-fascist National Alliance in January 1995 entailed a 
dramatic shift in its European rhetoric. From a relatively hard Eurosceptic position in the 
1980s and early 1990s (Conti 2009: 206), the party moved towards a more conciliatory 
view of European integration entailing modest support for the project. Earlier expert 
surveys have indicated that during the 1980s the party was very close to the 
hard/’rejectionist’ Eurosceptic end of the spectrum. On a seven point scale where one 
indicates strong opposition to European integration and seven strong support, Ray’s 
expert survey positioned the party at 1.63 in 1984 and 1988 expert surveys. During the 
following decade, the party modestly moved to 1.88 and 2.55 in the 1992 and 1996 
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expert surveys respectively (Ray 1999: 300). The MSI had recognised the importance of 
co-operation but ‘never enthusiastically supported integration because of its fear of loss 
of national autonomy and independent decision-making’ (Kritzinger, Cavatorta et al. 
2004: 958). The dramatic change in its position occurred from the mid-1990s onwards 
when the party started expressing a moderate stance towards integration in line with De 
Gaulle’s notion of ‘Europe of fatherlands’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 190). The 1995 
Fiuggi document stated ‘The idea of “Europe of Fatherlands”, integral to the 1960s 
Gaullism, can guarantee through intelligent adjustment the historic unity of the national 
states characterising the civilisation of the continent’ (National Alliance 1995: 61)179. 
The EU was envisaged as a confederation of equal member states respecting cultural 
particularities and identities against a ‘federal, centralizing superstate’ (Tarchi 2003: 
166).  
The subsequent section examines the party’s European position on the basis of the 
typology of radical right Euroscepticism identified in Chapter 3 of the thesis.  The main 
findings are that the National Alliance views Europe as a cultural and –in particular– 
Christian entity. It supports the principle of European cooperation at a higher 
multilateral level and within the context of the EU project. The party accepted by and 
large the EU policy practice and recognised the importance of European institutions. 
The nation was instrumental in the construction of the European project. Thus, the EU 
was seen as beneficial only to the extent that it promoted and safeguarded national 
interest. The party expressed modest support for the European project and its criticisms 
remained technical for their most part. It was argued, however, that the EU suffers from 
a democratic deficit and that, to the party’s disillusionment, it is solely an economic 
rather than a political project. The party’s ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism can be 
thought as a positive commitment to the European project coupled with feelings of 
disenchantment regarding the EU’s current and future trajectory.  
                                                
179 Original text: ‘L’idea dell’ ”Europa delle Patrie”, propria del gollismo degli anni ‘60, può 
garantire, attraverso un intelligente adeguamento, quell’unità storica degli Stati Nazionali che è 
peculiare caratteristica della civiltà del continente.’ 
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7.2.1 Definition of Europe  
The National Alliance viewed Europe as ‘a spiritual and cultural reference product of 
the history and characteristics of its peoples, from ancient Greece to Rome and 
Christianity’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)180. Europe is not only a geographical area but 
also ‘something deeper, a type of civilisation layered over centuries of history’ (National 
Alliance 2004: 5) 181 , a ‘European fatherland’ (National Alliance 2000: 4) 182 . The 
European way of life filtered through history distinguishes Europeans from other 
cultures. ‘When we speak of values such as personal dignity, the rule of law, solidarity, 
the family, respect for life, we inadvertently refer to principles that the Judeo-Christian 
roots have given to Europe’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)183.  
The issue of religion featured prominently in the party’s political discourse as it was 
thought to be a uniting element of Europe and its peoples. The National Alliance lobbied 
for a reference to Christianity in the preamble of the European Constitution and 
regretted that Europe’s Christian roots ultimately were not mentioned (Angelilli 2007). 
The party argued that ‘a reference to Europe’s Judaeo-Christian roots becomes the 
necessary recognition of the continent’s secular unity’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)184. 
Cristiana Muscardini, one of the party’s MEPs, argued:  
‘It is our hope that, with regard to the preamble, the Intergovernmental 
Conference will come to an agreement on the acknowledgement of the 
roots from which the Union has sprung to life. The ancient history of 
Greece and Rome, the Judaeo-Christian traditions and the secular, 
liberal values which came gradually to be established cannot be 
                                                
180 Original text: ‘L’Europa costituisce, per Alleanza Nazionale, un riferimento culturale e 
spirituale frutto della storia e delle specificità di suoi popoli, dall’antica Grecia alla romanità, 
alla Cristianità’ 
181 Original text: ‘qualcosa di più profondo, una certa forma di civiltà quale si è stratificata in 
secoli di storia’ 
182 Original text: ‘La Patria europea’ 
183 Original text: ‘Quando parliamo di valori, quali la dignità della persona umana, lo Stato di 
diritto, la solidarietà, il valore della famiglia, il rispetto della vita, senza accorgercene facciamo 
un riferimento ai quei principi che le radici giudaico-cristiane hanno donato all’Europa.’ 
184 Original text: ‘l’inserimento di un riferimento alle radici giudaico-cristiane diventa un 
riconoscimento dell’unità secolare’ 
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disregarded because it is from them that the future of Europe is 
drawing cultural and moral strength.’ (Muscardini 2003) 185 
 
The party perceived national and European identities as two distinct identities, which 
can nevertheless be reconciled. The two identities were not posited as necessarily 
antithetical or competing but were mostly seen in terms of concentric circles whereby 
feelings of national identity are strong in the people but feelings of European identity are 
also present. The National Alliance argued that only by finding the similarities as well 
as the differences of European peoples, it would be possible to acquire the 
consciousness of being European citizens (National Alliance 2002: 6). European 
citizenship however still implies ‘the need to safeguard our own identities and our own 
traditions too’ (Muscardini 2007a)186.  
7.2.2 Principle of European integration 
The National Alliance was in favour of the ‘principle’ of European cooperation at a 
higher multilateral level. The party believed that it is in the European States’ best 
interest to pool their resources in order to better manage issues that have an international 
and transnational character. It accepted the existence of changing geopolitical conditions 
and that the nation state has been undergoing deep and radical changes as a result of 
European integration (National Alliance 2001: 9-10). The party’s proposed framework 
for cooperation is a ‘Confederation in which the states have their autonomy but decide 
to delegate part of their sovereignty to the central institutions for the management of 
specific sectors’ (interview with Muscardini 2009)187. This ideal model would ensure the 
primacy of the nation state at all times. National specificities constitute Europe’s wealth 
and the EU should not ‘negate the nation state but rather constitute a Confederation of 
                                                
185 Original text: ‘Auspichiamo che la Conferenza intergovernativa, per quanto riguarda il 
preambolo, trovi un accordo per il riconoscimento delle radici dalle quali ha preso vita l’Unione. 
La storia greco-romana, la tradizione giudaico-cristiana, i valori laici e liberali che si sono via 
via definiti, non possono essere ignorati perché da essi il futuro dell’Europa trae forza culturale e 
morale.’ 
186 Original text: ‘bisogno però di difendere anche le nostre identità e le nostre tradizioni.’ 
187 Wording in Italian: ‘Il modello ideale è quello della Confederazione, nella quale gli Stati 
hanno un loro spazio di autonomia, ma decidono di delegare parte della loro sovranità alle 
istituzioni centrali per la gestione di determinati settori.’ 
 215
nation states; in this sense the states and their interests would contribute to rather than 
obstruct the formulation of the European interests and priorities’ (National Alliance 
2002: 6)188. ‘Europe cannot be formed against the Member States and against national 
interests’ (Tatarella 2008)189. Key party politicians accepted that Italy benefited more 
from the European Community and much less from the European Union (interview with 
Muscardini 2009). It nevertheless opposed a ‘single Europe’ that adopted the same 
policies for all member states without being sensitive to national and regional 
specificities.  
The nation state is both central to the creation of a united Europe but is also empowered 
by it. ‘It is through the states and the national governments […] that the Confederation 
of States could acquire a “political personality” […] and the States would find their 
centrality’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)190. This vision of Europe resembles the Gaullist 
belief of integration based on the strength and integrity of the nation state. ‘Our 
documents and political positions have been inspired by the Gaullist model’ (National 
Alliance 2006b: 16)191. The party leader specified that ‘we are in favour of delegating 
some powers of the State; but we are against abandoning national sovereignty. “The 
Europe of nations” should prevail where every member state can maintain its identity in 
a non-centralised structure’ (interview of Fini in Fini and Staglieno 1999: 29)192. This 
was contrasted to the creation of Europe as a Super State ‘The Right has always argued 
in favour of a Europe of nations rich by its identities and cultures that should be 
respected and cannot be reversed by a Super State’ (National Alliance 2004: 6)193. The 
                                                
188 Original text: ‘non annullando gli Stati nazionali bensì costituendo una Confederazione di 
Statinazione; in questo senso gli Stati e gli interessi nazionali contribuiscono e non sono di 
ostacolo alla formazione dell’interesse e delle priorità europei.’ 
189 Original text: ‘l'Europa non può nascere contro gli Stati e contro gli interessi nazionali’ 
190 Original text: ‘È attraverso gli Stati e i governi nazionali, quindi, in quanto espressione della 
volontà di cittadini e della rappresentatività , che la Confederazione di Stati può acquisire 
“personalità politica”; ancor più al compimento delle grandi transizioni, come detto, gli Stati 
ritrovano la loro centralità.’ 
191 Original text: ‘‘Ci siamo ispirati in tanti nostri documenti e prese di posizioni al modello 
gollista’’ 
192 Original text: ‘‘Preciso subito che siamo favorevoli a delegare alcune competenze dello Stato, 
ma non ad abbandonare la sovranità nazionale, perche l’Europa unita dovrà essere l’”Europa 
delle Nazioni”, dove ogni membro dovrà mantenere la propria identità in un assetto non 
centralistico’’ 
193 Original text: ‘Ma la Destra ha anche sempre affermano il valore di un’Europa delle nazioni, 
ricchezza plurima di identità e culture, che vanno alimentate e rispettate e non possono essere 
annullate in un super Stato informe’ 
 216
party was clearly against the creation of a European federal structure. ‘We oppose a type 
of European integration that would represent the creation of a single model. We are in 
favour of a Europe that respects the diversities and cultures which enrich it’ (interview 
with Muscardini 2009)194. The nation state must be central in EU decision-making 
where the ‘pluralism of national sovereignties’ must be preserved (National Alliance 
2004: 8). The party leader argued that ‘The best way to participate in the European club 
would be not to give up one’s national prerogatives, history, culture and identity. Being 
good Europeans presupposes being good Italians’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006: 
108)195. The strength of European integration stems from the notion of unity in diversity. 
‘We must establish European political unity while safeguarding national identities and 
diversities’ (Angelilli 2001)196. European cooperation should not be an unconditional 
surrender of power to the European institutions, ‘Integration should take place when 
necessary, decentralisation where possible’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)197.  
It is worth noting that the National Alliance portrayed itself as the only party in Italy 
seeking not only to preserve but also to promote Italian national interests to the 
European level. ‘Italy […] should find the possibility to develop and assert its 
characteristics in a united Europe’ (National Alliance 2004: 12)198. Fini criticised the 
other parties for being unconditional Europeans without succeeding in uploading Italian 
interests at the EU level. ‘Europeanists in words, we have never taken the European 
institutions seriously, we did not strive to insert our officials in the bureaucratic structure 
of the Communities’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006: 108) 199. Italy had assumed a 
deterministic ‘agree and get along’ position towards the EU in order to create an EU ‘at 
all costs but without any values’ (National Alliance 2002: 5). The party pointed to the 
                                                
194 Wording in Italian: ‘Ci opponiamo ad una integrazione europea che rappresenti 
l’omologazione ad un modello unico. Siamo per un’Europa che rispetti le diversità e le culture 
che la arricchiscono.’ 
195 Original text: ‘il modo migliore per far parte a pieno titolo del club europeo è quello di non 
rinunciare alle proprie prerogative nazionale, alla propria identità storico-culturale. Essere buoni 
europei presuppone essere e sentirsi buoni italiani’ 
196 Original text: ‘dobbiamo costruire l'unità politica europea, salvaguardando le identità e le 
specificità nazionali’ 
197 Original text: ‘Integrazione ove necessario, decentramento ove possibile’ 
198 Original text: ‘’ ‘L’Italia Paese […] deve poter trovare nell’Europa unita la possibilità di 
sviluppare e affermare le sue caratteristiche’ 
199 Original text: ‘Europeisti a parole, non abbiamo mai preso troppo sul serio le istituzioni 
europee, non ci siamo battuti […] per inserire nostri tecnici e funzionari all’interno della 
struttura burocratica della Comunità’ 
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fact that ‘Only in recent years, thanks to the Right, we can speak of the “rediscovery of 
the national interest” (National Alliance 2004: 12)200. Using the European issue as a tool 
for domestic criticism, the National Alliance criticised the Italian left for supporting the 
creation of a European Super State ‘against the culture and traditions of the European 
peoples’ (National Alliance 2004: 8) 201.  
7.2.3 Practice of European policy integration 
The party largely supported the policy practice of European integration. It espoused EU 
cooperation on a number of policies including the economy, energy, the environment, 
immigration and borders, security and justice. Policies of particular interest to the party 
related to technology and foreign policy. It saw a benefit from European integration to 
the extent that national interests were preserved and that the EU did not seek to establish 
uniform policies for all member states irrespective of geography, climate and financial 
considerations. ‘We are against regulations in some sectors that extend from the North 
Cape to the island of Lampedusa’ (interview with Muscardini 2009)202. The ‘practice’ of 
European integration was thus filtered through a systematic cost-benefit analysis 
conferred upon Italian national interests (Conti 2003: 26).  
The National Alliance criticised the EU for being distant from citizens’ interests and 
needs. The party argued that the EU is a bureaucratic creation suffering from a 
democratic deficit. Citizens do not participate in the process of integration. The EU has 
become a technocratic government without popular legitimacy. Its decision-making 
procedures are opaque and distant from the European peoples. The role of the only 
European Institution representing the people, i.e. the EP, is limited.  
                                                
200 Original text: ‘Solo in anni molto recenti, grazie all’azione culturale della Destra, si è tornato 
a parlare di “riscoperta dell’interesse nazionale”’ 
201 Original text: ‘È stata la retorica del progressismo di sinistra a inventare, senza che vi fosse 
alcuna traccia nei trattati, il superStato europeo, all’interno del quale si voleva annegare la 
cultura e la tradizione dei popoli.’ 
202 Wording in Italian: ‘Siamo contrari a regolamentazioni di alcuni settori che valgano da Capo 
Nord all’isola di Lampedusa.’ 
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‘EU decisions far from being taken in the Parliament arise from 
Council meetings and are implemented by the Commission. The first 
decide in secrecy whereas the latter implement them in a politically 
“non-responsible” manner. These paradoxes clearly contradict the 
democratic spirit inherent in Europe’ (National Alliance 2002: 6)203 
 
The party criticised the European Commission for being a ‘hyper-bureaucracy incapable 
of designing and implementing a common policy’ (National Alliance 2004: 7)204. The 
technocratic EU is averse to the process of democratic participation. The people instead 
of active decision-makers have become passive consumers of European legislation 
(National Alliance 2002: 5). European bureaucrats have created an over-regulated soul-
less Europe ‘incapable to assert the roots of its own identity’ (National Alliance 2006a: 
12) 205 . The main challenge for the party was to create a Europe ‘in which the 
institutional structures […] can be directly accountable to the citizens’ (National 
Alliance 2004: 8)206. EU regulations were seen as excessive, too hard and complex to 
understand. ‘Establishing the curvature of bananas or the diameter of peas or the length 
of contraceptives and believing that this means you are regulating the market is a sign 
that you are a thousand miles away from the daily life of the citizens’ (Muscardini 
2007b)207. 
Europe struggles between two antithetical conceptions. The first is a technocratic 
European Super State alien to democratic participation and legitimacy. The second is a 
political union of sovereign nation states collaborating in areas of mutual interest. The 
party’s view of the EU as it stands during the 2000s is rather pessimistic. It deplored that 
a technocratic and elitist EU reins, product of social democratic policies (National 
                                                
203 Original text: ‘ad oggi ancora troppe decisioni dell’Unione, lungi dall’essere prese in sede 
parlamentare scaturiscono dalle riunioni del Consiglio e sono attuate dagli organi della 
Commissione. Il primo decide in segreto, la seconda attua in maniera politicamente “non 
responsabile”. Questi due evidenti paradossi, in chiara contraddizione con lo spirito democratico 
di cui l’Europa è stata nei secoli portatrice,’ 
204 Original text: ‘iperburocraticizzata ma incapace di disegnare e realizzare una strategia 
politica comune’ 
205 Original text: ‘incapace di affermare finanche le radice della propria identità.’ 
206 Original text: ‘E soprattutto un’Unione le cui strutture istituzionali […] possano rispondere 
direttamente ai cittadini.’ 
207 Original text: ‘Fissare la curvatura delle banane o il diametro dei piselli o la lunghezza dei 
contraccettivi e crede di regolare, in questo modo, il mercato, significa essere lontani mille 
miglia dalla realtà quotidiana dei cittadini.’ 
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Alliance 2002: 5). ‘There is a clash between a spiritual Europe deriving from history and 
enriching its peoples through their cultural diversity and a Euro-cracy, a bleak 
technocratic entity […] distant from the citizens resting upon super-commissions 
resembling to a “supranational socialist entity” (National Alliance 2004: 7)208. Because 
the prevailing EU model is technocratic, the EU is perceived as disoriented and 
fragmented having protectionist and introverted tendencies.  
Europe would succeed only if it developed ‘with the people’ in a project of concentric 
circles of sovereignty primarily regulated by the principle of subsidiarity whereby 
decentralisation should take place where possible (interview with Muscardini 2009). 
Careful not to over-criticise the European Commission, the National Alliance 
recommended a Europe governed by national institutions as well as the EP, the only 
European Institution legitimated by popular vote (National Alliance 2002: 5). This, 
coupled with the wider use of public referenda, would be the only way through which 
the citizens could be involved and the EU could be more accountable and democratised. 
This is increasingly important given that more than half of national legislation derives 
from the EU.  
7.2.4 The Future of the European Polity  
The European vision of the National Alliance was that of a political union (National 
Alliance 2000: 4). ‘The European Union, following the creation of the single currency, 
should make another important step forward and start, as soon as possible, the procedure 
towards the realisation of a political union’ (National Alliance 1999: 1) 209 . As 
mentioned above, this political union refers to a confederation of European nation states 
where all members would contribute without compromising their sovereignty.  
                                                
208 Original text: ‘Uno scontro tra un’Europa spirituale, fatta dalla storia, che voleva arricchire i 
suoi popoli attraverso la pluralità delle culture; e l’Eurocrazia, un’entità arcigna, configurata 
come struttura eminentemente tecnocratica.[…] […]Un’Europa distante dai cittadini, arroccata 
in supercommissioni, quella di “un’entità socialista sopranazionale”’ 
209 Original text: ‘L'Unione europea, dopo la creazione della moneta unica, deve compiere un 
altro passo avanti altrettanto importante ed avviare, il più rapidamente possibile, le procedure 
per la realizzazione dell'Unione politica.’ 
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The ‘future’ of European integration would be successful only by respecting and 
preserving member state specificities, which is precisely what unites and enriches the 
EU. The maintenance of diversity was an important principle of the party which argued 
that ‘the future of Europe cannot be marked by centralised uniformity but by unity in 
diversity’ (National Alliance 2002: 5)210. In this political system, the states would ensure 
that national interests contribute to and do not become an obstacle to the formation of 
European interests and priorities (National Alliance 2002: 6). Practically this entails that 
EU member states should try to promote their national interests through the European 
structures. But it is only through member states and national governments that the EU 
can attain a political personality. Indeed, the major challenge each EU member state 
faces is to find a balance between national interests and the European common interest. 
It is only through the member states that the EU could be empowered. A notable 
example of this was the party’s attitude towards the European Constitution and the 
Lisbon Treaty. Although it largely supported both, it was against the reduction of the 
composition of the Commission (Muscardini 2007e). Regarding the Constitution, it 
argued that it should not be  
‘exploited for party-political purposes against governments that have 
been duly elected by their own citizens. The European Union must not 
run the risk of becoming a place where political groups join in the 
battle to attack freely made national decisions on ideological grounds.’ 
(Muscardini 2005)211. 
 
As a result of the party’s aspiration for a political union, the EU was criticised for 
prematurely enlarging in 2004 to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (National 
Alliance 2006a: 12-13). The EU should ‘deepen in order to enlarge, resulting in 
reinforced cooperation on strategic issue for the Union’ (National Alliance 2002: 5)212. 
Fini expressed disillusionment towards the EU as ‘The future of Europe, at this point, is 
being nothing more than a vast marketplace’ (interview with Fini in Campi 2006: 
                                                
210 Original text: ‘il futuro d’Europa non può essere segnato dall’uniformità nel centralismo ma 
dall’unità nella diversità’ 
211 Original text: ‘la Costituzione non venga strumentalizzata a fini partitici contro governi 
regolarmente eletti dai propri cittadini. L’Unione europea non deve rischiare di divenire il luogo 
in cui maggioranze ideologiche si scontrano per contrastare libere scelte nazionali.’ 
212 Original text: ‘approfondire per allargare, dando vita a cooperazioni rafforzate su temi 
strategici per l’Unione’ 
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106)213. EU enlargement was seen as an impediment to the EU becoming a strong 
political power. ‘EU accession does not preoccupy me since the Europe we are talking 
about is increasingly […] a marketplace ruled by a purely economic logic. Lets welcome 
the Turks with their companies, their workforce and their money’ (interview with Fini in 
Campi 2006: 106)214. 
The party portrayed itself as a ‘Eurorealist’ option as opposed to supporting a position of 
unconditional pro-Europeaness or hard Euroscepticism. This Eurorealism derived from 
what the party perceived as close to the people. ‘It is time to say that Euroscepticism, 
like Euroenthusiasm, are the two sides of a coin that the citizens are rejecting, because 
they are calling strongly for Eurorealist policies and for proper application of the 
subsidiarity concept. In other words, let Europe do what the nation states cannot do by 
themselves.’ (Muscardini 2004)215.  
7.2.5.1 The issue of Italy’s international role within the National Alliance’s European 
discourse  
The above European argumentation was related to the party’s foreign policy aspirations. 
The National Alliance saw the EU as a potential strong force in international affairs 
(National Alliance 2000: 4) that should produce security in the world by conducting 
crisis management operations (National Alliance 2002: 5). Within a Europe that is 
increasingly important on the international landscape, Italy should be a driving force in 
international relations. The EU was seen as a vehicle to reconstruct the Italian image 
abroad (National Alliance 1995: 61). Whereas the parties of the left have been 
unconditional EU supporters without promoting the Italian national interest (National 
Alliance 2004: 11), the National Alliance portrayed a vision of an Italy leading the way 
                                                
213 Original text: ‘Il futuro dell’Europa, a questo punto, è quello di essere niente più che un vasto 
mercato’ 
214 Original text: ‘Adesione che non mi preoccupa, dal momento che l’Europa di cui stiamo 
parlando è sempre più, come ho appena detto, un mercato retto da una logica meramente 
economistica. Ben vengano i turchi con le loro imprese, con la loro forza-lavoro e con i loro 
soldi’ 
215 Original text: ‘E’ il momento di dire che l’euroscetticismo, come l’euroentusiasmo, sono le 
facce di un’identica medaglia che i cittadini rifiutano, perché chiedono con forza che ci sia una 
politica eurorealista e una vera applicazione del concetto di sussidiarietà. Faccia cioè l’Europa 
ciò che gli Stati nazionali non possono fare da soli.’ 
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in a dynamic Europe assuming international responsibilities and inserting itself within 
the Franco-German axis (National Alliance 2009: 9). 
The party argued that ‘Italy and Europe should play a dynamic role in international 
relations since there are important areas in the world where systematic violation of 
human rights takes place’ (National Alliance 2000: 4)216. This global vision of the EU 
was linked to a belief of Europe’s civilising mission abroad ‘We want a political Europe 
able to inspire the desire for democracy in places in the world where millions of women 
and men still suffer a lack of freedom and the rule of law.’ (Muscardini 2007d)217. 
Europe was seen as a founding pillar of the West not antagonistic to that of the United 
States. However, its role would lie in ‘bringing its wisdom to the Alliance, its ability to 
filter cultures, to have a dialogue with the South’ (National Alliance 2004: 9) 218 . 
Without a common foreign and security policy, Europe ‘will remain weakened’ 
(Muscardini 2007c) and ‘will not be able to play a role in the world that is analogous to 
its economic and commercial weight and could be forced to accept choices make by 
others’ (National Alliance 1999: 1)219. 
Europe should become a strong player in international politics making a concerted effort 
to tackle international crises, which thus far are managed by individual states, the United 
States or the United Nations. ‘We have to anticipate future scenarios and cannot, as we 
were in the case of Kosovo, be unprepared and divided in the face of such a sensitive 
scenario.’ (Muscardini 2008) 220. This vision of Europe was portrayed as that of ‘Euro-
realism’ whereby ‘a Union of sovereign states is capable of acting effectively through 
                                                
216 Original text: ‘Ritiene che l'Italia e l'Europa debbano svolgere un ruolo propulsivo nelle 
relazioni internazionali; poiché esistono ancora aree importanti del globo nelle quali si realizza 
la quotidiana e sistematica violazione delle dignità della persona’ 
217 Original text: ‘Vogliamo un’Europa politica capace di ispirare la voglia di democrazia 
laddove nel mondo milioni di donne e uomini ancora subiscono la mancanza di libertà e di 
legalità.’ 
218 Original text: ‘Il compito dell’Europa è quello di portare nell’alleanza la sua saggezza, la sua 
millenaria capacità di filtrare culture, di dialogare con il Sud del mondo.’ 
219 Original text: ‘l'Europa non potrà svolgere nel mondo un ruolo corrispondente al suo peso 
economico e commerciale e potrebbe essere costretto ad accettare scelte fatte da altri’ 
220 Original text: ‘Dobbiamo immaginare gli scenari futuri e non, come nel caso del Kosovo, 
trovarci impreparati e divisi di fronte a uno scenario quanto mai delicato.’ 
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the expression of a common will.’ (Muscardini 2007f)221. It is, however, noteworthy that 
the party made an implicit assumption that the European nation states have converging 
interests all seeking to create a strong European power. 
7.2.5.2 Analysis of the National Alliance’s European Parliamentary Speeches during the 
5th and 6th Terms 
The analysis of MEP plenary speeches during the 1999-2009 decade demonstrates that 
there are a number of issues salient in their discourse. These include their preoccupation 
with the EU’s international role and  its democratic deficit as well as their expression of 
support for a number of EU initiatives222. During the 5th Parliamentary Term, 1999-
2004, the National Alliance elected 5 MEPs who they gave 196 speeches in total223. 
During the 6th 2004-2009 term the number of speeches increased to 297224.  
The author’s qualitative content analysis of a total number of 493 speeches offers an 
interesting insight. The recurring issues can be broadly classified into two categories, 
including (1) comments specific to the EU and Europe and (2) non-EU related 
themes225. Table 7.1 below shows that, contrary to LAOS MEPs, National Alliance 
MEPs overwhelmingly used the EP as a platform to discuss EU rather than domestic or 
other non-EU specific issues. The party referred to EU issues with a total averaged 
percentage of 93.6, which surpasses the French National Front’s very high 82.5 per cent 
(see Chapter 5, section 5.2.5.2). Only a minor 5.75 per cent of the speeches did not refer 
                                                
221 Origjnal text: ‘un’Unione di Stati sovrani è capace d’agire efficacemente attraverso 
l’espressione di una volontà comune.’ 
222 These have been found on the EP’s online archives at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/members/archive/alphaOrder.do?language=EN 
223 During the 5th EP term, the party elected Roberta Angelilli, Cristiana Muscardini, Antonio 
Mussa, Adriana Poli Bortone and Sergio Berlato 
224 During the 6th term, the party elected 8 MEPs in total. Roberta Angelilli, Cristiana 
Muscardini, Adriana Poli Bortone and Sergio Berlato renewed their mandate. Umberto Pirilli, 
Salvatore Tatarella, Romano Maria La Russa and Alessandro Foglietta joined afresh Alleanza 
Nazionale’s 6th EP team. Antonio Mussa replaced Romano Maria La Russa and Domenico 
Antonio Basile replaced Adriana Poli Bortone in 2008. Thus ten different MEPs gave plenary 
speeches during the 6th Parliamentary term. 
225 For a detailed analysis of how speeches have been coded, see Appendix III.  
 224
to the EU. This finding confirms that the party was preoccupied with the European issue 
(interview with Muscardini 2009)226.  
Table 7.1 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance) 
5th & 6th Parliamentary Terms  
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes  93.6 
Non-EU related themes 5.75 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
A comparison of these two thematic categories among the two EP Parliamentary Terms 
reveals a similar pattern. References to EU-related themes remain very high in both EP 
terms (see tables 7.2 & 7.3 below).  
Table 7.2 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance) 
5th Parliamentary Term 
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes  93.7 
Non-EU related themes  5.4 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
Table 7.3 General categories of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Categories of themes in EP speeches  Percentage 
EU related themes 93.5 
Non-EU related themes 6.1 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
A detailed analysis of the EU-related themes category demonstrates that the National 
Alliance used the EP platform to address a number of issues pertaining to the EU (see 
table 7.4 below). This is similar to the French National Front whose percentage 
references to EU related themes remain high during the 1999-2009 decade. However, 
the two parties have significantly different approaches. The French party overwhelming 
refers to the EU in a negative manner criticising its policies and institutions The Italian 
party chose to discuss rather than criticise by default any European initiative and had a 
much more positive approach on the issue.  
                                                
226 Note that although Europe was important within the party, the issue was not portrayed as publically 
salient.  
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Interestingly, and in concurrence with findings in the above sections of the chapter, the 
National Alliance criticised the EU on a number of issues (8.9 per cent). However, MEP 
negative evaluations referred to technical issues and can be thought as constructive as 
they recommended ways of improving the EU’s policies and practices. Moreover, unlike 
the other two parties where references to the EU tended to be largely negative, EU 
criticisms are solely a sub-category of the overall category ‘EU related themes’. It is 
also noteworthy that the party directly referred to the phenomenon of globalisation only 
by a rather small 1.7 per cent and that when it did so, it did not connect globalisation to 
European integration.   
Additionally, there is not one single issue prevailing in their speeches. Rather, the 
qualitative content analysis reveals that the party’s MEPs were concerned with (1) the 
EU’s role in the world, particularly but not exclusively in the context of terrorism (16.9 
per cent); (2) the issue of the EU’s democracy or lack thereof (7.15 per cent) and (3) 
their active support for a number of EU initiatives (13.95 per cent). This also provides 
an interesting contrast with the French National Front which employs a large part of its 
allocated time in plenary to hold the EU responsible for the negative consequences of 
globalisation in France; and the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally, which mostly uses the 
EP platform to ‘upload’ issues of domestic relevance.   
The comparison of the qualitative content analysis findings strongly points to the fact 
that the National Alliance became distinctive with regards to its European approach 
compared to the other two parties under investigation.   
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Table 7.4 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance) 
5th and 6th Parliamentary Terms 
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
5th & 6th EP Terms  
EU related themes  
Reference to common European culture  2.15 
EP Rules and Procedures 3.45 
EU Transparency 0.75 
EU Border Controls 0.15 
EU Budget 0.1 
EU Bureaucracy 2.05 
EU Enlargement  3.4 
EU Health 4.1 
Euro and Stability pact 2.9 
EU Trade/Competition 6.25 
Employment policies  3.3 
Human Rights and the EU  3.65 
European social model 0.45 
Various European issues  3.8 
Various EU recommendations 8.8 
Various Criticisms 8.9 
EU in the world/Terrorism 16.9 
Democracy/Citizens/Institutions 7.15 
Support for EU cooperation 13.95 
Criticism of Prodi 1.4 
EU related themes sub-total 93.6 
  
Non-EU related themes  
Globalisation 1.7 
Domestic issues 4.05 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  5.75 
  
Total  ≈ 100% 
N=707 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
 
A comparison of the two EP legislative terms shows that the pattern is broadly similar 
between the two terms (see tables 7.5 and 7.6 below). The party’s preoccupation with 
the EU’s international role remained the same (16.9 per cent). The issue of democracy 
slightly dropped from 8.1 per cent to 6.2 per cent in the 5th and 6th terms respectively. 
Support for EU initiatives increased from 12.7 per cent during the 5th term to 15.2 per 
cent during the 6th.. EU criticisms dropped from 10.4 to 7.4 per cent. The issue of EU 
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trade and competition increased dramatically between the two terms from 2.6 to 9.9 per 
cent227.   
Table 7.5 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance) 
5th Parliamentary Term 
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
5th EP Term  
EU related themes  
Reference to common European culture  2.6 
EP Rules and Procedures 3.5 
EU Transparency 1.3 
EU Border Controls 0.3 
EU Budget 0 
EU Bureaucracy 3.2 
EU Enlargement  3.9 
EU Health 3.9 
Euro and Stability pact 2.6 
EU Trade/Competition 2.6 
Employment policies  2.9 
Human Rights and the EU  2.6 
European social model 0 
Various European issues  4.9 
Various EU recommendations 9.4 
Various Criticisms 10.4 
EU in the world/Terrorism 16.9 
Democracy/Citizens/Institutions 8.1 
Support for EU cooperation 12.7 
Criticism of Prodi 1.9 
EU related themes sub-total 93.7 
  
Non-EU related themes  
Globalisation 2.2 
Domestic issues 3.2 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  5.4 
  
Total  ≈ 100% 
N=306 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
 
                                                
227 Note that a simple word frequency MEPs total 493 speeches reveals a similar pattern, see 
Appendix IV.  
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Table 7.6 Salience of themes in EP speeches (National Alliance) 
6th Parliamentary Term 
 
Occurrence of themes in EP speeches Percentage
6th EP Term  
EU related themes  
Reference to common European culture  1.7 
EP Rules and Procedures 3.4 
EU Transparency 0.2 
EU Border Controls 0 
EU Budget 0.2 
EU Bureaucracy 0.9 
EU Enlargement  2.9 
EU Health 4.3 
Euro and Stability pact 3.2 
EU Trade/Competition 9.9 
Employment policies  3.7 
Human Rights and the EU  4.7 
European social model 0.9 
Various European issues  2.7 
Various EU recommendations 8.2 
Various Criticisms 7.4 
EU in the world/Terrorism 16.9 
Democracy/Citizens/Institutions 6.2 
Support for EU cooperation 15.2 
Criticism of Prodi 0.9 
EU related themes sub-total 93.5 
  
Non-EU related themes  
Globalisation 1.2 
Domestic issues 4.9 
Non-EU related themes sub-total  6.1 
  
Total  ≈ 100% 
N=401 occurrences of themes  
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
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7.3 The European issue as a tool for institutional entrenchment  
This section aims to analyse the ways in which the party’s choice to change its European 
policy from a relatively hard and critical position to one of ‘compromising’ 
Euroscepticism link to the party’s overall political strategy in its domestic party system. 
It argues that the party’s motivation for cartelisation stimulated its ‘compromising’ 
Euroscepticism and its leader used the latter as a tool for institutional entrenchment. A 
relatively positive EU stance provided the party and its leader with long-sought national 
and international legitimacy. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism became a political tool for 
its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-
right leaders abroad. The following section assesses the party’s strategy with reference 
to Fini’s role in the European Convention and a discussion of how the issue of Europe 
was associated with the party’s and its leader’s aim to be a central force in Italian 
politics. 
7.3.1 Fini’s role in the Convention on the Future of Europe  
The party’s second re-election in 2001 as part of the House of Freedoms electoral 
coalition revealed that the party’s reputation had to a large extent been rehabilitated. 
Fini’s appointment as the deputy Prime Minster in the 2001-2006 centre-right 
government signified the system’s acceptance of the party as a legitimate force in the 
Second Republic. However, although the party had strived to prove its move from the 
past and had become part of Italy’s mainstream politics by the beginning of 2000s, there 
was still a fear of ‘being chased back into the ghetto to which it had been confined for 
almost half a century prior to the early 1990s’ (Newell and Bull 2002: 635). Within this 
context, participation in the Convention for the Future of Europe provided the perfect 
opportunity for the party to establish its international standing and became a vehicle for 
the party’s institutional entrenchment in Italian politics.  
Fini accepted that participation in the European Convention as the ‘Representative of the 
Head of State of Italy’ was his own idea and that no one in the party or in the coalition 
convinced him to do so. ‘I said to Berlusconi: I am available to do this’ (interview with 
 230
Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 43)228. His argument behind this choice was that Giuliano 
Amato, a left-wing Italian politician, was appointed as the Vice-Chairman of the 
European Convention that would draft the new architecture of the Union. Fini felt that 
there was a need for the centre-right government to appoint its own Governmental 
Representative since this Convention ‘as it actually happened in the end - could have a 
historical role’ (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 42)229 . Fini attached 
importance to the Convention as he thought that it would have a great historical 
significance as it was ‘unique in its kind’ dealing with a vast range of issues (interview 
with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 43-44). There was, however, a personal aspect behind 
his choice to run for Italian Head of State Representative, namely ‘The desire to occupy 
myself with Community politics, which increasingly determine the choices of national 
politics’ (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 44)230. 
Participating in the high profile Convention for the Future of Europe provided Fini with 
the perfect opportunity to improve his status both within Italy and abroad. He presented 
himself not only as the representative of the National Alliance but also, and most 
importantly, as the main representative of Italy’s executive branch, thus assigning 
himself decision-making powers (interview with Fini in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 46)231. He 
marketed himself as ‘a leading actor of the Convention’s success’ (interview with Fini 
in Fini, Fusi et al. 2003: 46)232.  
The Convention was a high profile political arena where Fini could introduce himself to 
other European leaders and political elites. To liaise with them, Fini sought to portray 
himself, his party and the Italian government as like-minded as far as the future of 
Europe was concerned. This was a challenge in itself as the main party in the Italian 
governmental coalition and its President, have not been considered staunch pro-
Europeans (Conti 2009) and his own party has been divided on the European issue 
(Quaglia 2005: 285). Although Fini provided overall support for the EU’s Constitutional 
                                                
228 Original text: ‘Dissi al presidente Berlusconi: “Io sono disponibile a farlo”.’ 
229 Original text: ‘come poi in effetti è accaduto, avere un ruolo di portata storica’ 
230 Original text: ‘desiderio di cimentarmi con un tema come quello della politica comunitaria 
che sempre di più determina anche le scelte della politica nazionale’ 
231 Original text: ‘‘non rappresentavo la destra ma l’esecutivo del mio paese’’ 
232 Original text: ‘Fatto sta che alla fine il rappresentante del governo italiano è stato considerato 
uno dei protagonisti del buon esito della Convenzione’ 
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Charter, he put forward a number of amendments whose aim was safeguarding national 
sovereignty, avoiding the use of the word ‘federal’ and limiting EU institutions’ powers 
on the member states. He supported the inclusion of a reference on Europe’s Christian 
roots in the Constitution’s preamble and advocated the creation of a common defence 
policy (Di Quirico 2003: 32). His recommendations, however, were contradictory since 
a common European defence would run counter to the principle of safeguarding member 
states’ national institutions. Additionally, a reference to Christianity would fail to 
encourage Turkish EU accession.  
Notwithstanding the inherent contradiction between Fini’s enthusiastic contribution to 
the European Convention  on the one hand (Angelilli 2007) and his argument against a 
federal Europe on the other, representing Italy in the European Convention gave Fini 
status, prestige and credibility both domestically and abroad. Fini established 
international legitimacy for both himself and his party, which would be essential if he 
were to realise his desire to lead the centre-right in Italy. He boosted his standing in an 
international arena and managed to appear as a ‘statesman’ on the same footing with  his 
European counterparts.  
Fini’s behaviour as Italian Representative in the European Convention confirms his 
drive towards cartelisation. The theory of party cartelisation expects parties to broadly 
alter their behaviour in terms of their internal organisation and to project ‘an “ideology” 
of managerial competence’ (Blyth and Katz 2005: 45-46). In the Convention, Fini 
evidently achieved both. Notwithstanding internal criticisms, he put forward his ‘Euro-
realist’ views decreasing his dependence on the party on the ground and the party in 
central office. He also portrayed himself as a professional politician with strong 
experience in international relations, unlike other politicians from the ruling coalition 
and Berlusconi himself who had repeatedly made errors on the international stage (Di 
Quirico 2003: 23). In a cartel party, politics become de-politicised and party positions or 
leader comments are tailored towards avoiding controversy. Within the coalition Fini’s 
position on the maintenance of national sovereignty, his opposition to federalism, his 
Christian-centric stance and his insistence on a strong defence policy were appreciated. 
In this respect, Fini’s moves on the European arena can be seen as tactical in order to 
enhance the party’s weight within the government by appearing as the only force within 
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the coalition of strong international standing. His ‘modest commitment’ (Conti 2006: 
222) to the issue of European integration became a strategic tool geared to ultimately 
pay off at the domestic level.  
7.3.2 A leader central to the system  
Fini’s behaviour explained above may not be seen in isolation. It is a function of his 
own goals and the party’s interaction with the other parties domestically. The literature 
on the party acknowledges that Fini responds to opportunities offered by external 
circumstances (Fella 2006; Fella and Ruzza 2006). He has been called ‘A man of all 
seasons’ (Marsiglia 2005)233. In the 1990s, Fini utilised the opportunities provided by 
the break-up of the political system in order to reformulate his party and distance it from 
its discredited fascist past. In the 2000s, active pursuit of a leading role in Italian politics 
have motivated him to portray himself and the party as similar and close to other 
European conservative/centre-right parties, which reached its apogee with the Alliance’s 
inclusion in the European People’s Party following the 2009 European elections.  
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the party saw itself as a strong political force of 
the right central to the political system. ‘A party of the right that manages to ensure 
consensus also at the centre of the political spectrum by virtue of its ability of being 
central to major issues of political and social interest. The party is central but not 
centrist’ (National Alliance 2002: 13-14)234. Thus it projected an image of a party 
clearly drawing from a right-wing electorate which, by virtue of being central to Italian 
politics, can also find common ground with moderate Italian forces.  
The party’s European position and its leader’s role in the European convention became 
an important tool for the party’s institutional entrenchment in Italian politics. The 
European convention opened a window of opportunity for Fini’s political aspirations in 
the context of international disenchantment with Berlusconi. The President of the 
                                                
233 Original text: ‘Un uomo per tutte le stagioni’ 
234 Original text: ‘Un partito di destra che riesce ad attrarre consensi anche al centro dello 
schieramento politico, in virtù della sua capacità di essere centrale rispetto ai grandi temi di 
interesse politico e sociale. Per usare una formula ad effetto: centrali ma non centristi.’ 
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governmental coalition was discredited abroad (Newell and Bull 2002: 629) being under 
investigation for charges including tax evasion and bribery. Especially during the run up 
to the Italian 2001 elections the international press led by The Economist argued that 
‘Mr Berlusconi is not fit to lead the government of any country, least of all one of the 
world’s richest democracies.’ (Economist 2001a). A few days following the 2001 Italian 
elections, the same periodical pointed out that ‘to all but the wilfully uncritical, he 
stands for sleaze, if not outright criminality’ and that ‘the election of Mr Berlusconi as 
prime minister would mark a dark day for Italian democracy and the rule of law.’ 
(Economist 2001b).  
Although participation in the European Convention did not satisfy Fini’s ultimate quest 
for leadership, it did result in his appointment as Foreign Minister in 2004 and President 
of the Lower House in 2008. These roles attached to the party international political 
credibility and ultimately facilitated the party’s entry to the European People’s Party. 
‘The two years I spent working on the European Constitution and my mandate as 
Foreign Minister have demonstrated that the National Alliance has similar values to 
those of the European People’s Party’ (Fini 2008)235. Within this European family, the 
party could market itself as having a noteworthy role as it has played a significant part in 
the process of devising Europe’s architecture, a cause to which the European right has 
been devoted for decades.  
This great importance of the party was transposed to the national level where the party 
argued that it is fundamental to the Italian political system and democracy:  
‘The National Alliance has become a fundamental force not only in 
Italian politics but also of Italian democracy. This force is neither 
marginal nor can be marginalised. It was in fact decisive for the 
accomplishment of democracy, for the consolidation of bipolarity and 
the alternation of government. The National Alliance should now free 
itself from both the syndrome of and the temptation for isolation’ 
(National Alliance 2006a: 1)236. 
                                                
235 Original text: ‘I due anni in cui mi sono occupato della Costituzione europea e il mandato alla 
Farnesina hanno dimostrato con i fatti che An ha valori affini a quelli del Ppe’ 
236 Original text: ‘Alleanza Nazionale è diventata una forza fondamentale non solo della politica 
italiana, ma della democrazia italiana. Una forza non marginale né emarginabile. E' stata infatti 
determinante per la realizzazione della democrazia compiuta, per il consolidamento del 
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Fini managed to depoliticise the EU issue, show professionalism and use Europe as a 
platform to promote himself not only internationally but also nationally. His political 
credibility on the international stage ultimately paid off at the domestic level. He 
marketed his party as ‘belonging to one of the greatest families of European political 
tradition which has largely contributed to the European cause and will continue to do so’ 
(National Alliance 2004: 6)237.  
The National Alliance utilised the issue of Europe as a tool for political strengthening 
and institutional entrenchment at the domestic level. In 2006, post-European Convention 
and Fini’s appointment as Italian Foreign Minister, the party saw itself as the central 
force in the coalition ‘thinking, organising and operating as “party-pole”’ in the system 
(National Alliance 2006a: 2)238 having the ‘right and obligation to aspire to permanently 
become the central force of the coalition through […] its political and cultural project 
[…] from the point of view of a large national and popular party with European 
inspiration and credentials ’ (National Alliance 2006a: 2)239. In the run-up to the 2008 
national elections, Fini ‘did not exclude the possibility of running for Prime Minister’240 
(Fini 2007a), argued that an alternative system to that of the left is possible ‘with or 
without Berlusconi’ and that ‘I can reconstruct the centre-right. Even if I have to do this 
on my own’ (Fini 2007b)241. The reason for the two parties joining together into the 
People of Freedom in 2009 was to ‘establish a unitary party of the centre-right, the 
                                                                                                                                             
bipolarismo e dell'alternanza di governo. AN deve ora definitivamente liberarsi tanto dalla 
sindrome dell'isolamento, quanto, simmetricamente, dalla tentazione dell'isolamento.’ 
237 Original text: ‘La Destra italiana appartiene ad una delle grandi famiglie della tradizione 
politica europea, che ha già dato un forte contributo alla causa europeista e che continuerà a 
darlo.’ 
238 Original text: ‘Alleanza Nazionale deve pensarsi, strutturarsi ed operare come "partito ­ 
polo",’ 
239 Original text: ‘Alleanza Nazionale ha il diritto ­ dovere di coltivare l'ambizione di diventare, 
stabilmente, la forza centrale dell'alleanza attraverso […] il suo progetto politico ­ culturale 
[…]nell'ottica di un grande partito nazionale e popolare di ispirazione e respiro europeo’ 
240 Original text: ‘Non escludo di candidarmi premier’ 
241 Original text: ‘Ma un sistema di alleanza alternative di Pd è possibile, con o senza il 
demolitore’ and ‘Rifaccio io il centrodestra. Anche da solo’ 
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largest party in national history, the largest European party’ (National Alliance 2009: 
1)242. 
7.3.3 Fini: Il Futuro della Libertà 
The party leader’s quest for institutional entrenchment extends over the decade under 
investigation with the publication of his book in 2009 entitled ‘The Future of Freedom: 
Unsolicited advice to those born in 1989’. The book is inspired by the twenty year 
anniversary since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 as an event marking modern 
European history. It provided an opportunity for Fini to summarise his world vision and 
his ideas on the challenges Italy faces in an era of globalisation and European 
integration. In the book, Fini carefully avoids discussing his own political trajectory but 
nevertheless explains his ideas and vision. This is done in order to avoid contradicting 
his past. It is notable that the book is addressed to young people born in 1989 that have 
neither experienced Communism nor lived during the First Italian Republic and are 
presumably not aware of National Alliance’s and Fini’s fascist past. 
As the title implies, the book makes a projection into the future showing Fini’s political 
ambitions and objectives portraying himself as the ‘future of freedom’ and clearly 
demonstrating that he seeks to assume a guiding role in Italian politics. In this respect, 
the party’s ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism seems to have been a reaction to the 
prevailing political atmosphere of both mainstream political elites in Italy. It also 
contributed to Fini’s vision of becoming the leader of a strong right-wing force 
comparable to other European centre-right parties and himself appearing as a 
‘Statesman’ (see figure 7.1 below).  
                                                
242 Original text: ‘fondare il partito unitario di centrodestra, il più grande partito della storia 
nazionale, il più grande partito europeo’ 
 236
Figure 7.1 Cover page of Gianfranco Fini’s 1999 book entitled ‘The future of freedom: 
Unsolicited advice to those born in 1989’  
 
 
 
Fini discusses the process of European integration within the context of rising levels of 
immigration in Europe. The general tone is one of educating the young Italians with 
regards to the challenges confronted in both Italy and Europe calling them to become 
protagonists in their resolution. He argues that ‘Away from Europe, Italy would 
increasingly become an outsider with regards to the processes of modernisation and 
globalisation’ (Fini 2009: 136)243. His justification of popular opposition to the EU 
project lies in the gap between a bureaucratic Europe on the one hand and the Europe of 
the peoples on the other. He recommends the resumption of the discussion on the 
Continent’s identity and religious credentials. Consistent with the thesis’ findings above, 
he views the future of Europe as inextricably linked to the latter’s leading role in foreign 
policy and international relations (Fini 2009: 145).  
Fini’s initiative to author this monograph analysing his viewpoints can be seen as an 
attempt to resemble other successful Italian leaders. Left-wing Romano Prodi and 
                                                
243 Original text: ‘Lontana dall’Europa, l’Italia diventerebbe sempre più eccentrica rispetto ai 
processi della modernizzazione e della globalizzazione’ 
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Walter Veltone have published a number of books. In particular, Romano Prodi, 
published the book ‘An Idea of Europe’ [Un'idea dell'Europa] in 1999 before he became 
Commission President in 1999 in order to set out his European credentials and in 2008 
‘My vision of facts: Five years of government in Europe’ [La mia visione dei fatti: 
Cinque anni di governo in Europa] where he provided an account of his experience as 
Commission President. Silvio Berlusconi has also engaged in this type of political 
advertisement by authoring a number of books including ‘Towards the party of freedom: 
the identity, values and the project’ [Verso il partito della libertà : l’identità, i valori, il 
progetto] in 2006. Centre-right politicians abroad have also been an inspiration for Fini. 
Particularly, Nicolas Sarkozy who published in 2007 the monographs ‘Together’ 
[Ensemble] and ‘Testimony’ setting out his political views to the public regarding 
contemporary French politics as part of his electoral campaign.  
Conclusion 
The main objective of this chapter has been to examine in detail the third type of radical 
right Euroscepticism and explain the way in which it is associated with a party’s 
domestic agenda. To shed light on this Eurosceptic variant, the chapter has analysed the 
ideas, positions and political trajectory of the Italian National Alliance during the 1999-
2009 decade. The chapter has also closely examined the role of the party leader, 
Gianfranco Fini, in shaping the party’s strategic objectives and European policy.  
The argument presented in this chapter consists of three components. Following a 
discussion of the party’s transformation and re-branding from the neo-fascist MSI to the 
post-fascist conservative National Alliance, the chapter has argued that since the late 
1990s the latter pursued a strategy of institutional entrenchment within the domestic 
political and party system. The party’s strategy was ‘dismissive’ avoiding controversial 
statements or policies, its logic of competition was cartelisation/institutional 
entrenchment and its predominant goal was pursuit of office. It has proceeded with a 
detailed analysis of the party’s European position through the in-depth analysis of party 
programmatic literature and the qualitative content analysis of MEP plenary speeches 
during the 5th and 6th EP legislative terms. It is argued that the party had a cultural 
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understanding of Europe based on the latter’s Christian, ancient Roman and ancient 
Greek roots. the National Alliance supported the ‘principle’ of EU cooperation. Its 
vision of Europe resembled De Gaulle’s notion of a ‘Europe of fatherlands’ whereby 
integration would proceed in areas of mutual interest and European institutions would 
not have great powers over national institutions. Maintaining the national interest was of 
vital importance for the construction of the European architecture. One of the main 
criticisms against the EU was for suffering from a democratic deficit whereby decision-
making is distant from the people rendering European rules illegitimate. The party was 
in favour of a strong Europe in international affairs with Italy leading the way in a 
dynamic Europe assuming international responsibilities and inserting itself within the 
Franco-German axis. Finally, the chapter has argued that the party’s ‘compromising’ 
Euroscepticism must be seen through the prism of the party’s predominant strategy in 
the domestic party system. Modest support for Europe as well as its leader’s active 
participation in the European Convention for the Future of Europe became a vehicle for 
the party’s and the leader’s further institutional entrenchment in the national political 
system.  
The party’s EU rhetoric has experienced a two-stage transformation. As part of its 
modernisation process, the party used the European issue as a means of showing that it 
has shifted towards more consensual positions. In the 1990s, the party’s re-branding 
from the neo-fascist MSI to the post-fascist/conservative National Alliance resulted in 
the party softening its EU rhetoric. This, as argued elsewhere, can be seen as part of the 
party’s wider rehabilitation strategy during the Italian second republic.  From 1999 
onwards, the party’s EU position crystallised into ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism 
tailored as a type of positive ‘Euro-realism’. The party’s strategic logic was rooted in the 
dynamics of the domestic party system and inter-party competition.  
In its ultimate quest for office and international respectability, the party adopted a 
‘compromising’ position on Europe. It downplayed the European issue with a view to 
decreasing its salience and avoiding contestation on the matter. A shaky commitment 
towards the European project allowed the party to project an image of support similar to 
other centre-right/conservative parties in Europe ultimately boosting the party’s 
reputation both at the national and European levels. ‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism 
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became a political tool for its leader in his effort to appear as a statesman on an equal 
footing with other centre-right leaders abroad, which was seen as potentially increasing 
the probability of occupying a leading role within the Italian centre-right. The analysis 
of the Italian National Alliance has revealed that parties can ‘move boxes’ or 
‘categories’ in the typology of radical right Euroscepticism depending on what they 
perceive better at a given point in time for their national strategy. This is the last case 
study of the thesis giving further weight to the thesis’ overall argument that a party’s 
position on European integration may be strategically employed at the domestic level for 
party political purposes. The extent to which a party’s strategy is successful remains, 
however, outside the scope of this chapter.  
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 Chapter 8 Conclusion: Radical right opposition to European integration  
Introduction  
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome in 2007, 
the President of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, the President of the 
Council of the European Union, Angela Merkel, and the President of the European 
Commission, José Manuel Barroso, signed the Berlin Declaration. This two page 
document originally written in German reaffirmed European common ideals and 
principles. The document started with the pronouncement of European unity:  
‘For centuries Europe has been an idea, holding out hope of peace and 
understanding. That hope has been fulfilled. European unification has 
made peace and prosperity possible. It has brought about a sense of 
community and overcome differences. Each Member State has helped 
to unite Europe and to strengthen democracy and the rule of law. 
Thanks to the yearning for freedom of the peoples of Central and 
Eastern Europe the unnatural division of Europe is now consigned to 
the past. European integration shows that we have learnt the painful 
lessons of a history marked by bloody conflict. Today we live together 
as was never possible before. 
 
We, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better.’ 
(European Union 2007: 1).  
 
The 2007 Berlin Declaration pronounced Europe’s common goals publicly confirming 
the EU’s focus on the citizens, the workings of democracy, supportive cooperation, its 
wider influence in the world promoting freedom and development abroad. The notion of 
‘togetherness’ was prominent in the text, in particular, in the process of constructing a 
European model combining economic success and social responsibility for the wider 
prosperity of the region. The document honoured the progress of the European project 
emphasizing that it is not only an economic area but also a community of shared values. 
After a few paragraphs on these broader EU commitments, the document concluded:  
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‘we are united in our aim of placing the European Union on a renewed 
common basis before the European Parliament elections in 2009. For 
we know, Europe is our common future.’(European Union 2007: 2) 
 
This was an important document sponsored by the then German EU presidency and was 
issued following the failure of the ratification of the European Constitutional Treaty in a 
general environment of political uncertainty regarding the future of European 
integration. The declaration proclaimed the general premises of the EU project and 
reassured the European Institutions’ willingness to preserve the diversity of European 
identities, traditions, languages and cultures.  
Although the document’s main goal was to lend new momentum in Europe after a 
period of doubt and soul-searching, it did not avoid tension. The declaration was only 
signed by the presidents of the three major European institutions. Its explicit (written) 
endorsement by the leaders of EU member states was carefully avoided for fear of 
creating further acrimony. Additionally, there was widespread nervousness regarding 
the translation of the German word ‘Glück’, which means fortune or happiness in other 
language versions of the declaration. In particular, the German phrase ‘Wir Bürgerinnen 
und Bürger der Europäischen Union sind zu unserem Glück vereint’ was translated into 
English as ‘We, the citizens of the European Union, have united for the better’ rather 
than ‘for our happiness’ clearly avoiding the strong connotation of the selection of the 
German word ‘Glück’. This was referred to this as a ‘political’ translation in particular 
with regards to the Danish and English translations (EUobserver 2007).  
The above is solely an example demonstrating that there is no longer a clear and 
unconditional impetus for deepening European integration and promoting federalism. 
The 2000s have witnessed an increasing influence of critical discourse in the European 
public sphere indicating that Euroscepticism has not only ceased to be a marginal and 
ephemeral phenomenon, but has become fundamental to the process of European 
integration. Evidence for the above statement can be found in an analysis of the society 
(public opinion), its intermediaries (political parties) and its representatives (EU 
member state leaders).  
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The last decade has been characterised by popular antagonism towards European 
integration. The Irish rejection of the Nice Treaty in June 2001 was taken with surprise 
by both politicians and the media and did not result in any serious analysis of the 
reasons behind the Irish negative vote. In contrast, the French and Dutch voter rejection 
of the project for a European Constitution in 2005 had a profound effect on the process 
of European integration. Not only was the European Constitution sidelined and 
ultimately shelved, but also these two referenda marked a clear change in how the EU 
was portrayed in the hearts and minds of Europeans. The latter clearly passed a negative 
judgement on the European project. In the run-up to the EU's 50th Anniversary, a 
Financial Times opinion poll surveying adults in Britain, France, Germany, Italy and 
Spain found that 44 per cent of Europeans thought life has got worse since their country 
joined. A striking 22 per cent argued in favour of their country’s EU withdrawal (BBC 
2007). This clearly indicates that the ‘permissive consensus’ thesis has been refuted in 
the 2000s culminating in the negative outcome of the Irish referendum on the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2008.  
In addition to an increasingly negative public opinion, a growing presence of parties 
with a Eurosceptic agenda can be observed in both national Parliaments and the EP. 
Radical left and radical right parties constitute the main anti-European political forces 
that have persisted across time and space. The 2000s have also witnessed the 
perseverance of single-issue anti-EU parties such as the United Kingdom Independence 
Party (UKIP) and the creation of new parties including Libertas. UKIP is a strong 
Eurosceptic party consistently supporting Britain’s EU withdrawal since its 
establishment. In the 2009 EP elections, UKIP reached an impressive second position 
beating the ruling Labour party. Libertas was the first truly pan-European single-issue 
Eurosceptic political party officially ‘launched to fight “anti-democratic” Brussels’ 
(EUobserver 2008). Lastly, following the 2009 EP elections, the European 
Conservatives and Reformists were established, a new European Political Group with a 
clearly Eurosceptic and anti-federalist agenda comprising mainstream political forces 
with governmental status including the Polish Law and Justice Party and the British 
Conservatives.  
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Some EU member state political leaders have a clearly Eurosceptic agenda such as 
Václav Klaus, the President of the Czech Republic, who actively supported Declan 
Ganley, the head of Libertas, in his campaign for a No vote in the run-up to the Irish 
Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty. The Czech President actively delayed its ratification 
by refusing to sign the Lisbon Treaty as the Head of State of an EU member state. 
Following the Irish negative referendum he declared that ‘The Lisbon Treaty is dead’ 
(The Independent 2009). Other examples include Angela Merkel, the German 
Chancellor, asserting German interests during the European financial crisis and Nicolas 
Sarkozy, the President of the French Republic, adopting a unilateral and somewhat 
assertive approach towards the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia whilst holding 
the six-month EU rotating presidency.  
Member state disagreements with regards to the future of the EU and its influence in the 
world also became apparent during the appointment process of the first EU President 
and the selection of the EU’s ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy’. The selection of Herman van Rompuy and Catherine Ashton reiterated 
member state tensions over the EU’s governance and its international role. Particularly 
in the face of the financial crisis and domestic problems such as creating jobs and 
increasing national growth, the notion of a strong Europe has been sidelined revealing 
that widespread opposition to, doubt or reservation about the European project has 
become a structural factor of the latter.  
8.1 Domestic strategies and party system dynamics  
Against the background of a growing Eurosceptic influence in EU politics, this thesis 
has tackled one aspect of this phenomenon, in particular that of radical right opposition 
to European integration. Challenging the notion that parties belonging to the same party 
family take similar positions on European integration, it is argued that there are 
instances of different radical right political agendas to European integration. Given party 
family associations and ideological proximity, the expectation would be that radical 
right parties adopt similar positions on European integration. However, this study has 
revealed the variations in anti-European argumentation within the radical right and has 
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explained the latter with reference to party strategic behaviour within the context of 
domestic party competition. In brief, this thesis argues that the European issue is not a 
matter of ideology but, rather, of party interests at the domestic level.  
In particular, this study is informed by three inter-related questions, (1) how can we 
conceptualise the nature of radical right positions on the EU? (2) how do radical right 
parties respond to the issue of European integration? and (3) why do radical right parties 
oppose Europe to differing extents? Based on this research design, different European 
positions have constituted the dependent variable of the thesis. 
In answering these questions, this research project has provided a bridge between the 
literature on party behaviour, radical right parties and the study of Euroscepticism. At a 
conceptual level and building on the literature of party-based Euroscepticism, it is 
argued that radical right parties display three patterns of opposition to European 
integration. These are the ‘rejectionist’, the ‘conditional’ and the ‘compromising’ 
patterns. These three types have been constructed based on the identification of four 
facets of European integration, including the definition of Europe, the principle, the 
policy practice and the future building of a European polity.  
The aim of this framework has been to improve the academic understanding of radical 
right anti-EU argumentation and to systematise the analysis of its nuanced nature. In 
addition to this, the main finding, that radical right Euroscepticism can be 
conceptualised in terms of three patterns, points to the fact that the European issue is not 
assimilated into historical party ideological frameworks and long-standing party 
commitments on political agendas. The broader findings of the thesis point to the fact 
that traditional cleavage theory (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Marks and Wilson 2000) is 
unable to account for, or predict, different types of European argumentation within a 
specific party family.  
A party’s ideological background can be a broad predictor of general party trends in 
terms of their European argumentation. It can predict that radical right and radical left 
parties tend to oppose European integration whereas Socialist and Christian Democrat 
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parties are likely to support the EU project. When examining intra-party family 
differences, however, the value of this variable is rather weak. Other predictors of party-
based Euroscepticism, including the national context and party strategic objectives 
within the domestic party system may have stronger explanatory power. This is 
especially true for radical right parties. Given that nationalism is core to their ideology, 
their European position may be largely influenced by the national context. Based on 
this, the wider argument of the thesis is that party positions on Europe are related to the 
endogeneity of the party system and the dynamics of inter party competition. Party type 
and a party’s wider aims and objectives in the domestic party system determine its 
position on European integration. The particularities of the national context affect how a 
party will choose to discuss the European issue at home and to what extent it will choose 
to politicise it. Like others, radical right parties use the issue of Europe in their 
discursive toolkit for political purposes relevant to their domestic agenda. 
In particular, one of the main findings of this project is that radical right party response 
to Europe varies as a function of party type, which constitutes the main independent 
variable of this project. Parties belonging to the same family do not necessarily behave 
in the same manner. They have a number of tactics in their strategic toolkit, which they 
use depending on their aims and objectives within their domestic party system. The 
main three goals parties tend to pursue include policy, votes and office (Strom 1990). 
Without side-lining any of these goals, parties may prioritise one of them at a given 
point in time depending on which party type characteristics they predominantly feature.  
The thesis has put forward a framework for analysis of radical right Euroscepticism that 
views parties as strategic actors in their respective party systems. Party type largely 
influences the structure and content of a party’s domestic agenda, including its 
discursive strategy towards the European issue and its overall position on European 
integration. The three main hypotheses, largely confirmed throughout the thesis, 
differentiate party political behaviour and its influence on a party’s European stance 
based on whether a party is anti-system, seeks to have a catch-all appeal or strives to 
become part of the governing cartel.  
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8.1.1 Anti-system radical right parties and ‘rejectionist’ Euroscepticism  
Anti-system parties seek to undermine the legitimacy of the system within which they 
operate. This is because the core principles of such parties tend to be antithetical with 
the values of the regime. Thus opposition to the system becomes ‘opposition of 
principle’ rather than of issues (Sartori and Mair 2005: 118). The ultimate goal for these 
parties is to be noticed in the party system for their ‘difference’ from the totality of their 
systemic competitors.  
Radical right parties featuring strong anti-system elements adopt a European discourse 
antagonistic of European integration. Employing the French National Front as its case 
study, the thesis has shown that radical right anti-system parties criticise the EU in a 
holistic manner and use the issue of Europe in order to distinguish themselves politically 
from their competitors. This party type adheres to the idea of an imagined community 
(Keren 2000: 109) supporting policies unlikely to be implemented. It imagines an 
impossible reality and their reason for existence lies in trying to realise this ‘utopia’.  
Anti-system parties tend to adopt an adversarial strategy towards European integration, 
which is a position opposite to other parties in the domestic system. The empirical 
findings of the thesis reveal that adopting an adversarial strategy towards the European 
issue increases policy divergence and becomes a tool for differentiation in the national 
political context. A ‘rejectionist’ European position contributes towards the ultimate 
goal of polarising the debate and attracting the particular segment of the society 
sympathising with this type of non-conformist views. It becomes a strategic tool for the 
party in an effort to demonstrate to the electorate that it represents a different, powerful 
and independent actor in the party system. Such a hard anti-European position lends the 
party the ability to claim ownership of the European ‘issue’ portraying itself as the only 
solution to the problems that the society faces. 
An anti-system radical right party articulates its anti-European argumentation in a 
manner unique to its own worldview and dissimilar from all other parties. In the case of 
the French National Front, the EU has been connected to the wider issue of 
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globalisation. The EU is blamed for mediating the allegedly dramatic consequences of 
globalisation to the nation state.  
8.1.2 Catch-all radical right parties and ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism 
The catch-all party variant actively seeks to reduce its ideological differences from its 
main competitors (Kirchheimer 1966). In this party type, top leadership is strengthened 
de-emphasizing ‘specific social-class or denominational clientele’ (Müller 1992: 183). 
The party’s ultimate goal is to maximise its votes from among the population at large 
without targeting one particular segment of society. Its ideological make-up is rather 
versatile adapting to what is perceived to be close to the median voter. In this quest for 
vote-maximisation, the political charisma of its leader may be rather important. This is 
because the public is not expected to cast its vote on the basis of embedded social 
divisions and ideologies, but rather on trust on the party’s ability to contribute to the 
efficiency of the political system.  
Radical right parties attaching importance to these catch-all characteristics (as opposed 
to their anti-system elements) support European integration ‘under conditions’. The 
precise formulation of these conditions depends on the issues parties perceive to be 
close to the median voter in their respective party systems. Their position on European 
integration becomes yet another tool in their quest for vote-maximisation, which has the 
potential to ultimately lead to respectability and political entrenchment. To this aim, 
these parties avoid radicalising their discourse and seek to accommodate the European 
issue within debates that they perceive as being close to the citizens as a whole. They 
adopt an ‘accommodative’ discursive strategy towards European integration, which 
includes moderating their language on Europe enabling them to construct an image of 
closeness to and policy convergence with their mainstream competitors.  
The case study of the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally suggested that its ‘conditional’ 
Euroscepticism was akin to a marketing decision serving to differentiate the party from 
both the margins and the mainstream, and to demonstrate that it occupies the middle 
ground in Greek politics. The party has made a discursive choice to link the European 
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issue to that of Greek security concerns in order to appear as the sole ‘guardian’ of 
Greek national interests at the European level. These issues resonate well within Greek 
public opinion and are likely to produce higher electoral returns. 
8.1.3 Cartel radical right parties and ‘compromising’ Euroscepticism 
The cartel party type is ‘characterized by the interpenetration of party and state, and also 
by a pattern of inter-party collusion’ (Katz and Mair 1995: 17). According to this model, 
the relevant parties in the system tend to cooperate or ‘collude’ in order to gain 
privileged access to state regulated channels of communication. As such, this type of 
party becomes part of the state having access to state subventions both in government 
and in opposition. These parties engage in ‘limited’ inter-party competition, which 
‘takes place on the basis of competing claims to efficient and effective management’ 
(Katz and Mair 1995: 19). 
Radical right parties that actively seek to become part of the governing cartel have 
different incentives to the above two types. Seeing politics as a profession in itself, they 
seek to mitigate the consequences of party competition. In this respect, they are 
incentivised not to adopt controversial or strongly opposing positions. This type of 
radical right parties put forward a ‘compromising’ position on Europe. They adopt a 
dismissive strategy towards the EU whereby they tend to downplay the importance of 
the European issue at the domestic level and avoid openly debating or politicising it. 
Their criticisms focus on aspects of European integration rather than the European polity 
as a whole and are usually of a constructive character. A shaky commitment towards the 
European project allows a cartel radical right party to project an image of support 
similar to other mainstream centrist conservative parties in Europe ultimately boosting 
the party’s reputation both at the national and European levels.  
The case study of the Italian National Alliance revealed that the party’s conciliatory 
position on European integration is being used as part of its modernisation process. 
‘Compromising’ Euroscepticism became a political device for the party’s leader in his 
effort to appear as a statesman on an equal footing with other centre-right leaders 
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abroad, which is seen as potentially increasing the probability of occupying a leading 
role within the Italian centre-right. In its ultimate quest for office and international 
respectability, the party has employed the European issue as a tool for its institutional 
entrenchment and a potential leading role within the government.    
8.1.4 The importance of the national context in the parties’ discourse  
One of the main findings of this research project is that the national context becomes 
influential with regards to how a party chooses to debate and/or politicise the European 
issue at the domestic level. Parties do not discuss the European issue independently. 
Rather they tend to associate it with other issues that are of domestic relevance and 
previously integral to their discursive toolkit. Naturally these issues vary from one 
national context to another, and may be used in association with the European issue in 
order to enhance aspects of party domestic agenda. What this also tells us about the 
European issue as a whole is that unless it can be connected with an issue of domestic 
relevance, it bears limited significance in and by itself.   
Within the French National Front, the issue of Europe is inextricably connected to that 
of globalisation. The EU is seen as a type of regional globalisation. European 
integration, instead of protecting the European states from the dire consequences of 
globalisation, is seen as promoting those forces at regional/European level. It is often 
argued that the entire project is an American fabrication. The party’s anti-EU and anti-
globalisation positions enhance its differentiation from the mainstream and facilitate its 
attempt to portray itself as the only party in France providing a ‘unique’ solution to new 
issues and problems.  
The Popular Orthodox Rally’s position on European integration is linked to issues of 
Greek security, which are core to its national and European agenda. The party fears that 
a potential loss of Greek veto power at the EU level may result in a Greek inability to be 
the decision-maker at the European level on issues of great importance, including 
Cyprus and Turkey. The party’s ‘conditional’ Euroscepticism provides it with the 
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opportunity to criticise the other Greek national parties for not ‘uploading’ the Greek 
national interest with regards to foreign and security policies onto the European level. 
The Italian National Alliance associates the European project with a potential greater 
role for Italy on the international arena arguing that Italy should play a dynamic role in 
international relations through the EU. The party’s ‘compromising’ European 
argumentation is related to its foreign policy aspirations. The EU is seen as a vehicle to 
reconstruct the Italian image abroad. The National Alliance is in favour of a strong 
Europe in international affairs, with Italy leading the way in a dynamic Europe, 
assuming international responsibilities and inserting itself into the Franco-German axis. 
Italy should be the driving force within an increasingly important Europe at the world 
stage by conducting crisis management operations.  
8.2 The theme of time in the thesis  
In explaining radical right party divergent positions on European integration, this 
research project has adopted a party-centric strategic approach. The principal argument 
is that the manner in which parties respond to the EU is related to the dynamics of inter 
party competition and the parties’ wider agenda in the system. In this argument, the 
theme of time is very important, as party behaviour involves a dynamic element. Party 
strategies change over time as a function of party system dynamics. Parties change 
agendas and shift their positions over time. This depends on whether at a given point in 
time they prioritise a particular policy, vote-maximisation or entering the governing 
cartel as well as how they perceive their competitors in the domestic party system.  
The case study of the Italian National Alliance has revealed that parties can ‘move 
boxes’ or ‘categories’ in the typology of radical right Euroscepticism put forward in the 
thesis depending on what they perceive to be better at a given point in time for their 
national strategy. This is a case of a Eurosceptic changing its European position over 
time for instrumental and tactical purposes as part of its wider modernisation process 
from the neo-fascist MSI into the post-fascist National Alliance. From a relatively hard 
Eurosceptic position in the 1980s and early 1990s (Conti 2009: 206), the party moved 
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towards a more conciliatory view of European integration entailing modest support for 
the project. The MSI recognised the importance of co-operation at the European level 
but ‘never enthusiastically supported integration because of its fear of loss of national 
autonomy and independent decision-making’ (Kritzinger, Cavatorta et al. 2004: 958). 
From mid-1990s onwards, the party changed its European position in a dramatic way 
expressing a moderate –yet still sceptic– stance towards integration in line with De 
Gaulle’s notion of ‘Europe of fatherlands’ (Fella and Ruzza 2006: 190). The National 
Alliance has henceforth put forward a vision of a ‘confederal’ Europe of equal member 
states against a federal super state (see Chapter 7).  
The party has changed its European position as part of its transition from a neo-fascist 
anti-system party and within the context of the changing dynamics of the Italian party 
system following the collapse of Christian Democracy at the beginning of the 1990s. In 
this respect the argument works over time.  Rather than providing a static picture, it 
explains the dynamism of party positions within a framework of domestic constraints 
and illustrates how these shifting interests impact on parties’ EU position.  
8.3 Wider relevance of the thesis  
8.3.1 Broader contribution  
This thesis has provided a bridge between the literature on party behaviour, radical right 
parties and the study of Euroscepticism. It has sought to build on the literature on small 
party political behaviour as well as improve the academic understanding of the wider 
phenomenon of Euroscepticism through the examination of radical right party 
opposition to European integration. The identification of four fundamental aspects of 
European integration is geared towards providing a solution to the wider problem of 
measuring the dependent variable, i.e. different levels of Euroscepticism. Consistent 
with previous arguments according to which ‘the issue of European integration provides 
us with a powerful lens for illuminating new aspects of party competition’ (Szczerbiak 
and Taggart 2008a: 2), the thesis has shown the ways in which party positions on 
European integration and changes thereof are integral to party system dynamics and 
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inter-party competition. According to Szczerbiak and Taggart ‘those interested in 
European integration need to understand party competition in member and candidate 
states and those interested in political parties need to understand the nature of the 
European issue’ (Szczerbiak and Taggart 2008a: 2). This project has provided insights 
into how different structures of party competition across European countries impact on 
the European issue dimension. 
The thesis has also conducted a systematic comparison of radical right party policies and 
preferences across the European space. This has contributed to a more rigorous 
understanding of the radical right, provided insights into ‘the boundedness’ of this party 
family as well as ‘how some issues are emphasised in some settings but not in others, or 
some others are prioritised by some types of parties but not others’ (Treschel and Mair 
2009: 2). It has contributed to the development of an explanatory framework of different 
levels of Euroscepticism within party families by linking a party’s position on European 
integration to its principle aims and objectives within its domestic party system. In an 
age of wider popular de-alignment and post-materialist tendencies, party stances are 
more likely to be associated with their wider interests at the national level rather than 
entrenched and somewhat ‘outdated’ political ideologies. This is especially true with 
regards to right-wing radical parties as their ideology is often influenced by the national 
context.  
8.3.2 Generalisability of the model  
This thesis has put forward a framework of analysing party-based Euroscepticism in 
terms of three patterns and an explanation of parties belonging to each pattern as a 
function of party competition. Although the proposed model is by no means universal, a 
further analysis of other party families’ European positions could be instrumental in 
illustrating its wider applicability. 
This model of analysis can also be extended to other party families including, among 
others, the conservatives and the communists. This however, is true with a caveat. The 
definition of Europe may need to be refined in order to apply to other party families. For 
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instance, whereas the European conservatives have –similarly to the radical right– a 
cultural definition of Europe, parties with a communist ideology tend mostly to define 
Europe as a geographical space employing a particular type of economic model, that of 
Western capitalism.  
A short study of parties belonging to the above party families reveals that the framework 
of Euroscepticism has the potential to be widely applicable and is relevant to our 
understanding of other party families’ European positions (see table 8.1 below).  
Table 8.1 Wider applicability of the framework of Euroscepticism  
 
 Conservatives Communists  
European Position    
Rejectionist UK Independence party Greek Communist Party 
Conditional  Movement for France French Communist Party  
Compromising  Dutch Christian Union Progressive Party of Working People 
 
 
With regards to the Conservatives, the three parties above share broad conservative 
ideological features including support for law and order, social stability, family values 
and the preservation of national culture. They stress the significance of an organic 
society, preferring continuity rather than change, attach importance to private property 
and are highly nationalistic. Certainly, the importance of religion features much more 
prominently in the agenda of the Dutch Christian Union. These three parties are also 
small in terms of size and broadly share the same levels of electoral success. Although 
the above parties share broad ideological characteristics, they have adopted dissimilar 
positions on European integration. More precisely, UKIP supports British withdrawal 
arguing that the EU holds Britain back in the world and is alien to the British political 
system. The French Movement for France only supports a ‘multiple-speed’ Europe of 
the nations contending that European integration impacts on member states’ 
sovereignty. Decision-making must be intergovernmental among European states 
cooperating freely. The Dutch Christian Union adopts a milder attitude compared to the 
other two parties. It opposes a federal Europe maintaining that more policies should be 
dealt with at the national level creating a power balance between the EU and its member 
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states. It nevertheless accepts the current EU framework and is willing to reform the 
system from within.  
As far as the communist party family is concerned, the Greek, French and Cypriot 
parties broadly share the principles of communist ideology. They all adhere to a 
Marxist-Leninist analysis of the society and the economy. Class is rather important in 
their ideological toolkit arguing that workers should be given more rights and that 
capitalism must be contained. Whereas both the French and Greek Communist Parties 
are rather small in size and electoral success, the Cypriot Progressive Party of Working 
People (AKEL) has progressively become rather large and electorally successful. Its 
General Secretary, Dimitris Christofias, was elected as President of the Republic of 
Cyprus in 2008 and was the President of the House of Representatives from 2001 to 
2008. These three Communist Parties have adopted rather dissimilar European positions. 
The Greek Communist Party openly advocates Greek withdrawal from the EU equating 
the latter to capitalist forces exploiting the working class. The French Communist Party 
does not support French EU withdrawal. It accepts that European states should 
cooperate but the EU is associated with a neo-liberal free market economic model alien 
to the French ‘socialist’ tradition. It would support the EU under the ‘condition’ that the 
latter would adopt a more socialist outlook. Lastly, AKEL has come to terms with the 
fact that Cyprus’ future is inextricably linked to European integration and as a result has 
supported the country’s EU entry. The party has accepted to play by the ‘rules of the 
game’ viewing participation in the EU structures as an opportunity to assert the 
communist view of a social Europe against neo-liberalism.  
The ‘rejectionist’ approach to European integration of both UKIP and the Greek 
Communist Party is integral to both parties’ anti-systemic elements. They both advocate 
a political system largely dissimilar to the current British and Greek systems; their 
discourse seems to draw resources from an idealist perspective of their respective 
polities. The French Communist Party, in sharp contrast to the above two parties, has 
discarded its anti-system credentials adhering to the principles of the workings of the 
French ‘system’ especially following its participation in Mitterand’s government at the 
beginning of the 1980s. The Movement for France is a conservative splinter party 
founded by Philippe de Villiers who defected from the French centre-right on the issue 
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of the Maastricht Treaty. The party has often co-operated with and openly supported the 
policies of the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement and the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy. These two parties appear unable to adopt a hard position on Europe as 
a result of their position in the party system. In this respect, a ‘conditional’ Eurosceptic 
stance becomes a function of their wider aim of integrating in the political system. The 
‘compromising’ position on European integration of both the Dutch Christian Union and 
the Cypriot AKEL can be seen as related to their office-seeking/cartel aspirations. Both 
parties have participated in government with a high-status role. The Dutch Christian 
Union occupied the prestigious position of Defence Minister in the Cabinet Balkenende 
IV. Following the 2009 elections, the party left the smallish Independence and 
Democracy Group in order to join the new European Conservative and Reformists EP 
group led by large and successful parties including the British Conservatives and the 
Polish Law and Justice Party.  
8.4 Directions for future research  
Building on the above suggestions regarding the wider applicability of this study’s 
analytical model and theoretical argument, future research may be directed towards 
conducting a systematic analysis of European positions of other party families and the 
ways in which these relate to party strategies within the context of party system 
dynamics. Therefore, a rigorous analysis of other party families’ European positions has 
the potential of being highly informative with regards to both among and within party 
family differences. The above section has solely given a rough indication of how the 
thesis’ argument may apply to communist and conservative parties. Further research is 
needed, however, to answer the question for instance of ‘why have some communist 
parties retained their Marxist-Leninist rhetoric whereby the EU is rejected as an 
‘accomplice’ to global capitalism whereas others have decided to participate in the 
project and try to ‘change it from within’? 
It would be interesting to examine what issues parties connect to the European issue and 
whether a pattern exists either among or within party families. Are some issues 
emphasised more in some contexts or by some types of parties rather than others? For 
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instance, two out of the three case studies of the thesis have linked the European issue to 
an aspect of their national foreign and security policy. It would be elucidating to assess 
whether this connection is mostly predominant in the parties of the right or whether in 
some shape or form it exists within the parties of the left. Europe, being outside of the 
domestic arena, by definition belongs to the realm of a nation-state’s foreign policy. In 
this respect, since radical right parties focus on the nation’s territorial integrity, it is not 
very surprising to note that the Greek Popular Orthodox Rally and the Italian National 
Alliance view Europe within this wider foreign policy agenda. However, it may be the 
case that national foreign policy is also of increasing importance within other party 
families. Building on this, it would also be useful to see whether this connection only 
exists in parties that do not have an anti-system character. The author’s expectation is 
that anti-system parties, either on the left or on the right-wing side of the political 
spectrum, are likely to connect the European issue with globalisation and its dire 
consequences with regards to openness of either social or economic borders. On the 
other hand, during an age of increasing European influence on domestic politics and 
policy-making, parties prioritising office or votes at the domestic level are likely to 
connect Europe to a criticism of a mostly practical character rather than one concerning 
the ‘polity’.  
Furthermore, the model for analysing Euroscepticism based on four indicators, including 
definition, principle, practice and future may also be extended to measure other novel 
issue dimensions such as the environment. Conceptually, a party’s position on 
environmental change may be measured as a function of whether the party 
supports/rejects the principle of cooperation on environmental issues; whether it 
supports the current legal ‘practice’ of various treaties and conventions regulating the 
interaction of humans and their natural environment; and the ‘future’ governing of 
environmental practice.  
Future research may also be directed towards collecting further primary source material. 
Although there is no evidence to suggest that the thesis’ interpretation of radical right 
Euroscepticism is distorted because of lack of material, it would be highly useful to 
conduct more interviews, especially in the case of the National Alliance. Additionally, 
evidence provided in this study is inevitably limited with regards to ‘key’ politicians’ 
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motives and preferences. Collecting evidence from party rank-and-file members could 
allow the researcher to compare and contrast whether there exists a difference of opinion 
on Europe between the party in central office and the party in public office on the one 
hand and the party on the ground on the other. Research has thus far shown that party 
elite positions tend to be less rigid compared to those of the party members and that 
there may be a divergence between party members and their elected representatives 
(Bochel and Denver 1983; Panebianco 1988). It would be thus interesting to see whether 
party members tend to adopt a more negative position on European integration 
compared to elected politicians. Thus far research has hinted that the leader of the Italian 
National Alliance tends to proceed in decision-making without fully consulting the party 
as a whole (Fella 2006; Ruzza and Fella 2009). It would thus be rather informative to 
see whether Fini’s participation in the Convention for the Future of Europe was an act 
endorsed by party members. Or whether, by contrast, Fini went beyond the wishes of 
party members in order to increase his party’s and his own personal status abroad. An 
analysis of the National Front members’ positions on Europe has the potential to show 
whether Jean Marie Le Pen’s inflexibility towards the EU project is matched by the 
rank-and-file elements of the party. Particularly during an age of international and 
European interconnectedness, what the National Front is proposing seems to be an 
unlikely scenario that may or may not be shared by party members.  
Lastly, it would be instructive to assess the extent to which domestic mainstream parties 
influence radical right positions on European integration; in particular whether the direct 
party competition with their main party rivals on the right has some bearing on their 
Euroscepticism. In the three case studies of this research project, the European positions 
of the national mainstream centre-right political forces vary to some extent. The 
National Front may be responding to a somewhat Eurosceptic Gaullist strategy whereas 
the ‘accommodating’ stance of the Popular Orthodox Rally may be couched with 
reference to a historically pro-European New Democracy. This was broadly the 
conclusion of the spatial analysis conducted in Chapter 4, which showed that the Greek 
Popular Orthodox Rally is situated comparatively closer to the centre-right New 
Democracy. Lastly, Fini’s consensual but constantly shifting ‘compromising’ position 
may be a function of Berlusconi’s inconsistent approach to Europe. In an age of waning 
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ideologies, it becomes increasingly important to study party system interactions and how 
these impact on wider party positioning.  
Conclusion  
In theory, right-wing radicalism and European integration are incompatible. Radical 
right ideology consists of interconnected ideas professing a commitment to the nation, 
authoritarian values and anti-elitism. The EU’s supranational institutions serve ‘to 
undermine constructs and values, such as the nation-state, national identity, state 
sovereignty, deeply embedded roots and national belonging’ (Hainsworth 2008: 82). In 
addition, the EU as a system also defined by its policies has a liberal –as opposed to 
authoritarian– character having taken a concrete stance on issues including European 
citizenship and access to rights, pluralistic decision-making structures, cultural tolerance 
and social inclusiveness demonstrated for instance by the Charter of Fundamental 
Human Rights. However, rather interestingly, radical right parties do not oppose 
European integration to the same extent. In fact, their strategies towards Europe are 
dissimilar and have been ‘governed by different national considerations’ (Featherstone 
1988: 339).  
This thesis has shown that radical right parties politicise the European issue in a 
different manner despite their broad similarities and commitment to cross-national 
radical right ideological features. Parties put forward a different argumentation with 
regards to the European issue conditional upon party type and the national context 
within which they operate. Moreover, radical right parties oppose Europe to differing 
extents and for reasons constitutive of their political environment. This research project 
views these parties’ dissimilar stance on the European project through the prism of 
different party competition dynamics within each political system.  
These findings suggest that, in understanding both the process of European integration 
and the driving forces of party-based Euroscepticism, one needs to consider the national 
context. Radical right parties contest Europe differently based on the dynamics of their 
domestic environment. It becomes increasingly problematic ‘to talk in universal terms 
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about a single contest over European integration’ (Taggart 2006: 20). The way in which 
each party utilises the European issue in its discourse seems to increasingly become 
‘independent’ from the EU system itself. It is couched instead within its overall strategy 
in the domestic party system. This disparate response seems to be formulated as part of 
each party’s response to the electoral competition dilemma (Kitschelt 1999) that 
winning office, gaining votes or pushing for a particular policy may involve altering 
their European position. This finding has important implications for the EU. In the 
presence of parties using the European issue for party political purposes integral to their 
national context, various EU strategies to involve Europeans, including the European 
Citizens’ Initiative introducing a new form of public participation, may prove to be 
largely ineffective.  
More generally, and with regards to the study of European Politics, this thesis points to 
the fact that it is rather hard to understand the process of European integration and the 
various occurrences of support for, or opposition to, the project without unpacking the 
domestic politics of each member state and the patterns of party competition within the 
different European political systems. Concurrently, students of Comparative Politics 
increasingly need to consider the process of European integration in their analysis. 
Given that the EU’s capacity has reached 27 members to date and the EU institutions are 
increasingly growing, this exercise is becoming ever more challenging for the student of 
both European and Comparative politics. This research project can thus be seen as a step 
towards the greater analysis of the interaction between the EU and the national level.   
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List of appendices  
 
Appendix 1: Raw data for each party 
 
European Election Study estimates  
Party LR Gen (-100 to +100) Pro-Anti EU (-100 to +100) 
Danish People’s Party -3.78 -37.84 
National Front                   2.12 -46.56 
Northern League           -3.19 -3.62 
Popular Orthodox Rally            13.51 -9.19 
British National Party      -1.09 -44.57 
National Union Attack   -23.68 -15.79 
For Fatherland and Freedom    2.38 11.90 
Flemish Block                  -3.73 -5.69 
Austrian Freedom Party -1.05 -26.32 
 
Chapel Hill estimates  
Party Name  LR 
General 
(0 to 10) 
Left Right 
Economics 
(0 to 10) 
Gal/Tan  
(0 to 10) 
Pro-Anti 
EU  
(1 to 10) 
Flemish Block                  9.67 7.13 9.50 3.57 
Danish People’s Party 7.67 4.75 7.63 3.32 
Popular Orthodox Rally            9.11 5.33 9.63 3.40 
National Front                   10.00 6.63 9.25 1.00 
National Alliance  8.00 5.43 8.88 6.78 
Northern League           8.71 8.14 8.75 2.14 
Austrian Freedom Party 9.67 4.83 9.67 2.50 
National Union Attack   5.46 3.25 9.17 3.51 
For Fatherland and Freedom    9.00 7.75 8.50 6.78 
League of Polish Families        9.29 1.17 10.00 1.97 
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Appendix II: Results from the computerised content analysis  
FRANCE  
 
France: Pro – Anti European integration dimension 
Party Name Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
FN 3.7500 0.1427     0.1559     -0.1690   0.4544244   95.1 
UMP 3.9067 4.6656     0.2026      4.2604    5.0708      94.9 
UDF/MoDem 3.9555 6.0764     0.2304      5.6155    6.5372      95.9 
PS 3.9329 5.4218     0.2251      4.9716    5.8720       96.3 
VERTS 3.8759 3.7758     0.1028    3.5702    3.9813      94.9 
PCF 3.8557 3.1945     0.1610      2.8725    3.5165    96.7 
 
France: Libertarian – Authoritarian dimension   
Party Name Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
FN 4.9053 9.6207 0.2077 9.2054   10.0360 95.1 
UMP 4.7271 4.6536 0.2680 4.1176    5.1896 94.9 
UDF/MoDem 4.7276 4.6667 0.3094 4.0480    5.2855 95.9 
PS 4.7089 4.1474 0.2918 3.5637    4.7311 96.3 
VERTS 4.5849 0.6915 0.1400 0.4114    0.9715 94.9 
PCF 4.7251 4.5990 0.2101 4.1788    5.0191 96.7 
 
France: Socialist – Capitalist dimension   
Party Name Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
FN 4.1804 8.1505 0.1724 7.8057     8.4953 95.1 
UMP 4.0753 5.0503 0.2469 4.5566     5.5441 94.9 
UDF/MoDem 4.0751 5.0453 0.2840 4.4772     5.6134 95.9 
PS 4.0181 3.3645 0.2762 2.8121     3.9168 96.3 
VERTS 3.9536 1.4609 0.1199 1.2210     1.7007 94.9 
PCF 3.9439 1.1748 0.2084 0.7580     1.5917 96.7 
 
France: General Left – Right dimension 
Party Name Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
FN 4.9924 11.0744 0.2243 10.6258 11.5231 95.1 
UMP 4.7524 5.0547 0.2919 4.4709    5.6385 94.9 
UDF/MoDem 4.7489 4.9676 0.3354 4.2969    5.6384 95.9 
PS 4.6959 3.6389 0.3250 2.9889    4.2889 96.3 
VERTS 4.6181 1.6872 0.1477 1.3919    1.9826 94.9 
PCF 4.6312 2.0159 0.2451 1.5257    2.5060 96.7 
 
                                                
244 Note that confidence interval includes the value of zero. This however, is not a problem for 
this statistical analysis as the confidence interval does not convey the results of a t-test. In the 
example above, we know that the transformed score is close to the value of zero.  
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GREECE  
 
Greece: Pro – Anti European integration dimension  
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
LAOS 3.9805  4.1363 0.0800 3.9762 4.2963 100.0 
ND 3.9813  4.4027 0.0807 4.2414 4.5641 99.9 
PASOK 3.9910  7.7182 0.2145 7.2892 8.1473 99.1 
SYN 3.9778  3.1990 0.1104 2.9782 3.4199 100.0 
KKE 3.9697  0.4440 0.1980 0.0480 0.8400 100.0 
 
Greece: Libertarian – Authoritarian dimension   
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
LAOS 4.9419 7.1781 0.0684 7.0413 7.3150 92.9 
ND 4.6842 4.2048 0.0651 4.0745 4.3351 92.1 
PASOK 4.3038 -0.1829 0.0585 -0.2999 -0.0659 85.0 
SYN 4.7433 4.8865 0.0974 4.6917 5.0814 92.9 
KKE 4.9752 7.5618 0.0970 7.3678 7.7557 93.0 
 
Greece: Socialist – Capitalist dimension   
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
LAOS 3.4263  5.5406 0.0521 5.4364 5.6448 92.9 
ND 3.4915  6.2011 0.0514 6.0984 6.3038 92.1 
PASOK 3.1951  3.1978 0.0466 3.1047 3.2909 85.0 
SYN 3.0644  1.8735 0.0822 1.7091 2.0380 92.9 
KKE 2.7967  -0.8390 0.1081 -1.0552 -0.6229 93.0 
 
Greece: General Left – Right dimension  
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
LAOS 4.1481  7.8198 0.0769 7.6660 7.9736 92.9 
ND 4.0569  6.7411 0.0683 6.6045 6.8777 92.1 
PASOK 3.7245  2.8087 0.0600 2.6888 2.9287 85.0 
SYN 3.7143  2.6888 0.1145 2.4599 2.9177 92.9 
KKE 3.4014 -1.0131 0.1523 -1.3178 -0.7084 93.0 
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ITALY 
 
Italy: Pro – Anti European integration dimension  
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
Left 
Coalition 4.1439 5.2360 0.0309 5.1742 5.2978 95.5 
IdV 3.7945 0.6420 0.3760 -0.1100 1.3941 86.9 
UDC 4.1709 5.5910 0.1525 5.2860 5.8959 95.3 
Right 
Coalition  4.1703 5.5843 0.1006 5.3831 5.7854 95.5 
LN 3.9903 3.2166 0.0614 3.0938 3.3394 93.8 
 
Italy: Libertarian – Authoritarian dimension   
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
Left 
Coalition 4.9420 6.1132 0.0668 5.9797 6.2468 95.5 
IdV 4.5940 -0.3838 0.7560 -1.8958 1.1281 86.9 
UDC 4.9340 5.9632 0.3288 5.3056 6.6208 95.3 
Right 
Coalition  4.9881 6.9736 0.2167 6.5403 7.4070 95.5 
LN 4.9205 5.7124 0.1295 5.4534 5.9715 93.8 
 
Italy: Socialist – Capitalist dimension   
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
Left 
Coalition 4.6082 5.6596 0.0803 5.4989 5.8203 95.5 
IdV 4.3111 -0.8309 0.9099 -2.6506 0.9889 86.9 
UDC 4.6082 5.6597 0.3992 4.8614 6.4580 95.3 
Right 
Coalition  4.6767 7.1544 0.2644 6.6255 7.6832 95.5 
LN 4.5847 5.1461 0.1536 4.8390 5.4532 93.8 
 
Italy: General Left – Right dimension  
Party 
Name 
Raw 
Score  
Transformed 
score 
Transformed 
SE 
95% 
Confidence 
interval  
% of Total 
Words 
Scored 
Left 
Coalition 4.7315 5.8079 0.0641 5.6797 5.9362 95.5 
IdV 4.4037 -0.4016 0.7365 -1.8745 1.0713 86.9 
UDC 4.7211 5.6093 0.3155 4.9783 6.2404 95.3 
Right 
Coalition  4.7783 6.6928 0.2097 6.2734 7.1122 95.5 
LN 4.7232 5.6492 0.1255 5.3981 5.9003 93.8 
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Appendix III: Content analysis of MEP speeches  
 
In order to compare MEP speeches across the three case studies, the thesis has employed 
the research tradition of content analysis. This is a technique for compressing large 
amounts of text into categories in a systematic manner. It is a way to provide a 
quantitative description of an otherwise long text. Content analysis is an ‘empirically 
grounded method, exploratory in process, and predictive or inferential in intent’ 
(Krippendorff 2004: xvii) used to make valid and replicable inferences from texts. It 
provides an indication of the salience or the absence of specific key 
issues/characteristics in a text but the inferences drawn from the analysis are context-
dependent. This method is inherently quantitative. Its purpose is to ‘identify and count 
the occurrence of specific characteristics of dimensions of texts, and through this, to be 
able to say something about the messages, images, representations of such texts and 
their wider significance’ (Anders 1998). Since this type of analysis is ‘useful for 
examining trends and patterns in documents’ (Stemler 2001), it has been adopted for the 
purpose of processing MEP speeches.  
The two main approaches to content analysis are emergent versus a priori coding 
(Stemler 2001) or inductive versus deductive (Elo and Kyngs 2008) or conventional 
versus directed (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) coding. On the one hand, inductive or 
emergent or conventional content analysis is used when the main aim of the study is to 
describe a phenomenon (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1279), particularly in cases where 
literature is scarce. On the other hand, a priori or deductive or directed content analysis 
is preferred when ‘existing theory or prior research exists about a phenomenon’ (Hsieh 
and Shannon 2005: 1281) and is rather useful when testing an existing theory (Elo and 
Kyngs 2008). Practically, one of the main differences between the two approaches to 
content analysis lies in the identification of key concepts or variables relevant to the 
analysis. Key themes are identified during the analysis in the first approach whereas 
before the analysis in the latter approach.  
The choice of the specific type of approach depends on ‘the theoretical and substantive 
interests of the researcher’ (Hsieh and Shannon 2005: 1277). Given that (1) the purpose 
of the analysis of MEP speeches is largely exploratory and descriptive; and that (2) to 
the knowledge of the researcher this type of analysis has not been previously conducted, 
the thesis follows the conventional approach to content analysis in the study of MEP 
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speeches. As a result of this methodological choice, the categories of themes vary across 
cases. This enables the researcher to compare and contrast the occurrence of themes as 
well as the relative salience or absence of themes across cases.  
In this research, the main unit of analysis is MEP speeches. These have been found in a 
text from on the EP’s online archives at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/.  The analysis 
produced words and phrases into semantic categories, namely groups of  content sharing 
a commonality, which are both internally homogenous and externally heterogeneous 
(Graneheim and Lundman 2004: 107). In defining and creating descriptive 
constructs/categories, the author has identified the recurring themes within each speech 
by order of appearance. More than one themes may occur within one speech. The 
analysis has focused on the manifest content of each speech, i.e. the visible and obvious 
components of the speech. It has, additionally, concentrated on the latent content of each 
speech, which involves ‘an interpretation of the underlying meaning of the text’ 
(Graneheim and Lundman 2004: 106). Thus in interpreting the content of the speeches, 
the analysis has sought to establish whether the references were of a positive or of a 
negative character aiming to describe how each party’s MEPs approach the wider 
phenomenon of European integration in their speeches.  
This method produced a set of proportions which constitute the primary findings in 
terms of the centrality of issues in MEP speeches. The findings are represented in the 
form of percentages, with the latter representing the ratio of occurrences of a particular 
category. The data have been organised and coded manually by the researcher using 
NVIVO, a data analysis software.  
This analysis has been complemented by a simple word frequency count in order to test 
whether the author’s findings in terms of occurrence of themes paint a similar picture to 
the occurrence of words within the speeches. It must be pointed out, however, that some 
words carry multiple meanings and thus the results from the word frequency count must 
be treated with caution.  
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Appendix IV: National Front Presidential Election Results  
 
Year of Presidential Elections Votes Percentage 
1974 190,921 0.7 
1981* - - 
1988 4,376,742 14.4 
1995 4,570,838 15 
2002 (1st round) 4,804,772 16.86 
2002 (2nd round) 5,525,034 17.79 
2007 3,834,530 10.44 
Source: French Ministry of the Interior at http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/ (2002 & 2007) 
and  http://electionresources.org/ (1974, 1988 & 1995) 
*In 1981, the National Front’s leader did not attain the 500 signatures of elected 
representatives required to run for the Presidency  
 
 
Appendix V: Frequency of words matrix (French National Front) 
 
Words  Frequency  
Immigration  479 
Liberal 193 
Borders 220 
Competition  164 
Customs (douane & 
tarif) 
105 & 31  
Bolkestein Directive  24 
Agriculture  138 
Schengen 47 
Enlargement  49 
Turkey  156 
Russia  48 
European Constitution  65 
Chirac 46 
Sarkozy  44 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
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Appendix VI: LAOS Electoral Results  
 
LAOS’ National Election Results 
Year of Elections Votes Percentage Seats 
2004 162.103 2.19 0 
2007 271,809 3.80 10 
2009 386,152 5.63 15 
Source: Greek Home Affairs Ministry (www.ypes.gr) 
 
LAOS’ European Parliament Election Results 
Year of Elections Votes Percentage Seats 
2004 252.429 4,12 1 
2009 366,637 7.15 2 
Source: Greek Home Affairs Ministry (www.ypes.gr) 
 
 
Appendix VII: The sociology of LAOS’ voters  
 
Employment Status of LAOS voters – 2009 EP elections 
 
Employment Status of LAOS voters Percentage
Employer/Business person 14 
Self-employed/Farmer 2 
Self-employed/Free professional 15 
Self-employed/Craftsman 7 
Public sector employee 10 
Private sector employee 9 
Unemployed 13 
Housewife 3 
Public sector pensioner 5 
Private sector pensioner 5 
Private landlord 13 
Source: VPRC 2009 EP elections Exit Poll  
 
Education level of LAOS voters 
 
Education level Percentage
Primary 5 
Secondary 8 
Higher 9 
Source: VPRC 2009 EP elections Exit Poll  
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Age of LAOS voters 
 
Age Bracket  Percentage
18-24 2
25-34 11
35-44 9
45-54 9
55-64 5
65 + 5
Source: VPRC 2009 EP elections Exit Poll  
 
 
Appendix VIII: Frequency of words matrix (Greek Popular Orthodox Rally) 
 
Words  Frequency  
Immigration  10 
Liberal 0 
European Constitution  11 
Competition  3 
Customs 0 
Bolkestein Directive  1 
Agriculture  5 
Schengen 3 
Enlargement  4 
Turkey  88 
Cyprus 34 
FYROM (Skopje & 
Macedonia) 
16 
Borders 21 
Russia  32 
USA 38 
Globalisation  12 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations)  
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Appendix IX: Frequency of words matrix (Italian National Alliance) 
 
Words  Frequency  
Immigration  81 
Transparency  30 
Borders 4 
Competition 34 
Trade 54 
Agriculture  24 
Schengen 4 
Enlargement  37 
Cooperation  65 
Constitution  45 
Prodi  36 
Human rights  70 
Citizens  325 
Foreign policy & 
global 
33 & 35 
Health  86 
Source: EP online archives (author’s calculations) 
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Appendix X: List of interviewees  
 
French National Front   
 
1. Bruno Gollnisch – February 18th 2009 (executive vice-President and MEP) 
2. Lydia Schenardi – October 29th 2009 ((Member of the political office and former 
MEP) 
3. Thibaut de la Tocnaye – February 3rd 2010 (Member of the political office)  
4. Wallerand de Saint Just – February 4th 2010 (Treasurer) 
5. Jean Pierre Reveau – February 5th 2010 (Member of the political office)  
6. Catherine Salagnac – February 5th 2010 (Member of the political office)  
7. Dominique Martin – February 18th 2010 (Member of the political office) 
8. Ludovic de Danne – March 5th 2010 (National Front consultant and Paris 
regional elections candidate)  
 
Greek Popular Orthodox Rally  
 
1. Asterios Rontoulis, April 8th 2009 (MP) 
2. Alexandros Chrisanthakopoulos – April 8th 2009 (MP post-2009 Legislative 
elections) 
3. Elias Polatidis, April 8th 2009 (MP) 
4. Makis Voridis – April 10th 2009 (General Secretary of LAOS’ Parliamentary 
Team, MP) 
5. Georgios Georgiou, April 13th 2009 (MEP 2007-2009) 
6. Spyridon-Adonis Georgiadis, June 12th 2009 (MP)  
7. Costantinos Aivaliotis, April 13th 2009 (MP) 
 
 
Italian National Alliance   
 
1. Christiana Muscardini – November 18th 2009 (MEP) 
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